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THE STANHOPE ESSAY
1900.

CHARLES III OF SPAIN

JOSEPH ADDISON

OXFORD

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
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Charles the Third of Spain.

CHARLES THE THIRD OF SPAIN

THE STANHOPE ESSAY, 1900

BY

JOSEPH ADDISON

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COMMONER OF MAGDALEN COLLEGE, OXFORD

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1900

Spanish of all Spanish monarchs, Philip II., is mysterious.

Charles III. was more lucky. We have a highly valuable contemporary description, which gives us the one true insight into his character.¹ His correspondence is voluminous and complete; yet we have no "Life of Charles III." worthy of the man. It is generally acknowledged that his reign was a brilliant attempt to vindicate Spanish history. Above this little is known: the man has remained shrouded in a thick veil of mystery. The truth is, he was not a hero: he had none of those qualities which go to make a great man, good or bad. One now and then wishes he partook less of the prig. As his life was seemingly interesting only in so far as it was bound up with political events, his personality was forgotten. Thus, in the heat of controversial opinion, he has been too much praised and too much blamed. Even in our times the great mass of the Spanish nation is by no means unanimous, and there are those who think that, by departing from the old traditional Spanish policy and shaking himself free from ecclesiastical tyranny, he hastened the decay of his kingdom. From a study of his life, we learn to respect him. His career is singularly free from any blot. Both as man and king he did his best: if he was no genius he was at least an honest well intentioned man, who, placed in a high position, performed his duty with integrity. His life offers one peculiarity: it is throughout of one piece, and not one link in the chain can be missed. His reforms in Spain were the natural outcome of his former training, of a long reforming reign in Naples under the influence of Tanucci. The

¹ Conde de Fernan Nuñez *Compendio Historico de la Vida de Carlos III.*

absence in him of any of the characteristic Spanish fanaticism is due to his early removal from Spanish life and long sojourn in a priest-ridden land. He came back to his native land a complete foreigner, with ideas, sentiments and habits strange and even distasteful to the large majority of his subjects.

The eldest son of Elizabeth Farnese, he was born on the 20th of January, 1716, between three and four of the morning: a robust and handsome infant, said the official Gazette.¹ The usual ceremonial was observed at his birth, but there was no particular stir: merely one more infant was the feeling; yet his birth was a political event of the highest importance. His parents are known to us. Philip V. shy, timid, superstitious, with a Bourbon love of finery and display, irresolute and always susceptible to the influence of a stronger mind. He was exceedingly fond of his wife, but his affection was egotistic and due to his uxorious propensities. All his life he felt the necessity of a petticoat to which he could cling. His weak nature made him a puppet in the hands of his masculine second wife, and until his death he remained tied to her apron strings. We may dismiss him with no further comment.²

Our interest is centred upon the extraordinary woman who really governed Spain for over thirty years. Elizabeth Farnese should have been born a man. High spirited and ambitious, she had definite political aims and a resourceful diplomacy. From the first she had carefully set herself to study the King's disposition; by flattering his vanity and never leaving him alone for

¹ *Gaceta de Madrid*, January 21, 1716.

² For both Philip and Elizabeth see Ed. Drumont *Papiers inédits de St. Simon* (Ambassade d'Espagne) and Armstrong *Elizabeth Farnese*.

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CHARLES III. OF SPAIN.

I.

No foreign historical personage, of those who deserve to be remembered, is so little studied and known as Charles III., and yet in some ways he is the most sympathetic figure in the annals of Spain, and, with Henry IV. of France, the most deserving Bourbon monarch. The undeserved neglect which has been his portion is largely due to the want of that precision and definiteness without which no interest can be awakened. The difficulty of dealing with most historical subjects lies in the dimness that time imparts to all events, when men and actions come down to us strained through many men's minds of everything personal or precise; not as contemporaries saw them, but as the fancy of subsequent ages has pictured them. This is particularly the case in Spanish history. The flattery of contemporaries, the want of a spirit of criticism, the grave punctilious character of the Spanish nobility, did not tend to foster a disposition to intelligent criticism or just description. Thus, while the great figures in the histories of other countries stand out in sharp and well-defined outlines, the Spanish monarch escapes us: we see Henry IV. of France, Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, as if they were standing before us; but we do *not* see Charles V., and the most

Spanish of all Spanish monarchs, Philip II., is mysterious.

Charles III. was more lucky. We have a highly valuable contemporary description, which gives us the one true insight into his character.¹ His correspondence is voluminous and complete; yet we have no "Life of Charles III." worthy of the man. It is generally acknowledged that his reign was a brilliant attempt to vindicate Spanish history. Above this little is known: the man has remained shrouded in a thick veil of mystery. The truth is, he was not a hero: he had none of those qualities which go to make a great man, good or bad. One now and then wishes he partook less of the prig. As his life was seemingly interesting only in so far as it was bound up with political events, his personality was forgotten. Thus, in the heat of controversial opinion, he has been too much praised and too much blamed. Even in our times the great mass of the Spanish nation is by no means unanimous, and there are those who think that, by departing from the old traditional Spanish policy and shaking himself free from ecclesiastical tyranny, he hastened the decay of his kingdom. From a study of his life, we learn to respect him. His career is singularly free from any blot. Both as man and king he did his best: if he was no genius he was at least an honest well intentioned man, who, placed in a high position, performed his duty with integrity. His life offers one peculiarity: it is throughout of one piece, and not one link in the chain can be missed. His reforms in Spain were the natural outcome of his former training, of a long reforming reign in Naples under the influence of Tanucci. The

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one minute, she acquired over him a mastery none the less complete because it was concealed. To gain her end she submitted to a life of boredom. Her natural abilities had never been trained by education. Thus she lacked one of the requisites of success in politics—the power of overlooking details and taking a broad view of the situation. Her policy was shortsighted and prejudicial to the true interests of Spain. She never, however, studied the interests of her husband's kingdom: she was a thorough Italian in heart and ambitions. While Philip was to some extent a victim of religious mania, Elizabeth, though sincerely pious, was never tortured with scruples of conscience. Hers was a vigorous mind in a healthy body.¹ When we have said that Carlos united in his person the characteristic traits of Philip and Elizabeth, we shall at once divine him to be what he was, a strange blending of seemingly contradictory qualities. He took more after his mother: he had her qualities and her defects; the same obstinacy, the same desire to be about and doing, the same inability to take wide views; but he had also a strong strain of the Bourbon character—that tendency to melancholy which pervaded Philip V. and drove Ferdinand VI. to his grave, troubled him all his life, and he was only saved by the other side of his character, the energy inherited from his mother. Obstinate as he was, he would have his moments of weakness and would yield suddenly to opposition.

As yet, however, Carlos is in the arms of his

¹ Elizabeth, managed her husband on pretty much the same lines as Queen Caroline influenced George II. The comparison was often made: e.g.

You may strut, dapper George, but 'twill all be in vain.
We know 'tis Queen Caroline, not you that reign,
You govern no more than Don Philip of Spain, etc.

nurse¹ and the unconscious object of much scheming; for if his birth in itself bore no particular meaning—since there seemed but a slight chance of succession to the throne²—the political events to which it furnished a motive were of the highest importance and had an effect on Spanish history which it would be difficult to over-rate. Elizabeth Farnese, as a good Italian,³ could not view with favour the supremacy of the Emperor in her native land. The first opportunity that offered itself—a European war, or danger on the Turkish side—would, it was clear, find Spanish troops in Italy to carry out her great scheme. The birth of a son stimulated her zeal. She was throughout her life a good mother: her pride and affection were hurt at the thought that her son was born to no patrimony and she determined to carve for him a principality in Italy, where she herself had reasonable claims. The history of Spain from the year of Carlos' birth to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle may be summed up in one line—"the successful attempt of Elizabeth Farnese to establish her sons in Italy."

To accomplish her purpose was not easy. The Treaty of Utrecht had expressly excluded Spain from the Italian Peninsula, and any attempt to break through it would be sure to meet with a general resistance. Elizabeth could not act alone. The natural alliance would have been with France; but Philip's claim to the French crown and foolish dislike of the Regent precluded all possibility of agreement. For a time alliance with England was in the air,—guarantee of Italian appanage for Carlos in return for the boycotting of the

¹ The Marquesa de Montehermosa.

² There were three half-brothers in the way: one died in 1719: the other two preceded him on the throne and died s.p.

³ Armstrong 50.

Pretender and other things. Bubb was a partisan of this scheme.¹ But the Treaty of Westminster between George I. and Kaiser Karl put an end to Anglo-Spanish friendship,² while the Regent was driven by Philip's obstinacy into the enemy's camp.³ Thus Spain was left isolated.

It is not the purpose of this essay to enter into a detailed relation of the battles, treaties, alliances, leagues and congresses that led up to the Treaty of Seville and the triumph of Elizabeth. The attempt of Spain to act by herself ended in failure. As was to be anticipated, the invasion of Sardinia and Sicily provoked a coalition: the refusal of Alberoni to accept the terms proposed by England and France led to the Quadruple Alliance and general hostilities. The nascent Spanish fleet was utterly destroyed at Cape Passaro; a French army crossed the frontier; Lord Cobham took and sacked Vigo; the Emperor, freed from the Turkish war, sent an army into Sicily, and by the autumn of 1719 the Spaniards held little more than Palermo and Castel Vetrano.⁴ All the wild schemes of

¹ "His Majesty is already guarantee of the Neutrality of Italy; if he will go one step farther and be guarantee for the estates of the Duke of Tuscany to the Queen and her heirs, I am of opinion that he might obtain very ample conditions, at the head of which I consider the guarantee of the Crown in His Majesty's Royal Family, and of the Barrier Treaty I thought upon this particular thing, because we shall thereby so highly oblige the Queen (whose son is the 4th Prince of Spain and can pretend to nothing from the succession to this crown) that I doubt not but that in time His Majesty will be as much considered here and much more below'd than ever the French were."—Bubb to Stanhope, 19th Feb., 1716.

² George I. desired the extension of the electorate and could not afford to quarrel with the Emperor.

³ France was not anxious to fight Spain, and the Regent even offered through the Duke of Parma to help Spain, provided his succession to the French throne was recognised. This Philip refused.

⁴ Armstrong 121.

Alberoni to provoke risings in France and England and to arm the North failed ignominiously. A storm destroyed the fleet destined to convey the Pretender to England;¹ the conspiracy of Cellamare was nipped in the bud; the unexpected death of Charles XII. destroyed all hope of a Northern coalition.

The result of these events was the dismissal of Alberoni and the accession of Philip to the Quadruple Alliance. It was clear Spain must come to terms. The first condition imposed by the Powers was the dismissal of the ambitious Minister. The war was not of his doing;² he laboured to show the King that it was imperative to give in. He was, however, made the scapegoat: abroad he was feared; in Spain the King disliked him, the nobility hated him, his services were overlooked, his mistakes enlarged. He left the Peninsula, and with him went the energy and vigour of the country. It is not superfluous to insist on Alberoni: his place in the history of Spain is larger than his short term of office and political bankruptcy would seem to indicate. During his brief tenure he did wonders: the very terror his name inspired is no small recommendation. In some respects he is the true predecessor of Charles III.: he recognised the great truth that Spain should be a maritime and colonial power.³ Those who wished the Spanish nation to remain in its usual state of lethargy did well to insist on his disgrace.

¹ Two frigates reached Kintail with 300 Spanish troops: they were joined by 1700 Highlanders, but were easily broken up by General Wightman.

² Alberoni told Nancré he should like to hear that the Spaniards had lost 10,000 men: this alone would bring the King to think of peace before Cape Passaro, Alberoni told Lord Stanhope that he was not the author of the war: it should cease.—Armstrong 113.

³ Ibid.

By the Quadruple Alliance, Tuscany and Parma were recognised as fiefs of the Empire: baby Carlos was to succeed in case the Emperor had no male children. The arrangement was eminently unsatisfactory. The succession to Tuscany and Parma was one of those concessions which would have to be won by force of arms, when the time came. The acknowledgment that they were fiefs of the Empire gave a loophole for quibbles, as subsequent events did not fail to prove. The French and English Governments began to perceive that they had fought the Emperor's battles to their own detriment: the possession of the Two Sicilies by a Great Power was a danger to the French navy and prejudicial to English commercial interests. On the other hand, each year of life to Louis XV., as he grew up to strength and manhood, removed the prospect of succession to the French throne. It was rumoured that the Emperor was trying to draw Spain away from France and England.¹ Under the sense of a common antagonism to the Empire and of the necessity of support in the coming Congress, France and Spain concluded the treaty of the Buen Retiro to "secure more effectually to one of the sons of the Queen of Spain the right of succession to the Duchies."² The Treaty was to be cemented by a treble marriage.³

The accession of England to this alliance brought into conflict irreconcilable interests. In all their dealings with England, the one dominant idea of the Spanish Government was the restitution of Gibraltar.

¹ Armstrong 131.

² Danvila *Reinado de Carlos III.*, vol. i. pp. 21, 22.

³ Louis XV. to marry Philip's daughter: the Prince of Asturias and Carlos to marry respectively Mesdemoiselles de Montpensier and de Beaujolais, the Regent's two daughters.

The Regent had bound himself by the Treaty to use his good offices to that purpose, and it is curious to note that George I. and his ministry were not unwilling to give the place up.¹ The very idea, however, would have put the nation in a flame; and, in the face of public opinion, the Ministry receded from their promise.

The Congress dragged on, "drinking champagne in Ramillies wigs and arranging comedies for itself,"² until, on the return of Elizabeth to power, after the death of Luis I., the death of the Regent and the lukewarm support to Don Carlos' cause given by the French at the Congress occasioned a sudden change of front. The alliance with France and England had brought no result, while it was becoming clear that without the Emperor's goodwill no peaceful establishment of Carlos in Italy was possible. The letters of investiture had been sent, but very grudgingly, and, with the saving clause of the Emperor's "superiority," whatever that might mean.³ In Vienna there was a great willingness to come to terms, for the friendship of Elizabeth was imperative for the success of Imperial schemes in Italy.⁴

The idea of alliance with the Empire found an ardent supporter in Ripperda, the new favourite. He won over Elizabeth to his views, and towards the end of 1724 he was sent to Vienna. Small progress, however, was being made in the negotiations, when suddenly the French put a match to the mine and caused

¹ George I. had made a conditional promise to restore it in 1715 and again expressed his willingness to do so in a letter to Philip V. in 1721 (vide Lecky *Hist. Eng.*, vol. ii. p. 408).

² Carlyle *Frederick*, vol. ii. p. 83.

³ Danvila i. 23. 24.

⁴ Armstrong 173: there was also the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, which document had just been made public, and the advantage of Spanish friendship to the Ostend Company.

the Alliance of Vienna to burst upon an astonished world.¹ Five treaties were required to settle all pending questions. The two sovereigns mutually renounced their claims to each other's estates: Philip guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, and transferred to the Ostend Company the privileges hitherto enjoyed by French and English; the Emperor gave up the succession of Tuscany, Parma and Piacenza to Carlos, and promised to support Philip in his demand for the restitution of Gibraltar. The marriage of Carlos to Maria Theresa was in the air; in short, a complete upheaval of European balance—a return to the old Spanish policy, based on hostility to France and England.² It was hardly to be expected that the threatened powers would remain inactive; and the answer to the alliance was the League of Hanover, by which England, France, Prussia, Holland, Sweden and Denmark combined. Frederick William was allured by the prospect of being allowed to carve for himself what he could—Silesia, if possible.³ The alarm caused by the League occasioned the fifth treaty by which Carlos was elevated to the position of would-be husband to Maria Theresa, with election to the Empire. His brother Don Philip was also to get an archduchess, with a slice of Italy. The Emperor pledged himself to offensive activity with regard to Gibraltar, and a general European war seemed imminent, but

¹ The French Court suddenly announced their intention of sending back the Infanta: her extreme youth was no doubt a reason, but Ripperda's mission had become known, and the Spanish Court was believed (as was indeed the case) to be contemplating the rupture of Carlos' marriage to Mademoiselle de Beaujolais. (Armstrong 177). Ripperda's instructions were to negotiate the marriage of Carlos to the eldest archduchess with election to the Empire. (Danvila i. 32. 33).

² Danvila i. 34. 35. Armstrong 186. 187.

³ Carlyle *Frederick*, ii. 84.

it all ended in talk and another grave assembly of peri-wigs. Frederick William was bribed by the Emperor to the Treaty of Wusterhausen; the imperial advocate at Madrid, Ripperda, boastful and indiscreet, was dismissed. The Emperor, who had thought Spain, with her gold, would prove an excellent milch-cow, was disappointed—subsidies were so few, while the Spaniards complained that too much was being sent to Vienna. Nobody but Elizabeth wanted to fight, and she was unable to excite war; the siege of Gibraltar was a ridiculous affair, and ended in nothing.

The Emperor and his foes, weary of quarrelling, soon signed preliminaries of peace (May, 1727). All disputes were referred to a Congress, a dignified way of shelving questions without loss of reputation. Elizabeth, after a year's sulking, gave in and signed. The Congress met at Soissons; but there was little to discuss, since the Emperor had agreed to satisfy the Italian ambitions of the Queen of Spain and had promised to abolish the Ostend Company. The Pragmatic Sanction was produced, however, by the Imperial envoys, and every other question was subordinated to the attainment of guarantees to this important document: so, while the Emperor, as Carlyle says, stood there "mule-like,"¹ Fleury concluded behind his back what must always be considered one of the greatest triumphs of French diplomacy.²

The Treaty of Seville marks the triumph of Elizabeth and the début of Carlos. The Kaiser did not give

¹ Carlyle *Frederick*, ii. 176. Karl VI. also refused to give Maria Theresa to Carlos (Drumont *Instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France—Naples*, p. 54): he had succeeded in marrying the Duke of Parma so as to remove the probability of Carlos' succession (Lafuente *Historia General de España*, parte III. libro vi. p. 95).

² Vide Lecky, vol. i. p. 412.

in gracefully; he blustered, collected an army, seized the Duchy of Parma on the death of the Duke (1731), but was pacified by the adhesion of Walpole to the Pragmatic Sanction.¹ The second Treaty of Vienna was the Kaiser's acknowledgment of necessity,² and the end of the year 1731 saw Carlos on his way to Italy and manhood.

Now that our Carlos is, so to speak, on the threshold of public life, it would be interesting to go back and trace his childhood step by step, to observe the influences around him, the games he played, the lessons he learnt, and to see how far the man may be discerned in the child. Information is however most scanty, and in its absence we must imagine the young prince leading the ordinary life of an infant of the period, playing his part in the dull routine of the court, and occasionally accompanying his parents upon those slaughtering expeditions which went by the name of "royal shooting parties."³ His health was good, and except for a mild attack of the measles in 1722⁴ and a slight indisposition the following year,⁵ he escaped all those illnesses common to childhood and which, in an age when the most elementary rules of medicine and sanity were unknown, played havoc with the highest families. During the fifteen years of strife, while his mother had been fighting for his future establishment, the baby had grown

¹ Vide Lecky, ii. 413.

² Drumont says the *second* Treaty of Vienna was between Carlos and the Emperor in 1732 (p. 55), but the *second* Treaty was really between England and the Emperor (6th March, 1731,) and before Carlos went to Italy (vide Lafuente iii. vi. 115—118).

³ Vide *Gaceta de Madrid*, 1 December, 1722.

⁴ Ibid 6 January, 1722.

⁵ Ibid 27 April, 1723. In a letter to his mother he says "ma santé se rétablit tous les jours, grâces à Dieu" (*Archivo Histórico Nacional* 2706).

into a sturdy youth. At the time of the French Alliance the project had been mooted of sending him to Italy at once, to be there educated as an Italian prince; but St. Simon threw cold water on the plan, and his childhood was undisturbed. His education was not neglected: he spoke French, and could write the jargon which in foreign courts went by that name; Italian he was familiar with; a fair smattering of History and Geography, enough knowledge of "military art" to enable him to cut a figure in a camp, completed his curriculum.¹ There is one phase of his character which is striking and pleasing to dwell upon—his great and genuine affection for his mother. He had, indeed, a sympathetic nature and an earnest desire to please those he loved. Through the stiff style of his baby letters, dictated by Convention and the French tutor, in those protestations of devotion to their Majesties we discern the ring of true affection, and his subsequent conduct proves that they were no vain words.² On the eve of his departure from Spain, he presents the not unpleasant picture of a healthy, well-formed, fairly intelligent youth, desirous to please and anxious to succeed.³

¹ Danvila i. 14: Ferrer del Rio i. 193. 194: all his early correspondence with his parents is in French.

² See *Arch. Hist. Nac.* 2706. . . . "je prie Dieu pour cela que V.V.M.M. jouissent de la plus parfaite santé et qu' Elles trouvent toujours en moy un fils et un sujet selon leur cœur" (Carlos to his parents, 10 September, 1722) . . . "J'ay regardé comme une nouvelle marque de la tendresse de V.V.M.M. la part qu' Elles veulent bien prendre à mes progrès dans les études; j'en profiteray, de mon mieux en tachant de m'appliquer, car je veux me rendre digne de leurs bontés, d'où dépot mon bonheur" (Carlos to his parents, 21 July, 1723).

³ Beccattini thus describes him: "se hallaba el Infante en la edad de diez y seis años, joven de una presencia agradable, vivo y de unos modales graciosos y atractivos" (*Vida de Carlos* III. vol. i. pp. 71. 72).

With the Treaty of Vienna we pass at once from guesswork to facts, supplied by the general history of the time and his own quaint letters. His journey to Italy was one long pleasure trip of shooting parties, dinners, receptions, reviews, masquerades and fireworks;¹ the Spanish nobility flocked to kiss hands as he passed on; his reception in France was most cordial; at Antibes the Grand Prior presented him with a sword from the French king.² But it was in Italy that enthusiasm ran highest; an enormous crowd greeted him at Leghorn, and rejoicing and popular festivities went on for several days.³ The sentiment was spontaneous and natural: Carlos came embodying a principle, independence from the hated Imperial rule, the yearning of Italians for national existence, if not as one great people, at least in separate communities: the Tuscans had no desire to become part of the Empire.⁴

A slight touch of smallpox detained him in Leghorn for over a month: from thence he went to Florence (22 February), and in October proceeded to Parma.

¹ See his correspondence with his parents, *Arch. Hist. Nac.* 2649: the following will stand for a specimen . . . "ce matin j'ay allé á la batu ou j'ay tires un cerfe du quelle je envoi a vostre M un pied et le fillet; cette apres diné ceus de Linares on fait une feste de novillos assez jolie; le cerf était asez gros, il avait neuf points, et dans la batu on a vu plus de trant entre cerfes et sangliers et il fait asez frais de sorte qu'il faut que nous metions des justocorps de dra" (from *la Penuela*, 29 October, 1731).

² Carlos to his parents, 19th December, 1731 (*A.H.N.* 2649).

³ Vide his correspondence passim (*A.H.N.* 2649).

⁴ The Grand Duke of Tuscany did not want Carlos to be his successor (*Lafuente* iii. vi. 119), he made however a virtue of necessity; he and his sister received Carlos amiably. (Beccattini i. 78. 79). . . . pour ce qui apartien, a ce que vos M.M. me demandent si l'Electrice me recoy aveque une véritable amitié a ce que j'ay a comprendre jusque . . . ilme paroît qu'elle me recoy aveque amitié et il me paroît ausi que les Florentins m'ayment ausi (Carlos to his parents from Florence, 3 May, 1732. *A.H.N.* 2649).

These duchies, however, were not to be, after all, the scene of his labours, and the ever watchful activity and ambition of his mother were soon to provide him with the title of king and a wider field of action.

The Emperor had been taken unawares by the Treaty of Seville; his hand had been suddenly forced, and the establishment of Carlos was being backed by other nations and smacked of defiance to imperial authority. Under the circumstances, it was clear he would seek his revenge. There were many ways in which, without open hostilities, he could vex the Spanish Court and keep the question open. Elizabeth seemed to be meditating further conquests, for she was arming with all possible vigour and causing much uneasiness.¹ The French and Spanish Governments were drawing closer: an understanding was delayed because at first the object of Spain's hostility was Austria, while France thought only of war with England. Questions, however, of small interests, but wounding to Spanish pride, did away with any pro-English sentiments at Madrid, and by the end of 1732 alliance with France was being seriously discussed.² All through that year the general state of Europe was one of nervous apprehension, the air being full of mysteries and diplomatic intrigues. But for the Oran expedition, hostilities might have broken out sooner; meanwhile, Governments were busily sounding dispositions and distinguishing between friend and foe. It was felt that another struggle was necessary to settle the Italian problem.

In Italy Carlos had perhaps not acted with all requisite prudence. The Florentine Senate recognised

¹ The Sardinian Ambassador thought it might mean attack on Sardinia: the English grew nervous for Gibraltar.

² Armstrong 286.

his title without waiting for the Imperial investiture. The proceedings were annulled at Vienna, and the Dowager Duchess of Parma was instructed not to confirm that duchy to Carlos without the imperial sanction; yet, notwithstanding, Carlos took possession of Parma and Piacenza in October.¹ This open defiance made hostilities nearly inevitable. England mediated between Madrid and Vienna; and a compromise was suggested, by which the Emperor was to grant the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany to Carlos, who was in turn to recognise himself vassal of the Emperor.

Affairs being in this condition, the death of the King of Poland provided the necessary excuse for another war and the satisfaction of Elizabeth Farnese's ambitions. She had now in view the conquest of the Two Sicilies for her son Carlos and the establishment of his brother Philip in the duchies. France gained over Savoy; and the first Family Compact was signed (28 October, 1733). The allied powers had for object—(1) the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy; (2) the cession of the Milanese to Piedmont; the whole to become the kingdom of Lombardy; (3) the settlement of Carlos on the throne of the Two Sicilies and the cession of the duchies to his brother Phillip.²

The allies were completely successful. While the Franco-Piedmontese army expelled the Austrians from the Milanese, Carlos, at the head of a Spanish army, advanced against Naples. The conquest proved to be a mere pleasure trip, for hardly any resistance was offered to the invaders: the allied armies in the rear defeated all Austrian reinforcements. The two imperial

¹ Danvila i. 74. Lafuente III. vi. 135. 136.

² With other clauses. See *Instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France—Naples*, ed. Drumont, 55.

generals, Traun and Carraffa, were divided in opinion, the former being for avoiding any open resistance and waiting for help, while the second thought a battle should be risked: Traun got his own way. The fortresses were strongly garrisoned, and Carlos was allowed to pursue his route unmolested. On the appearance of a Spanish fleet before Naples the Neapolitans rose in rebellion, and the Viceroy was obliged to run away. At Aversa Carlos was met by deputies from Naples, who came to offer him the keys of the city, and on the 10th May he made a triumphal entry into the capital.

The foolishness of dividing up the Imperial forces was at once apparent. Montemar was sent into the province of Bari and utterly defeated the army at Bitonto, and nothing remained for the garrisons of the various fortified places but starvation or surrender. The last to give in were Gaeta and Capua, and by the end of October the conquest of Naples was complete. The expedition to Sicily was no less a success; the towns surrendered one after the other. A few months had sufficed for the whole business.¹

As a military operation the conquest of the Two Sicilies is of no interest. It could not, of course, have been accomplished with such ease and rapidity without the unanimous sympathy and co-operation of the country: a few thousands of hostile peasants could have hampered the army more effectually than the disciplined troops of Traun or Carraffa. For the state of feeling itself there was abundant cause. Between the Neapolitans and the Spaniards there were many points of resemblance: both were partizans of the "do as you

¹ For further information vide Danvila i. 81—119; Becattini i. 108—138; Lafuente, III, vi. 144.—152.

please" system; both acted thoroughly up to the policy of "mañana," which says "Never do to-day what you can put off till to-morrow." To the light-hearted and easy-going Neapolitan the German, with his discipline and rigid adherence to system, was a most disagreeable anomaly. No Austrian was ever or could be popular in Italy.

With the conquest, half of the original plan of the allies was accomplished; it now remained to expel the Emperor completely from Italy, and settle Philip in the duchies vacated by Carlos. Montemar accordingly rejoined the allies in the North, and Mantua was invested. The usual jealousies following on success, however, divided the allied Courts. Roughly speaking, the situation was the following: England and Holland were decidedly restless. Fleury began to think that Spain had got enough, and to consider whether the total expulsion of the Emperor from Italy, merely to please Elizabeth and aggrandize Savoy, was likely to prove at all beneficial to the interests of France; in addition, he wanted Tuscany as an equivalent for Lorraine. The King of Sardinia, always anxious to trim and balance, was also getting nervous at the growing power of the Spanish Bourbons in Italy: they might prove, he thought, inconvenient neighbours, since they would probably want more elbow-room. So negotiations were opened between Paris and Vienna behind the back of Spain, and the preliminaries of peace were quickly agreed upon, though the definite treaty was not signed till 1738. Augustus was to remain King of Poland; Lorraine was given to Stanislaus for lifetime, with reversion to France; Duke Francis received Tuscany and the hand of Maria Theresa; the Emperor recovered Parma and Piacenza; Savoy had to be content with

Novara and Tortona. Finally, Carlos was officially recognised King of Naples.¹

II.

OF all the Italian states, in the year 1735, none was more hopelessly sunk in misery and decay than the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The happiness of countries, as of men, depends upon wise governance. In so far, may it be said that Naples was the most unhappy land; she certainly had a most unhappy history. For centuries she had been jockeyed from one form of tyranny to another: in turn an independent kingdom and a vassal province, she had experienced all the miseries attendant on anarchy. Each successive government left behind it enough to do evil, too little to accomplish good: the laws of the country were a potent proof of this, for they derived their strength from the authority of the Greek, Roman, Lombard, Norman, Swabian, Angevin, Arragonese, Spanish-Hapsburg, German-Hapsburg, Feudal, and Ecclesiastical systems of legislation.

As the viceroy, the clergy, and the baronage fought for paramountcy, there was little thought of administering justice. The Viceroy decided cases by his arbitrary will; the Nuncio held a court, summoned to it and imprisoned whomsoever had the misfortune to displease him; the baronage, to kill time, exercised what they

¹ See Cantillo *Tratados de paz y de Comercio*: the Emperor's act of cession was sent in December, 1736. Carlos ceded Tuscany and Parma, but claimed the moveables of the Medici as direct heir and son adoptive of John Gaston and the Electress; this claim he renewed every year up till 1761 (Becattini i. 167).

called feudal justice. The finances were administered on the same system, or rather want of system: the one problem was how to secure the largest sum of money to keep up the necessary splendour of the viceregal court, and it was solved by a tax on every article of luxury or necessity, supplemented by the sale of titles when this did not suffice.

It is hardly to be expected that a government which so neglects internal rule should at all look after external defence. The army was suffered to fall into the state of an armed mob. Occasionally, to fill up the ranks, the prisons were emptied, men were kidnapped, and the feudal lords contributed unwilling vassals: thus, composed of such various elements, the army became at once an object of terror and contempt, and the word "soldier" was an insult. The navy had ceased to exist: there was not one single galley fit to take the sea; emboldened by the defenceless state of the coasts, pirates were most active, and maritime trade suffered in consequence.

By far the greatest evil was caused by the scandalous power and immunities of the Church. The number of clergy was out of all proportion to the population: in the kingdom of Naples alone there were about 22 archbishops, 116 bishops, 56,500 priests, 31,800 friars, and 23,600 nuns.¹ This vast ecclesiastical body held two-thirds of the landed property, and paid no taxes.

Such was the state of the kingdom that Carlos had come to rule. For an untried youth of 20, who had not yet begun to shave,² the task was difficult; he had, however, brought with him to Naples a man of ex-

¹ These figures are given in Colletta *History of Naples*, vol. i. p. 28.

² He shaved for the first time 1 January, 1737 (*A.H.N.* 2755).

traordinary ability, who directed him the right way. Tanucci is the real author of the reforms of the period; under his guidance Carlos received his training and learnt, not only to reign, but also to govern.¹ Especially important was his influence in ecclesiastical questions: he was no friend of the papacy. "The Court of Rome," he declared, "is the cause of Italian servitude."² His influence extended beyond Naples: to the end of his days he remained the confidential friend, the one man to whom the King exposed his doubts, his troubles and family affairs.

To give more than a very brief outline of the reign of Carlos in Naples is impossible. The work of reform was both destructive and constructive: the old had to be pulled down, before the new could be put up; Rome and the Church must be curbed, feudalism must be crushed, before a Government, a fleet, an army could be created. The Pope had favoured Carlos at first; but it was never the policy of the Papacy to commit itself too deeply, and his success was a sufficient reason for inclining to the Emperor's side. The *Acanea*³ had been sent to Rome both by the new King and by the Emperor. The Pope was thus placed in the awkward position of having to declare himself: he

¹ Tanucci was born of humble parents and studied for the bar: he began to practice in 1725, was appointed professor of jurisprudence at Pisa and wrote in favour of Spain in the dispute as to the right of investiture: as a reward, in 1732, was named "auditor de camara" to Carlos and accompanied him to Naples, with the rank of colonel: he was at once appointed Minister of Justice and became a Marquis: in 1755 was given the portfolio of foreign affairs: on the departure of Carlos to Spain Tanucci was practically appointed Regent of the Kingdom during the young King's minority: he died in 1783.

² Danvila vol. i. p. 274.

³ A yearly tribute to Rome of a white horse (and 7000 ducats).

named a commission, which decided that, as Carlos was not universally recognised King of Naples, tribute should be accepted from the Emperor.¹ The decision was just, but none the less unpalatable, and another incident of a more serious character made matters worse. A riot broke out at Rome against the Spanish party. The populace, probably inflamed by Imperial emissaries,² sacked the Neapolitan embassy. The tumult spread to Velletri, where there was a considerable feeling of irritation against the recruiting agents of Spain and Naples. The Spanish soldiers were turned out, but soon returned, killed some of the inhabitants, exacted a tribute from the rest, and generally committed all the excesses of an unlicensed soldiery.

The Spanish and Neapolitan Ambassadors left Rome: the Nuncio was ordered out of Naples. The one going to Spain stopped, by order of the Spanish Government, at Bayonne. The Emperor immediately offered the Pope a strong body of troops to protect him from insult. If Clement had not given in, another war might have broken out upon this frivolous pretext. After negotiations, however, three leaders of the riot were sent to Naples, suffered a short term of imprisonment, publicly craved pardon for their offence, and were then released.³

These bickerings hastened the inevitable struggle. A "Tribunal of Economy" was created to inquire into the state of the kingdom and propose measures of reform. This body was not idle: it struck busily at ecclesiastical abuses; many grounds of exemption from

¹ Vide Becattini vol. i. pp. 158—162 and Colletta vol. i. p. 56.

² Danvila vol. i. p. 276.

³ Vide Fernan Nuñez vol. i. pp. 41—43: Becattini vol. pp. 183—185.

taxation were declared to be without foundation, and the right held by several convents of growing tobacco was revoked; any possessions which, in the opinion of the tribunal had been fraudulently acquired, were confiscated to the Treasury, and the rest was taxed at a fair valuation. Such drastic measures did not fail to excite discontent among those interested in the maintenance of abuses; but the Government were in no mood to brook opposition, and the Bishop of Sessa, who dared to remonstrate, was immediately banished.¹

It was indeed evident that the primary cause of all evil was the ecclesiastical body, which, in addition to its vast possessions and extensive privileges, claimed and exercised a power of controlling matters in which it had no concern.² The abolition of abuses was productive of immediate good, for three million ducats were added to the revenue in one single year³; but, in spite of this increase and a subsidy from Spain of one million five hundred thousand dollars,⁴ it was clear that for the needs of the country ecclesiastical property should be regularly taxed or the further accumulation of mortmain arrested.

A scheme of reform was drawn up by the then young "Abate Genovesi": he proposed that all ecclesiastical property should belong to the Crown, each monk or nun receiving four and each superior six carlinas daily. The plan was approved by the Council, but was modified in view of the certain refusal of the Pope to consent to such a radical measure. Monsignor Galliani

¹ Becattini vol. i. pp. 172, 173.

² The Archbishop of Naples had his own prison and armed guard and sometimes summoned laymen to his court.

³ Fernan Nuñez vol. i. p. 40.

⁴ Ibid. vol. i. p. 43.

was sent to Rome with instructions to demand—(1) the right of exclusion in the Conclave, (2) the right of presentation to bishoprics and benefices, (3) fixation of the number of priests, monks and friars who were to enjoy the customary exemption, (4) appropriation of all mortmain by the Crown, and (5) the establishment of the Nuncio and his court with the same prerogatives as he possessed in other Catholic countries.¹ These proposals were rejected by the College of Cardinals, but Clement recognised Carlos as King of Naples, and the Bull of Investiture was read in the presence of the Neapolitan Ambassador: he also granted to Naples the Bull of the Crusade, and thus staved off, though not for long, the intended reforms.

The Ecclesiastical question languished for a time: proposals were made and rejected; but at last, in 1741, an agreement was come to between Gonzaga and Acquaviva, respectively Papal and Neapolitan commissioners. By the concordat, as it was called, ecclesiastical property was henceforth to be taxed, the right of asylum was restricted to churches, the difficulty of ordination was increased, and a tribunal was instituted, composed of three ecclesiastics and two laymen, to decide all disputes. These concessions fell far short of the original demands, but were so interpreted by the Government as to effectually accomplish the desired reforms. There was no desire on the part of Carlos and his Ministers to pursue an anti-clerical crusade, but simply to limit the influence and power of the Papacy and priesthood to their legitimate sphere—the care of souls. The struggle in Naples was not the only one of its kind, and the difficulty of reconciling the

¹ Vide Colletta vol. i. p. 58: Fernan Nuñez vol. i. pp. 43, 44: Ferrar del Rio vol. i. pp. 216, 217.

conflicting interests of Crown and Papacy, and of determining the boundaries of royal and papal power, has existed in all countries.

Meanwhile, other measures were taken to revive the prosperity of the country. To obtain an equitable assessment of taxation, a census of the kingdom was made, with the result of trebling the revenue; a tribunal of commerce was instituted, composed of eight judges; the army was reorganised, and no efforts were spared to build a navy; peace was made with the Turk, and commercial treaties were signed with most European nations.

In 1738 Carlos married Amelia, daughter of the King of Poland. His parents had always wanted him to marry an Austrian archduchess, on the very sound principle of consolidating his position, and the Count of Fuenclara was despatched to Vienna to ask for the younger sister of Maria Theresa. The Emperor was unwilling, and for some time kept the matter in suspense. There were, however, plenty of would-be brides, for a young king was a most desirable match,¹ and propositions flowed in from every Court. As the Emperor procrastinated and made objections, Philip and Elizabeth were for "trying their luck" in England, if the bride would turn Catholic.² The Prussian Minister in Vienna hinted to Fuenclara that his master was ready to give one of his daughters, religion being no obstacle;³ but neither of these projects passed beyond

¹ "Il ne manquera pas des femmes," wrote Carlos to his parents (5 March, 1737. *A.H.N.* 2755).

² Same to same, 26 February, 1737, ". . . . il, paroist a vos M.M. qu'il faudra se retourner d'un autre côté pour mon mariage, et que dans ce cas là il faudroit aller taster en Angleterre en premier lieu . . . en cas bien entendu qu'elle venille se faire catholique." (*A.H.N.* 2755).

³ Same to same, 5 March, 1737.

the stage of proposal. When the Emperor finally refused to give his daughter, the Empress suggested the Saxon match,¹ and, both sides being agreeable, the marriage was soon arranged. Carlos himself was impatient for matrimony, but not particular as to the bride: "I hope your Majesties will be able to marry me soon," he wrote to his parents, "for time is passing, and nothing is done."² It was rumoured he was getting thin, and was taking milk to fatten himself. "I was never so fat before," he wrote indignantly, "and am in an excellent state for receiving the sacrament of Marriage."³ There was something of his father in this anxiety for a married state. The ceremony was performed by proxy in Dresden, and the Queen reached Gaeta on the 19th June. Carlos was delighted with his young bride,⁴ and until her death he remained a devoted husband. She bore him thirteen children, and was always a kind and affectionate wife.

Naples took little part in the war of Austrian Succession. Elizabeth Farnese, desirous of settling her son Philip, joined the ranks of the young Empress' enemies, and Carlos was ordered to send as many troops as he could spare to help the Spanish cause. Twelve thousand Neapolitans were accordingly despatched to the army under Montemar. Of a sudden an English fleet of five ships of the line, four bomb

¹ Danvila vol. i. p. 163.

² Carlos to his parents, 1 January, 1737 (*A.H.N.* 2755).

³ Same to same, 14 January, 1737 (*A.H.N.* 2755).

⁴ Same to same, 8 July, 1738, ". . . . Je diroy aussi à vos M.M. . . . comme aussi que c'est la plus belle fille du monde, qu'elle a un esprit comme un ange, et qu'elle a le meilleur humeur du monde, et que je suis l'homme le plus heureux de ce monde ayant cette femme qui doit estre ma compagne toute ma vie." (*A.H.N.* 2760).

vessels, and four tenders, under Commodore Martin, sailed into the bay (18th August, 1742). The Commodore sent on shore to notify that if the King did not, within an hour, agree to withdraw his troops from the Spanish army, and promise to remain neutral, he had orders to bombard the town. Expostulation was useless. "Do you understand me, Sir? within half-an-hour," was the Commodore's only reply.¹ Resistance was impossible, for Naples was totally unprovided with defence of any kind, and the offer of patriotic Neapolitans to burn the English fleet could not be taken seriously.² So an order was sent to Castropignano recalling the Neapolitan contingent. The incident made a deep impression on the mind of Carlos. It was not in his disposition to forgive injury or forget resentment, and the memory of the occasion when an English fleet menaced him in his own capital may well have played no small part in determining his later conduct and directing his policy into the channel of hostility to England.

Early in 1742 the Spanish army, unable to hold the field, crossed the border of the Neapolitan kingdom, followed by the Imperialists: Maria Theresa, since fortune favoured her arms, had determined to conquer the Two Sicilies, and issued a proclamation promising the inhabitants many things. In view of the avowed determination of the Empress-Queen, neutrality could no longer be observed; the Neapolitan army, 19,000 strong, was mustered, and Carlos advanced to join the Spaniards. The Austrians retreated for strategical purposes; the Spanish-Neapolitan army followed, and

¹ Vide John Charnock *Naval Biography* vol. iv. pp. 71—76.

² "Todos los Napolitanos mostraron gran deseo de vengar esta injuria, ofreciéndose a quemar la escuadra Inglesa," says Fernan Nuñez, vol. i. p. 57.

the only important fight of the campaign, Velletri, was fought in the immediate neighbourhood of Rome. The Imperialists, intending to surprise, succeeded in their attempt; but were in turn defeated, as they gave themselves up to loot and pillage. The action put an end to the military operations; Lobkowitz retreated, and Carlos, after paying a visit to Rome, returned to his kingdom.¹

It cannot be said, as an historian has maintained,² that the campaign proved Carlos to be a born general. The affair at Velletri was no great victory, but, like Dettingen, a lucky escape from disaster. It is not only that he was no general; he was also no soldier: he had not even the ordinary desire of most princes to hold reviews or ride at the head of a regiment. His military efforts were those of an amateur, and, although he did his best both in Naples and Spain, to improve the military forces—although he held reviews, reformed discipline, and founded military academies—he never succeeded in proportion to his efforts, partly no doubt through circumstances beyond his control, but principally because he had no true military instincts and no real grip of military affairs.

Naples was never again threatened by the war. In 1746 Philip V. died, and Elizabeth Farnese retired to San Ildefonso. The new king, Ferdinand VI., was pacifically inclined. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle gave the duchies to Philip.³ The conclusion of peace left

¹ For the campaign see Colletta vol. i. pp. 68—80: Ferrer del Rio vol. i. pp. 208—211: Fernan Núñez pp. 61—65.

² Danvila vol. i. p. 248.

³ By the fourth article of the preliminaries it was stipulated that the duchies should revert to the Empire in case (1) Philip died s.p., (2) Carlos succeeded to the Spanish throne. The Plenipotentiaries were thus of opinion that the departure of Carlos for Spain would naturally be followed by the accession of Philip to the throne of

Carlos free to continue his work of reform. The whole reign was one long improvement, and only the principal facts can be touched upon. The power of the Church had been effectually crushed, not by any general acts of hostility, but by a steadily pursued policy of firm resistance. The reform was by no means complete—there were still grave abuses, too many bishops, priests and friars—but, by limiting future ordination to ten in every thousand of the population and by curtailing the power of episcopal censures, the seeds were laid of betterment.

The baronage were too powerful to be openly thwarted. As much was done, however, as could safely be attempted. In 1738 many of their privileges were curtailed, only to be restored in 1744.¹ Their jurisdiction, which before had been absolute, was now subjected to appeal; a few personal obligations were abolished, and every encouragement was held out to draw the feudal lord to court and turn the arrogant and powerful vassal into the needy and cringing courtier.

The Army and Navy were not much improved: the reforms of Carlos were chiefly legal and ecclesiastical. Of course, by reforming the law and its administration, he struck at the Church. The importance of and the prominence given to lawyers brought about the greatest revolution of the reign, viz. the gradual rise of a third estate. The bar was open to all; indeed, before the

Naples: but by the Treaty of Vienna, the crown of Naples had been ceded in full right to Carlos and his heirs, and supposing he was forbidden to unite the two crowns of Spain and Naples (and the first prohibition was contained in the Treaty of 1759) he was perfectly entitled to name one of his children to succeed him. So Carlos protested against this article of the preliminaries and in the definitive treaty the error was removed (vide Cantillo *Tratados de paz y de Comercio*, p. 399).

¹ Colletta, vol. i. p. 95.

reign of Carlos, any one who chose could don a robe and plead. The new race of lawyers, who supplied the Ministers and governed the country, were mostly of humble birth. As they grew rich and prospered, they raised the social standard of the classes from which they sprang: this gradual rise of a new nobility undermined the power of the old and prepared the way for the introduction of modern ideas.

Many other minor facts are worthy of notice, as indicating the activity displayed in all branches of government. A workhouse was founded at Naples to receive all the poor of the kingdom; the Bourbon love of display and pageantry was gratified by the building of a superb palace at Caserta; Naples was improved by a new theatre, built regardless of expense; several roads were made, often, however, for the King's convenience and in places where they were least wanted; the Farnesian library was brought from Parma, and education was encouraged. It should also not be forgotten that it was during the reign of Carlos that the excavations of Herculaneum and Pompeii were begun, and the Museo Borbonico became one of the finest in Europe.¹

The death of Ferdinand VI. in 1759 called Carlos to the throne of Spain. We have seen sufficiently of him to know what his line of conduct will be: in Naples he learnt the art of rule and imbibed those ideas and habits which he was to retain through life; he was methodical and disliked disorder of any kind, frugal and temperate in his habits, earnest and conscientious in his work, pious, but not fanatical. He had none of the hatred of a bigot. One of his first acts in Naples had been to recall the Jews, banished since 1220; but popular

¹ Vide Ferrer del Rio: Danvila: Fernan Nuñez: Colletta—passim.

ignorance was too strong, and, on the Queen being assured by a friar that she would never have a male child as long the Jews remained in the kingdom, they were expelled.

The question of the succession to the throne of the Two Sicilies was satisfactorily settled. By treaty with the Empress,¹ Carlos agreed to that which was evidently desired by all the powers—the separation of the two crowns of Spain and the Two Sicilies. His eldest son being a hopeless imbecile,² he appointed his third son, Ferdinand, to succeed him to the throne he was vacating, while his second followed him to Spain as Prince of Asturias. An immense crowd saw the Royal Family off, and joy at the elevation of Carlos to a higher throne was mixed with the great and genuine grief of the people at the departure of so good a King. He had, indeed, done much for them: he had delivered them from a hateful yoke, had raised their country from the state of a vassal province to that of an independent kingdom, and had restored to them some of the old prosperity, that was theirs in the days of the brilliant Frederick II.³

¹ Vide Cantillo p. 462.

² He had become so through the imprudence of one nurse and the foolish obstinacy of another. For the story see Fernan Nuñez vol. i. pp. 74. 75.

³ Vide "Oracion que el abogado Mañino, como diputado de la ciudad de Napoles, recito 'ante las augustas de Carlos, y Maria Amalia, reyes de las Dos Sicilias, el día de su partida para España.'" (Brit. Mus. MSS. 21444 f. 479).

III.

THE death of Ferdinand VI. had not come unexpected; ever since his wife's decease, he had fallen slowly from a state of melancholy into one of suicidal madness.¹ The greatest confusion arose during the sort of interregnum created by the King's utter incapacity to attend to business; cabal was brisk, and there were many plots and counter-plots at court, each man intriguing to overthrow the other. Carlos was not neglectful of the situation; his mother was empowered to act for him till his arrival in Spain; ² Yacci, the Neapolitan Ambassador, and she were in constant communication, and all was ready for the last moment.³

Whatever the general feeling was at Court, where speculation was rife as to whether the Queen Mother would wield an influence over her son equal to that she held over her husband, there could be no doubt as to the sentiments of the people. No king was probably ever so anxiously expected, or so heartily greeted on arrival. His fame had preceded him, and it may confidently be said, as Elizabeth wrote to Carlos, that the

¹ Elizabeth Farnese to Carlos, 26 January, 1759, ". . . Tu hermano ha querido ahorcarse por dos veces estos dias con Tiras que se saco de la camisa: continua siempre su cabetha mas perdida, y se va muriendo lettamente." Same to same, 9 July, 1759, "A lo de villaviciosa que expresan las ordinarias, relaciones no hay que añadir sino que no passa dia sin furia ó golpes pocho ó mucho. (*A.H.N.* 2548).

² By power, dated 13 Feb., 1759, from Naples (*A.H.N.* 2850).

³ Just before Ferdinand's death, Carlos ordered, through Yacci, the President and Council of Castille, the Captains, Generals and the Commandants of Garrisons, to report direct to him. (Bristol to Pitt, 13 August, 1759. *R.O.S.* 289).

whole kingdom, tired of anarchy, was for him heart and soul.¹

If Elizabeth felt confident of recovering some of that power she had lost on the accession of Ferdinand, she was soon undeceived. Every mark of filial love and respect was lavished upon her, but she was allowed no share in the government, and her advice was neither asked nor followed. Carlos never fell under the influence of women, and not even his wife exercised any control over public affairs. He began his reign with measures that won the popular applause. The Catalonians were restored to some of their privileges in recognition of their enthusiastic greeting. It was ordered that the debts of Philip V. be paid, and the landowners of various provinces were excused the sums advanced to them by the Treasury during years of scarcity.

"Madrid was turned from the most filthy into the cleanest capital known," remarks the biographer of Carlos.² Its condition certainly invited reform: a walk through the streets was fraught with great peril; there was no paving, and, as all refuse and slops were thrown out of the windows, to the imminent risk of passers below and ruin to their clothes, it was impossible to walk abroad otherwise than in the "flapped hat and large cloak." Moreover, the dirty condition of the streets made the atmosphere unhealthy and promoted disease; this state of things was good only for the pigs, who were turned out into the streets to feed. The general use of flapped hats and large cloaks, which effectually concealed beyond recognition the person who wore them,

¹ Elizabeth Farnese to Carlos, 12 January, 1759 (*A.H.N.* 2548). The royal family landed at Barcelona, but was detained some time by illness (see correspondence of Carlos and Amelia with Elizabeth Farnese, *A.H.N.* 2714). Madrid was reached 9 November.

² Fernan Nuñez i. 151.

encouraged crime, and acts of violence increased to an alarming extent.¹ An Italian architect, Savatini, was commissioned to study the question; he submitted a plan which was approved and put into execution.² The various rules in existence providing for the lighting of Madrid were ordered to be enforced, and many edicts were issued forbidding judges to wear "the flapped hat and large cloak," and prohibiting generally the national costume in theatres and processions; the custom of throwing eggs full of water, wine, mud in the theatres, and all such disorderly practices were prohibited under severe penalties.³ At the same time, the police of the town were put upon a better footing by the reform of the Corps of Invalids and their organisation as an effective force of over 1500 men, and by the institution of an urban militia to patrol the city at night.⁴ These measures did not fail to excite opposition: the Spanish people have always been averse to change, and have always considered that what is old is best, and wondered why anyone should wish to alter a state of things good enough for their grandfathers. So here it was argued that the dirt in the streets of Madrid was necessary to

¹ See letter of Squillaci, 2 December, 1759, in *Libros de Gobierno de los Alcaldes de Casa y Corte*. (A.H.N.)

² (i.) All house proprietors were to make a pavement of three feet wherever their houses looked upon the street. (ii.) Religious communities were to do the same. (iii.) Gutters to be constructed on the roof with pipes down to the street; also drains leading to a well. (iv.) All this to be done at the cost of the proprietor, but with the right of charging 5 per cent. on the outlay to tenants. (v.) Ordinary refuse to be put in bins and carried out of the town daily by a service of donkeys. (vi.) No pigs to be allowed in the streets: the monks of San Antonio, who claim their privilege, will have the keep of their pigs paid them. (Vide *Libros de Gobierno*, etc.)

³ Bando of the 16 February, 1760. (*Libros de Gobierno*, etc.)

⁴ *Ibid.*

counteract the sharpness of the air, as had been formally declared by an assembly of doctors in the reign of Philip. "We will make the experiment," said Carlos, "and if I find this is so, I will immediately remedy matters by ordering all drainage to be thrown into the streets."¹

In the midst of these preliminary measures of reform a great affliction fell upon the King. His wife died towards the end of 1760 (27th September). She had never been well since a fall from her horse in Naples the year before: in Saragossa she fell ill with the rest of the family. She took a violent dislike to Spain: nothing in the country pleased her; the houses were ugly, the people gloomy, Madrid was a western Babylon and confusion reigned supreme; the Spanish women were ignorant to an incredible degree and their company was insupportable.² Such a state of mind was not likely to improve her health, which was fast failing, owing to chest affection and her early maternity.³ It cannot be said that she was regretted by any save the King, for she had to a great degree what diplomats

¹ Fernan Nuñez vol. i. p. 153.

² Danvila vol. ii. 53--56.

³ Memoria del Medico de Camara Mucio Zona (Simancas 6040): the doctors were by no means unanimous. See also Ferrer del Rio, i. 273. Bristol wrote to Pitt (29 September, 1760, *R.O.S.* 292) "... it would be difficult for me to particularize the disorder of which her C.M. dyed, since I hear no one of the physicians who attended her were agreed in their opinion, one attributed her decease to an attack upon the liver, another to the derangement of the fluids, a third said that the lungs were ulcerated, a fourth alledged in general that the solids were corrupted, the last that some female complaints had caused obstructions which, not being early attended to, had brought on tho' slowly those various symptoms of many distempers, which had at last occasioned the closing of the scene: those who can only judge from reports think that the Queen of Spain came from Naples with a hectic fever, which increased after having the measles at Saragossa, and as her Majesty would never subject herself to any kind of diet, either in quantity or quality, the greatest part of the intestines were irritated."

style "vivacity of manner," and familiars "a sharp temper." Her one merit consisted in being a faithful wife and a devoted, if somewhat strict, mother; but her actions were not always under her control, and she sometimes gave way in public to exhibitions of temper which were neither dignified nor pleasant.¹

It is time to turn from these domestic scenes to the wider range of foreign policy. When the subject of an historical essay is a King, it is difficult to give a condensed narrative. We have to strain the neck of the man to suit the exigencies of scanty space: we have, as it were, to pick and choose, to take only the salient features, the main tendencies, and group around them all collateral facts. It is thus in the reign of Carlos that certain events stand out as milestones on our way. Foremost among these are the Family Compact, which, at the very beginning of the reign, gives the keynote to his foreign policy, and the expulsion of the Jesuits which sums up his attitude on clerical questions and is the direct result of his reign in Naples.

Much has been said and written about the Family Compact and the participation of Spain in the Seven Years' War. Spanish writers regard it as a necessary measure of defence against the insolent conduct and intended encroachments of England.² English historians

¹ Vide Fernan Nuñez, i. 156, 157, says he ". . . era afable y caritativa, y tenia un excelente corazon; pero la extremada viveza de su genio ofuscaba á veces en un primer momento, de que luego se arrepentaba, el fondo de estas buenas calidades." Bristol to Pitt says (15 December, 1760, *R.O.S.* 292) "her C.M. is as much forgot at present as, I am sorry to say, she was little regretted at first, for with great piety, fine talents, and many good qualitys, yet without the gentle or amiable ones that are expected in one of her sex, she had so much intimidated all who approached her that no one even of the Ministers or of her own family ever went into her presence without dread."

² Vide Danvila, ii. 166, 167. Ferrer del Rio says ". . . con todo el punto escencial de las diferencias entre ambas cortes versaba

pronounce it to have been a wanton aggression. There is much to be said on both sides,—the interesting point is certainly why Carlos thought fit to adopt such a policy.

The situation of Europe on his accession to the Spanish throne was one which it is now-a-days difficult to realise. We are not astonished when we read that England utterly defeated France, and took from her the best of her colonies, yet in 1759 it was a wonder. England now, for the first time, steps out as a great power; for, although the campaigns of Marlborough shed a lustre on British arms of which we may well be proud, the prestige of France was comparatively unimpaired. The opening campaigns of the Seven Years' War did not belie the general expectations. Disaster after disaster overtook the English. Reinforcements were poured into Canada, Minorca was captured; in India, Sujarah Dowlah took Calcutta. The campaign in Hanover, with the defeat of Hastenbeck and the capitulation of Closterseven, was quite in keeping with the disaster which befell Braddock. Prussia was also being overwhelmed. The outlook was very gloomy, and public opinion in England was most despondent; all trembled at the fear of a French invasion, and Germans were landed to defend the kingdom. "We are undone both at home and abroad," wrote Chesterfield, "we are no longer a nation." No one could have ventured to predict that within two years the tables would have been turned, that the genius of one man would utterly change the situation, and make England the dictator of peace. Yet such was the work of Pitt, and in 1759 the monarchy of France was lying helpless at the feet of its rival.

sobre si habian de hacer pié los Ingleses en la America Española ó de abandonarla segun justicia." (Vol. i. p. 283.) See also Becatini, vol. ii. p. 15.

Such a sudden disturbance of European balance materially altered the prospects of Spain; as long as France with her powerful fleet was there, the danger of hostilities with England was minimised; but with a ruined and crippled France everything seemed possible. The Empire might, perhaps, abandon the losing cause, and seek compensation in Italy, at the expense of the Bourbons: England would be tempted to annex a few Spanish colonies for trade purposes. Such thoughts would naturally occur to Carlos, and induce him to depart from the system of strict neutrality, which had been carefully expounded by Ensenada,¹ and faithfully maintained, in spite of temptations,² by Ferdinand VI.

It was felt in France that the decisive moment had come for drawing Spain into an alliance. The new king was known to be no friend of the English; he had a strong sense of the obligations of relationship; but he was credited with a fair amount of perspicacity, and political considerations might outweigh family ties. So Choiseul worked upon both grounds.³ The King was pressed to help the head of the Bourbons; he was

¹ Vide *Puntos de Gobierno* (Memoir of Ensenada to the King, printed in Rodriguez Villa's *Ensenada*), in which he maintains that it would be idle for Spain to hope to equal France on land or England on sea. France and England will always be enemies: no peace between them will last. Spain will be courted by both, for she can turn the scale: so the right policy for Spain is to trim judiciously, avoid war, and carry out actively internal reform.

² Pitt, in the days of despondency, offered to restitute Gibraltar. (Lecky, vol. ii. p. 409, also Coxe.) Louis XV. even went to the length of writing a letter to Ferdinand saying, "les Anglois ont été de tout temps les ennemis constants et implacables de notre sang et de notre maison; nous n'en avons jamais eu de plus dangereux." (Vide Boutaric *Correspondance Secrète de Louis XV.*, p. 47.)

³ Says Fernan Nuñez "... Conocia Choiseul la bondad del caracter del nuevo Rey de España, su pundonor, la nobleza de su animo, su generosidad natural, y, sobre todo, su extremado amor á su familia y su teson eu sostener el decoro de ella." (Vol. i. p. 160.)

warned of the fatal consequences of neutrality. D'Ossun, the Ambassador, and the French party at court laboured unceasingly. They represented the danger to maritime balance (*équilibre maritime*) of England's paramountcy on the seas; they argued that a perfidious, peace-breaking nation, jealous of its commercial interests, would never keep the peace long; and that the first object of its greed, after the crushing of France, would be the Spanish American colonies.¹ No means were spared to secure adherents to the French policy.² Carlos sincerely desired peace,³ nor would he immediately give in to the importunities of Choiseul: he refused a project of alliance presented by d'Ossun before even leaving Naples;⁴ but it would have required a man of more strength of character to resist the influence of the pro-French party, and, during all the negotiations which led to the war with England, he was swayed from one hostile act to

¹ "Le Roi pense, Monsieur, que ce sont les possessions en Amérique qui désormais formeront la balance du pouvoir de l'Europe. . . . Mais s'il arrivoit par malheur que les événemens de cette guerre forçassent le Roi à faire dans cette partie des cessions aux Anglois, la foiblesse de la France, qui résulteroit de ces cessions, ne lui permettroit plus de faire des efforts considerables pour arrêter les vues ambitieuses de la cour de Londres. Alors, si cette cour attaquoit l'Espagne, comme je ne doute pas que ce ne soit à l'avenir son projet, la France auroit plus de bonne volonté que de moyens pour s'unir aux Espagnols." (Choiseul to d'Ossun, 7 September, 1759. *Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs de France, Espagne*, vol. iii. 349, 350.)

² "As it is known how fond the Queen of Spain is of diamonds, pearls, and all other kinds of jewels, the Court of France, in order to make a present to her Majesty which might induce her to influence the King her husband in its favour, has caused the Dauphiness to send a present of bracelets, composed of very fine pearls, with diamonds of a most extraordinary size and water, and consequently valued at several thousand pounds, to her sister. The Catholick King was not pleased with this gift. (Bristol to Pitt, 9 June, 1760. *R.O.S.* 291.)

³ See Appendix A.

⁴ Danvila, vol. ii. p. 105.

the other. Before he had even reached Madrid, d'Albreu, Spanish Ambassador in London, presented a memorial, proposing that Spain should mediate between France and England, and declaring at the same time that the success of the British arms was a source of serious alarm to the King his master.¹ This extraordinary statement nullified, of course, the possibility of acceptance, and the proposal was rejected, to the great indignation of the Spanish court.²

From this proposal to a formal statement of grievances there was but one step. In June, 1760, the dull and prosaic Fuentes made a formal complaint of the arbitrary acts of the English at sea, forwarding at the same time a complete list of the Spanish ships seized by the English men of war, or privateers since 1756;³ and in September of the same year he again presented a memorial on the usurpations of English settlers in Yucatan, with the additional information that a copy of the memorial had been communicated to the French court (*que copie en est communiquée a la cour de France*). The answer of the British Minister was concise and sharp;⁴ nor could it very well have been other-

¹ " . . . le roy étant un des princes, qui ont le plus d'intérêt dans cette partie là du monde, ne peut pas regarder avec indifférence le dérangement que ces conquêtes portent à l'équilibre y établi par le traité d'Utrecht. (D'Albreu to Pitt, 5 Dec., 1759. *R.O.S.* 289).

² " Monsieur Wall said that it was a thorough mortification to him to perceive that the Catholick King was thought to be inclined to the French interest, for what the Spanish Monarch meant by offering his intervention was by comparing the different pretensions of England and France to see if it was possible to re-establish peace between the two Crowns, and that the Catholick King never meant to dictate to one or to the other of these two powers what each might insist on, or where he considered either should relinquish its claim." (Bristol to Pitt, February, 1760. *R.O.S.* 291.)

³ Fuentes to Pitt, 20 June, 1760 (*R.O.S.* 291).

⁴ " Je dois remarquer à V.E. qu'on ignore parfaitement le motif et l'objet d'une communication si extraordinaire, envers une cour en

wise. Whatever particle of right there was in the Spanish claims, they were presented in such a way as to make them unacceptable.

The Queen, with the Portuguese Ambassador and Wall, was the only person at court who realised what war with England meant: as long as she lived, she counteracted the efforts of the French party, but, when her influence was removed by death, there was no one left who could soothe the feeling of irritation produced by Pitt's answer to the Spanish memorial.¹ The King began to be seriously alarmed: the firm, but perhaps hasty language held by the English Minister wounded his pride, the French party increased his fears, and he soon showed great anxiety at what he styled the American invasions.² D'Ossun had long conferences with Carlos, and as the result, Grimaldi, then Ambassador at the Hague, and known to be a partizan of the French alliance, was sent post haste to Paris, in place of Masones, who was thought to be rather lukewarm in his

guerre ouverte contre l'Angleterre, et qui, d'ailleurs, ne peut en aucun temps, avoir à se mêler des prétensions Espagnoles sur Nous pour la pêche de Terre Neuve. Ce qui est très certain, est que la façon de penser de cette puissance ennemie par rapport au dit objet, ne sauroit jamais ajouter plus de poids, auprès de sa Majesté, que ses sentiments d'amitié lui en donnent aux Représentations de sa Majesté Catholique. (Pitt to Fuentes, 16 September, 1760. Brit. Mus. 32911, f. 367.)

¹ Bristol thought her favourable to France: "I am so far from considering the death of the late Queen of Spain as prejudicial to Great Britain, that I think it was rather fortunate for the common cause. Those memorials presented by the Count of Fuentes on the 9th of last September were penn'd here during the life of that princess, determined upon whilst she assisted at the 'despachos,' and communicated to the Court of France by her instigation. This last circumstance, you easily imagine sir, I cannot positively assert, tho' many words that have been let drop leave me no room to doubt of it." (Bristol to Pitt, 15 December, 1760. *R.O.S.* 292.) Her correspondence with Tanucci conclusively proves her pacific inclinations (*vide* Danvila, vol. ii. pp. 57, 58).

² Carlos to Tanucci, 10 February, 1761.

support of the good cause.¹ The points of dispute were trifling—sufficient to raise a conflict if it was wanted, but not to warrant by themselves the frightful expenditure and loss a war implies. The Spaniards (i.) complained that Spanish ships had been illegally seized and detained; (ii.) claimed the right to fish at Newfoundland; (iii.) complained of the illegal encroachments of English settlers who came to cut logwood in Yucatan. There was something to be said on both sides. The English had perhaps behaved rather arrogantly on the seas; the right to fish at Newfoundland, Pitt qualified a “stale and inadmissible pretension”; and refused, in energetic terms, to even discuss.² The Spaniards claimed to have been the first discoverers of Newfoundland, and to have always held an undefined right.³ The third contention was the most serious. The English colonists possessed by treaty⁴ permission to resort to uninhabited parts of Yucatan for the purpose of cutting logwood, but the Spanish Government argued that they built huts and took formal possession of the land, driving away all Spaniards, and that the Governor was justified in turning them out. The result of Pitt’s despatch, which was read to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Madrid by his express order to avoid misunderstanding “in the present

¹ Bristol seems to have been constantly deceived: he thought Masones had been recalled because of his French sympathies. (Bristol to Pitt, 13 April, 1761. *R.O.S.* 294.)

² Pitt to Bristol, 26 September, 1760 (*R.O.S.* 292).

³ The fifteenth article of the Treaty of Utrecht gave the Spaniards privileges to which they could prove a right “*quae Cantabri aliive Hispaniae populi, jure sibi vindicare poterunt, ipsis sarta tecta conservantur.*” The second article of the Treaty of Madrid of 1721 reconfirmed these rights.

⁴ The right if not expressly recognised was tolerated. The first article of the commercial treaty of 1713 says “*absque prejudicio libertatis aut facultatis alicujus subditis Britannicis, antea sive competentis, sive permissae aut indultae.*”

serious and critical situation of things between the two courts,"¹ was to hasten agreement with France. Grimaldi, as aforesaid, left the Hague in a hurry for Paris.

It was not the intention of the Spanish Court to rush blindly into alliance with France. Grimaldi mysteriously concealed his instructions, and gave out that his transference to the Court of Versailles had long been decided. The idea of the Spanish Government seems to have been that without engaging to enter into the war, Spain might frighten the English Ministry to terms by the bogey of a Bourbon alliance.² But Choiseul was more than a match for the Ambassador: he pointed out that France could make peace with England,—indeed since His Catholic Majesty seemed disinclined to sign an alliance, the negotiations had begun—and that the Spanish Government, in view of their conduct, could not complain.³ This threat had the desired effect: "The French, you may depend upon it, are anxious for peace," wrote Grimaldi.⁴ In March he considered that no time should be lost in concluding a defensive treaty, and forwarded to his Court the draft of a project of alliance.⁵

¹ Pitt to Bristol, 26 September, 1760 (*R.O.S.* 292).

² ". . . . en tercero despertaré segun el permiso que tengo y como idea mia el proyecto de alianza con el rey; esto le animará quizas á no abandonarse tanto en sus proposiciones; acaso si pudiera discernir alguno desde luego (y aun sin el objeto de hacer la guerra ahora) que nos procurasse un apoyo ó para el caso que los Ingleses intentassen algo contra las Possessiones del Rey en America, ó para que sabiendole aquel Ministerio, se contenga mas de lo que haria, si creyese que la Francia no auxiliaria á la España." (Grimaldi to Wall, 14 February, 1761. *A.H.N.* 4176.)

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Grimaldi to Wall, 14 February, 1761 (separate, *A.H.N.* 4176).

⁵ "Hé considerado que nos convenia una alianza defensiva pero que obligasse la Francia á socorrer al Rey, en caso que algun enemigo le molestasse en America, y que su reciprocidad no recayesse en el caso de la guerra presente. Tambien hé juzgado que en

Choiseul seems to have played a double game: it was the interest of France in her exhausted condition to conclude peace with England; and negotiations were opened between London and Versailles. The French offered to cede Canada, with certain restrictions, and also either Senegal or Goree; to exchange Minorca for Guadaloupe and Marigalante; all the conquests of England in the East and Belleisle were to be restored. To these Pitt made counter proposals: viz. the unconditional cession of Canada, Senegal *and* Goree, the exclusive right of fishery at Newfoundland, and the demolition of Dunkirk; all other conquests to be mutually restored.¹ If Choiseul had been able to obtain his own terms, there is no reason to believe that he would have deferred making peace—there was a strong peace party in the council—but since the terms proposed by Pitt were unacceptable, it was felt that little was being risked by continuing the war, for it was generally believed that England was utterly exhausted, and would not resist the united power of France and Spain.²

The Family Compact was decided in principle, but not in fact. There was a small minority in the French council which thought it should have no bearing on the

la situación en que nos hallamos con la Inglaterra convenia apresurar este Paso y asegurarnos la Alianza." (Grimaldi to Wall, 3 March, 1761. *A.H.N.* 4176.)

¹ Vide Coxe, vol. iv. pp. 259, 260 and Lecky iii. 193.

² "The nation is tired and desires peace; their not making it this winter has been a great disappointment. The Ministry is embarrassed, knowing the difficulty of finding money to continue the war. All these advantages France will lose by now precipitating a peace. Choiseul knows it, but wants to discover what your Excellency's instructions are. So good an opportunity is not to be lost." (Fuentes to Grimaldi, 10 March, 1761. *Brit. Mus.* 32920, f. 40.) Choiseul told Grimaldi he would certainly not conclude peace if France and Spain were united. (Grimaldi to Wall, 14 April, 1761. *A.H.N.* 4176.)

present war. But this was not the aim of Choiseul's policy; he proposed a secret convention by which Spain was to declare war if peace had not been made by 1st of May, 1762, and suggested the union of French and Spanish interests. Bussy was instructed to keep on good terms with Fuentes;¹ by July, both the Compact and the Secret Convention had been approved in principle at Madrid, and each article was being discussed.² The Spanish Court was now fully persuaded of the advantages accruing to them by the alliance. Choiseul was less eager; he objected to the Secret Convention, on the ground that he might be obliged to make peace with England, so as to be free to act against the Parliament;³ he still had hopes, it would seem, of a peace on his own lines. His policy was, as he wrote to Bussy, to drag out the proceedings, to render the cooperation of Spain inevitable by the union of French and Spanish negotiations, and "if we cannot come to terms with the Court of London, we will break off the negotiations with noise" (*nous romprons avec éclat la négociation*).⁴ Accordingly, Bussy presented a memorial declaring the union of French and Spanish interests⁵ (23 July); while the same was said to Stanley, English envoy in France⁶ (13 July).

Such an extraordinary act convinced the British Ministry that the Bourbon Courts contemplated hostilities. Pitt, with his usual sagacity, at once perceived,

¹ Grimaldi to Wall, 2 June, 1761 (*A.H.N.* 4176).

² Grimaldi to Choiseul, 2 July, 1761 (*ibid.*): "Il me paraît qu'il n'y a rien de changé ni qui puisse retarder la conclusion et la signature de cette grande et mémorable affaire."

³ Grimaldi to Wall, 14 July, 1761 (*A.H.N.* 4176).

⁴ Choiseul to Bussy, 15 July, 1761 (*A.H.N.* 4176).

⁵ See Negotiations with Great Britain (*Brit. Mus.* 34713 f. 160).

⁶ Choiseul to Stanley, 13 July, 1761 (*R.O.S.* 294).

as well as if he had read the letter of Choiseul to Bussy of the 15th July, that hostilities were inevitable and that a rupture was delayed merely to bring on winter, render the English fleet less dangerous, and get the Spanish treasure ships safely into port.¹ He proposed the sound plan of anticipating the foe by declaring war; how he was thwarted and resigned is a part of English history. War was now only a question of days. The Family Compact and the Secret Convention were signed on the 15th of August. Their contents are too well known to need analysing. The first it may roughly be said, provided for the general and intimate union of the two Bourbon Monarchies; the King of Naples and the Duke of Parma were to be invited to join it. The second, for a long time unknown, provided for the particular case of hostilities with England, Spain engaging to declare war if by 1st May, 1762, no peace had been arranged.

It is easy nowadays, when the whole period is past, to criticise from a Spanish point of view the Family Compact: whenever two or more nations of unequal strength and power unite in alliance, the weaker is bound to follow the lead of the stronger, and the union of the two Bourbon branches is no exception to the rule. Carlos has been blamed for subordinating the true interests of Spain to the will of France, and voluntarily entangling himself in complications, when, by doing as his predecessor had done, he would have better studied the interests of his kingdom. But Spain is not a country that prospers in peace: she is essentially a warlike nation: stagnation is apt to bring on decay; the campaigns of Carlos served to keep the rust off: moreover, he had Italian interests, and we must not forget that, by union with France, he also to a great extent tied the hands

¹ Vide Lecky iii. 195, 196.

of the Empress. The only alternative to union with France was alliance with England: but it would have required a greater political genius than that of Carlos or his Ministers to divine all the possible fruits of such a policy: the continental ties were too strong. The Secret Convention one can have no difficulty in denouncing: it was decidedly foolish. The strong minority in England which clamoured for peace led the two Monarchies to believe that England would not fight, and in this they displayed ignorance of the British character.¹ The greatest diversity of opinion at home is compatible with vigorous defence. We grumble and criticise, but, in our insular pride, we allow no interference, and foreign attack has always silenced dissension and found the British Nation unanimous. The fact is too patent to require illustration. There is, besides, a vast difference between the exhaustion of success and the despondency of defeat. The two Bourbon courts were certainly not in condition to continue hostilities. As the French fleet for all practical purposes did not exist, the brunt of the battle must fall on the Spanish navy; Carlos had devoted himself to its improvement, and all through the year great activity reigned in all the ports of the kingdom.²

¹ It seems to have been the general opinion. ". . . . je suis très persuadé que la Nation Angloise ayant déjà senti un grand degré dans ses fonds publiques, le bien que les espérances de la paix ont produit, se montreroit extrêmement mécontent de se voir frustrée de nouveau pour quelque temps de ce bien par l'éloignement de la paix, et il pourrait même arriver que l'on trouvât des difficultés insurmontables pour lever de l'argent, en cas que la malheur voulut que l'on dût continuer une guerre aussi destructive." (Gallitzin to Choiseul, 28 April, 1761. *A.H.N.* 4176).

² See the letters of Bristol *passim* and also of Consul Goldsworthy; the following is a specimen: ". . . all the ships of war, great and small, are getting ready with the utmost expedition, for which reasons they are working there day and night, Sundays and

According to an official return there were 20 men of war and 4 frigates completely armed in 1759;¹ it was hoped greatly to augment this number, but there were not enough sailors to man more than 20 ships.² At the beginning of 1761 Carlos had about 40 ships of the line fit for service, but, without sending to Naples, Sicily, or Genoa for sailors, not more than half could possibly put to sea.³ The colonies were in a defenceless condition: not only were they unprovided with the necessary troops for defence, but the whole military force of Spain would not have sufficed for the task.⁴ Something was done to strengthen Cuba; about 950 infantry and 200 dragoons were sent out, and the Governor was ordered to take all measures he thought fit.⁵ The unpreparedness of the allies was pointed out in the French Council, by Puisieulx, who was soon however silenced.⁶

holy days not excepted. . . . aviso ships have lately been sent from Cadiz for different parts of the West Indies, with engineers on board, as privately as possible, and I am told that other avisos are also gone from several other parts of Spain." (Goldsworthy to Pitt, 20 February, 1761. *R.O.S.* 294.)

¹ See the return of Arriaga of 2 April, 1759, given in Danvila ii. 73, 74.

² Bristol to Pitt, 2 June, 1760 (*R.O.S.* 291).

³ Bristol to Pitt, 26 January, 1761 (*R.O.S.* 294). There were 50,000 seamen enrolled in the different departments, but not above 26,000 available.—Bristol to Egremont, 6 December, 1761. Bontaric (correspondence etc. 215) says there were only 30 efficient ships, and crews for 15. Half the fleet went for a cruise; on returning the men were transferred to the other half, thus making believe that the whole 30 were manned.

⁴ Arriaga to Wall, 2 April, 1759 (printed in Danvila ii. 75, 76).

⁵ Real Orden, 27 February, 1761 (*A.H.N.*).

⁶ ". . . por S.A. supé que el artículo de atar nuestro acomodo con la Inglaterra al ya entablado de la Francia, havia dado lugar á un segundo largo discurso del Marquès de Puisieulx, en que relevando las contingencias á que se exponía la Francia en un tiempo en que ya su arruinada situación la imposibilitaba de continuar la guerra con suceso, anadió que dudaba que la Marina de España se hallasse en el buen estado que se queria ponderar, ni

Although it was clear that war was at hand, the Spanish Ministers held smooth language and thoroughly deceived Bristol: "Monsieur d'Ossun," he wrote to Pitt, "seconded by Monsieur Rosenberg, is now renewing his attacks upon Mr. Wall, to bring this Court into the taking some share in the present war, either as a principal party or even as an auxiliary, but I flatter myself these efforts will prove as little prevailing as all their former ones have done. His Catholick Majesty is too clear sighted, not to weigh impartially the interests of this kingdom, and Monsieur Wall undoubtedly wishes for nothing more than to find out some method of accommodating the differences between Great Britain and Spain in relation to our American Disputes."¹ But early in November there was a "surprising change:" Mr. Wall worked himself up to a pitch of "uncommon warmth," and said the conduct of England was unwarrantable.² On hearing this the British Ministry ordered Bristol to demand categorically whether Spain intended to join France, and to treat any vague reply as a hostile act. Bristol accordingly threatened to leave, in case the Spanish Ministers refused to answer, and was politely told he might retire how and when he pleased (*Como y quando le acomodasse*).³ Fuentes at the same time made a las plazas de nuestra corona en America en el pié que deverian estar, si se determinasse S.M. Catholica à empezar una guerra contra la Inglaterra. Parece que el Xmo le interrumpió sobre estas ultimas observaciones, y, preguntandole sobre que Noticias seguras fundaba sus asserciones y si conocía el la Marina de España y la fuerzas de esta Corona en America, le obligó a callar." (Grimaldi to Wall, 26 May, 1761.) Marshall d'Estrées and the Minister of Marine Berryer were also against the Secret Convention. (Grimaldi to Wall, 28 April, 1761. *A.H.N.* 4176.)

¹ Bristol to Pitt, 28 October, 1761 (*R.O.S.* 295).

² Bristol to Pitt, 2 November, 1761 (*ibid.*).

³ Wall to Bristol, 10 December, 1761 (*ibid.*).

pompous declaration in London, throwing the responsibility of the coming war on Pitt.¹ Portugal, the ancient ally of England, was summoned to announce its intentions, and, the answer not being considered satisfactory, France and Spain declared war: this was a necessary corollary to the situation. Spain could not, of course, allow Portugal to harbour English fleets and receive English armies, and under the circumstances it was better to invade and occupy the country.²

The Portuguese campaign was a signal proof of the want of direction and organisation of the Spanish army. It was at first intended to do that which common sense dictated, viz., concentrate at Ciudad Rodrigo, capture Almeida, and march straight on Lisbon; but at the last minute it was decided to invade from Zamora, and make for Oporto through the province of *Tras os Montes*;⁴ Miranda was easily taken, for the Portuguese garrison tried to fire a gun and only succeeded in blowing half the place up: but as the Spanish army

¹ "On ordonne en conséquence au Cte. de Fuentes . . . de déclarer au Roi Britannique, à la nation Angloise, et à tout l'univers, que les horreurs où vont se plonger les deux nations Espagnole et Angloise, ne doivent être attribuées qu'à l'orgueil et à l'ambition démesurée de celui qui a tenu les rênes du gouvernement, et ici paroît les tenir encore, quoique dans une autre main."

² As Choiseul wrote some years later: "La neutralité du Portugal nous est plus nuisible que son inimité, car la neutralité procure à nos ennemis une retraite certaine pour leur Marine militaire, qui est très dangereuse pour tous nos projets et destructive de notre commerce, tandis que l'Angleterre tire en sécurité des trésors immenses du commerce exclusif qu'elle fait en Portugal pendant la guerre, et nous ne pouvons pas y aller vu qu'il y a des Escadres Angloises dans tous les ports du Portugal. Cette vérité reconnue, le Portugal par lui même ne pouvant pas nous faire grand mal, il vaut mieux qu'il nous serve de théâtre de guerre." (Choiseul to Grimaldi, 3 May, 1768. *A.H.N.* 3830).

⁴ A Catalan engineer named Gaber (according to Fernan Nuñez i. 185) was responsible for the alteration.

advanced, it found subsistence in the sterile province impossible; it was accordingly ordered back, and concentrated once more at Ciudad Rodrigo to carry out the original plan. While the Spanish army was thus marching about to no purpose,¹ the English were busy conquering Spanish colonies. An expedition, under Admiral Pocock, invested Havana: after a vigorous defence the "Morro" was captured, and the governor surrendered. At the same time General Draper landed at Manila, which was taken with greater ease than the Havana: the Archbishop, who was also governor, to save the town from plunder, agreed to a ransom of 4,000,000 dollars.² The Manila galleon was intercepted. Such a series of disasters was but poorly compensated by the easy conquest of Sacramento and peace became a necessity, in spite of the cheap enthusiasm of the Spanish nobility.³

By the Treaty of Paris Spain came out better than she was entitled to expect. Cuba and Manila were restored; Florida was ceded to England, but Spain received Louisiana from France in compensation:⁴ the English were to be allowed to cut logwood, provided they demolished their huts and the claim to fish at Newfoundland was given up, while Sacramento was given back to the Portuguese.⁵

¹ The best account of the war with Portugal is in Lafuente, part iii., book viii., pp. 50—60.

² The English Government were never able to obtain payment of the ransom: much paper on both sides was blackened to no result. (Vide R.O.S. 299, Memorial of Masseran, 6 March, 1764, and the refutation of it by General Draper, March 31.)

³ They sent up an address to the Crown, offering their lives and their fortunes to beat the enemy.

⁴ Louisiana was ceded to Spain by a special treaty between the two Bourbon courts (*Instruction aux Ambassadeurs de France Espagne* vol. iii. p. 442).

⁵ The colony of Sacramento, ever since its foundation in 1680,

The peace was regarded by the Bourbon Monarchies merely as a truce to repair forces;¹ they were only biding their time for a better season. Meanwhile, the interests of the Bourbons were consolidated by marriage. The Prince of Asturias married his cousin Maria Louise, daughter of Duke Philip of Parma; the Infanta of the same name, daughter of Carlos, became the wife of the Archduke Leopold; other matches were arranged for the King of Naples and the new Duke of Parma (for Philip died soon after his daughter's marriage). The principle of the Family Compact was thus fully established. It was intended, by a solid network of marriages, to consolidate and perpetuate the union of the Bourbons and Hapsburgs.²

The enmity to England was necessary under the had been a bone of contention. The Spaniards turned out the Portuguese: a treaty in 1681 restored it to them, but without settling the question of right. Anxious to gain Portuguese support, Philip V. recognised it as a Portuguese Colony by treaty in 1701, but retook it in 1705 because of the Portuguese support of the Archduke. By the Treaty of Utrecht it was again restored; desultory fighting went on between the Spanish and Portuguese of Sacramento. By the treaty of 1750 the colony was ceded to Spain, but Pombal delayed giving it up and the Treaty of the Pardo in 1761 annulled that of 1750.

¹ Louis XV. wrote "J'y ai vu avec une extrême satisfaction la conformité de ses sentiments avec les miens sur tout ce qui a précédé et accompagné la signature des articles préliminaires de la paix et sur les mesures à prendre de notre part pour nous mettre en état de réprimer dans la suite l'ambition des ennemis naturels de nos couronnes." — Louis XV. to Carlos, 25 December, 1762, *A.H.N.* 2850.

² See Louis XV.'s correspondence with Carlos *A.H.N.* 2850 . . . "V.M. doit être bien persuadée de la part que je prends au prochain mariage de ma très chère soeur et nièce l'Infante Marie Louise avec l'Archiduc Léopold. J'applaudis d'autant plus volontiers à cette alliance que je pense ainsi que V.M. qu'elle est conforme aux intérêts politiques de notre maison et de nos couronnes" (Louis to Carlos, 18 July, 1763). . . . "Les motifs qui ont déterminé V.M. au mariage du Roy de Naples avec une Archiduchesse sont parfaitement conformes aux principes politiques de notre union et de notre intelligence avec la cour de Vienne" (Same to same, 18 Sept., 1766).

circumstances. The balance of power has always been the especial trust of European diplomacy, and the sudden and unparalleled monopoly of the seas won by England during the Seven Years' War was not unnaturally the reason for the hostility to our country. Freed from danger in Germany by the Austrian Alliance and the indignation of Frederick of Prussia for what he considered the treacherous conduct of the English, the French, under Louis XVI., revived their navy to a height of prosperity never known since De Tourville ravaged the English coasts, and never since equalled; and in their last determined bid for maritime supremacy they were materially aided by Charles III., who recognised, as Alberoni had done sixty years before, that Spain should be a maritime power, and that the energy of the country, instead of being wasted, as heretofore, in continental enterprise, should be diverted to the more useful task of colonial and commercial betterment.

IV.

A French writer has observed that to Frenchmen the Spanish eighteenth century is of particular interest, for it shows the political principles and literary and social ideas of France engaged in a struggle for supremacy with the traditions of the Monarchy of Charles V. and his successors.¹ It is certainly true that a vigorous attempt was made to awaken the Spanish nation from the state of torpor into which it had been plunged by Hapsburg rule. Spain, it has often been said, is the most conservative nation of Europe; yet a veneration

¹ Morel Fatio *Etudes* vol. ii. preface p. 12.

for old institutions is not incompatible with progress, nor is conservatism a synonym for decay. It might reasonably be hoped that, under a wise guidance, the Spanish nation would recover in Europe a position to which it was entitled by its past history.

The opposition to reform of any kind was not so much due to conservative as to ultranational instincts. Spain has always been most anti-foreign, a country where the foreigner is disliked because he is a foreigner; yet, for the greater part of the eighteenth century, the government was completely in the hands of foreigners. The decay of the national intellect is one of the most curious phenomena in history, and generally forms a theme for those who wish to point out the evils of a bad government. At the accession of Philip V. the Spanish nobility were no longer fit to carry out the ordinary duties of their position, and the land was governed by the son of an Italian gardener or by a Dutch adventurer. The elevation of foreign upstarts of course excited great indignation and resentment, and there grew up at Court an opposition, sometimes called the anti-foreign, sometimes the old Spanish party, which strenuously resisted foreign influence of any description and by so doing neutralised the benefits of reform. This party grew stronger as time went on and the Spanish nobility, by its more frequent opportunities and intercourse with the outside world, prepared and fitted itself for higher duties. The question reached an acute stage during the first period of the reign of Carlos. The King himself was a Spaniard neither in parentage nor character; he had not one of the national weaknesses; he was not a showy man and he never indulged in the habit of putting business off to "mañana": regular and methodical to the very smallest details, he rose every day at

the same time, went early to bed and apportioned each hour to a given task. His ministers were foreigners; Squillaci and Grimaldi were Italians, Wall was an Irishman. The Family Compact was the work of Grimaldi, under the supervision of Wall. Thus Spain's finances were administered by a foreigner; her most delicate negotiations were entrusted to a foreigner; while foreign soldiers of fortune planned campaigns for Spanish armies and led Spanish troops into the field.

Popular discontent and Court intrigue were increased by the Family Compact. Among the mass of the people France was perhaps an object of more hatred than England. At Court opinion was divided; Wall and Squillaci had always been adverse to the new policy;¹ Grimaldi boasted that the Family Compact was a child of his own;² Arriaga, Minister of the Indies and Marine Department, was a Spaniard of the old school.³

It was upon Squillaci that discontent fixed itself: in him the national hatred found a scapegoat. His personality lent itself to attack. He was a man of low birth and small intelligence. Vulgar and ostentatious, he had all the arrogance of an upstart who possessed the royal favour: his system of financial administration was ruinous and short-sighted. In his anxiety to keep in power and find money for the growing expenses, he multiplied vexatious taxes, did nothing to reform the absurd fiscal system,⁴ and sometimes resorted to mea-

¹ Rochford to Conway *passim*.

² Same to same, 3 October, 1765, *R.O.S.* 304.

³ Same to same, 17 September, 1765, *R.O.S.* 303.

⁴ See the memoir of Broglie to Louis XV. in *Boutaric* (vol. ii. p. 220). Rochford says "Squillaci, though an excellent *Ministre de Finances*, is excessively timid, frightened at the expense that would attend even the preparations for a war, but most servilely acquiescing in whatever scheme the King his master adopts (Rochford to Conway, 17 September, 1765, *R.O.S.* 303).

asures which were neither honourable nor expedient.¹ The popular voice accused him of dilapidating the finances; and it is certain he looked after the interests of his family; his eldest son was a Major General, his second enjoyed the revenues of a fat archdeaconry; his third, when hardly out of the cradle, was named Administrator of the Cadiz Customs. His wife, who appears to have been a most disagreeable person, was believed to sell her influence to the highest bidder and to hold a general store in her house, where tobacco, chocolate, cacao, and other articles were openly sold.² The dislike to Squillaci grew to an alarming extent, and he was made responsible for all the ills of the country.³

There was some ground for the general discontent: the financial condition of the Government was very bad.

¹ e.g. Rochford to Halifax (17 September, 1764, *R.O.S.* 300). . . "The inhabitants of Old Castile have a privilege that wheat should not bear a greater price than 28 reals vellon the bushel; and Monsieur Squillaci having ordered it to be sold at that price, sent his agents to buy it up, and then contrary to the privilege of the Castilians, retailed it again at 80 reals."

² Vide *Relacion del Motin de Madrid acaecido en 1766* (*Academia de Historia. Papeles Varios* E. 87).

³ An anonymous petition was presented to the King, making Squillaci generally responsible for all the ills of the country, — vide *Discurso Historico de lo acaecido en el alboroto ocurrido en esta Ville y corte de Madrid*, *Acad. Hist. E.* 64 — which further accuses him of despoiling the church. There is no direct proof that he dilapidated the revenues to enrich himself. It was alleged there were 600,000,000 reals, Rochford says 40,000,000 dollars, in the Treasury, on the arrival of Carlos in Spain (Rochford to Conway, 6 September, 1765): but the real sum was 124,000,000 reals: the payment of royal debts cost 240,000,000: the war with England 140,000,000: 15,000,000 went to the King of Sardinia: the Infanta's dot was 20,000,000: her wedding and journey cost a few millions: the improvement of Madrid accounts for 12,000,000: the importation of corn cost 50,000,000: the reforms in the army and navy were very expensive: yet Squillaci left 20,000,000 in the Treasury. (*Dos papeles acerca del Motin de Madrid—A.H.N.* 2872). It must be admitted however that this optimistic statement is not borne out by any evidence.

Grimaldi told Lord Rochford they had just wherewith to live from hand to mouth, but absolutely no resources.¹ The heavy expenditure consequent on the war, the marriage of the Infanta, the efforts to place the army and navy upon a better footing, and the general improvement of Madrid, had completely drained the Treasury, and public credit was so bad that Squillaci was at a loss to know where to look for funds.² Circumstances beyond human control made the situation worse. For two years, owing to a scarcity of rain, the crops had failed. The King and Squillaci, at a great expense, imported corn from England, France, Naples and Sicily; but in spite of their efforts, the price of bread rose and hungry mobs clamoured starvation.³

It was at this moment, when excitement was at its highest pitch and the population of Madrid—which had largely increased during the last few years—was feeling the pangs of hunger, that the Government took a step which immediately roused the popular indignation and occasioned the well known Insurrection of Madrid. An order was issued forbidding, under severe penalties, the wearing in the streets of the flapped hat and large cloak (10 March, 1766). The enactment was not the first of its kind: during the reign of Philip I. the “*capa y sombrero*” had been the object of many police regulations,⁴ and one of the first cares of Carlos had been to attempt to restrict the abuse of this national costume, which

¹ Rochford to Conway, 5 August, 1765, *R.O.S.* 303.

² Same to same, 19 August, 1765.

³ “As the price of bread is considerably raised, there have been great clamours amongst the people of Madrid, and the day the Court returned here, the mob got about the Queen Mother's coach and cried they were starving.” (Rochford to Conway, 9 Dec., 1765).

⁴ Vide *Libros de gobierno de los Alcaldes de Casa y Corte*, 1766. (*A.H.N.*).

favoured acts of violence and rendered detection impossible.¹

From the first there sprang up an organised resistance, which from its complete preparedness, seems to have proceeded from the Court. The posters were removed during the night, and in their place appeared a placard declaring "that there were 80 Spaniards who were determined to oppose the edict." The Police had orders to seize offenders in the street; they were hurried off to prison where the fine of six ducats was immediately exacted, and their cloaks were cut to the size prescribed;² small bands, however, paraded defiantly before the police stations, and many brawls took place between them and the soldiers who had been called out to preserve order.

On Sunday, the 23rd of March, a small band of sixteen men, starting from the Plaza Mayor, went off by twos through the town to collect a mob; about four thousand were soon assembled, and marched to Squillaci's house, shouting "Long live the King and down with Squillaci," with other expressions of insult to the Minister and his wife.³ The Marquese was away at San Fernando and his wife, on the approach of the mob, escaped to a neighbouring house. Beyond breaking some furniture, the rioters did no damage, and soon formed up again to march to the Palace Square, while some went and broke the windows of Grimaldi's house. In the Palace confusion reigned supreme. In

¹ Vide *Libros de gobierno de los Alcaldes de Casa y Corte*, 1761. (A.H.N.).

² Fernan Nuñez vol. i. p. 198.

³ Dandole publicamente el nombre de ladrón y a su muger de p . . . del rey, porque entraba en Palacio con alguna mas satisfacción y confianza que otras Señoras, haciendo quitar a Todos, aunque fuesen soldados, el sombrero de tres picos (*Relacion del Motin*, E. 87).

spite of warnings that mischief was brewing, the King and his Ministers were taken by surprise, and displayed a lamentable want of firmness. A few well-directed volleys, or even a water hose, would probably have effectually dispersed the mob, but nothing was done. It was thought that there were not enough troops to quell the insurrection, as the Spanish Guards could not be trusted. So messengers were despatched to all parts to bring up reinforcements, cannon was sent for from Segovia,¹ the Palace Guards were doubled, and the Insurgents were left to parade about, forcing the passers by to slouch their hats, until fatigue compelled them to retire. The next day the scene was repeated. The soldiers had orders not to fire, but in the confusion some Walloons fired a volley; the fury of the crowd was instantly awakened and the detachment was pelted with stones and sorely mishandled. One of the Walloons was seized and put to death in a barbarous manner, and, having once tasted blood, the mob proceeded to vent its rage on any small detachment of Walloons it happened to meet.²

Meanwhile the Dukes of Arcos and of Medinaceli did their best to find out the object of the insurrection; they could, however, only gather that the Insurgents wanted the head of Squillaci. At last a priest, Father Cuenca, persuaded them to put their demands in writing, and he himself waited upon the King with the petition demanding: (1) That Squillaci and his family be banished; (2) All foreign Ministers be dismissed, and their places taken by Spaniards; (3) The Committee of

¹ Rochford to Conway, 24 March, 1766 (*R.O.S.* 305).

² During the fêtes in honour of the marriage of the Infanta, viz. 14 February, 1764, the Walloons brutally illtreated the crowd under the pretence of keeping order, killing some and wounding many. (*Vide Discurso Historico*, E. 64).

Supplies be abolished (Junta de Abastos); (4) The Walloons leave Madrid; (5) The people be at liberty to dress as they pleased; and (6) The price of provisions be lowered. A council was hurriedly held. The councillors were equally divided in opinion, three being for shooting the Insurgents down, and three for compliance with their request.¹ Carlos inclined to the latter view and by his commands the people were admitted into the courtyard; the King appeared on a balcony, and nodded assent to each article of the petition as it was read aloud by Father Cuenca. The crowd was immediately appeased and gradually dispersed.

Carlos was soon persuaded by those around him that it did not become his dignity to remain in his disaffected capital. That very same night the whole Royal Family, including even the Queen Mother, who disapproved of the step, stole secretly out of the Palace, and drove to Aranjuez with the unhappy Squillaci. The fallen Minister's wife and daughter got away in the Dutch Envoy's coach. This flight of the King rekindled the disturbances. The mob, who had begun to enjoy parading about, gathered again the next day for the purpose of celebrating their victory. As soon as it became known that Carlos was at Aranjuez the riot began afresh, the Walloons marched out to join the King, the Spanish Guards were confined to barracks, the Invalids gave up their arms and no resistance was offered. For forty-eight hours the Insurgents were undisputed masters of the situation; but, beyond closing the gates of the town and mutilating the Walloons killed the day before, they did no harm.² The old

¹ Their opinions are in the *Discurso Historico*, and are reproduced in Danvila vol. ii. pp. 324. 333.

² The greatest rage they showed was to the dead bodies of the Walloon Guards who had fired upon them: these they dragged

Bishop of Carthagena, Governor of the Council, was quite unable to cope with the situation; with great alacrity he made ready to go himself to Aranjuez as deputy from the people, but he was not allowed to move, for fear he should remain there. After some parleying, one of the Insurgents was sent to demand the King's return; he came back with the message that His Majesty had been bled, and could not possibly leave Aranjuez, but that he confirmed his former decision and his royal pardon, on condition the riot ceased.¹ This conciliatory message, together with the news that Squillaci was already on his way to exile, had the desired effect. The mob, of their own accord, gave back the arms which they had seized, shook hands with the soldiers, and Madrid resumed its normal aspect.

The royal promises were kept on the whole: Don Miguel Muzquiz was appointed Minister of Finance; the Department of War was given to another Spaniard, Gregorio Muniain. No punishment was administered publicly to any of the rioters, but several of the ring-leaders disappeared mysteriously, and a man who had indulged in some wild talk about the necessity of spilling Bourbon blood was put to death in the Plaza Mayor.²

Such was the Madrid Riot, in which the people had showed so determined a spirit and Carlos a timidity worthy of his father. To those on the spot it appeared indisputable that the movement was no ordinary outburst of popular wrath.³ From the first, resistance was

about the streets, put out their eyes, plucked out their tongues and burned their bodies. (Rochford to Conway, 31 March, 1766, *R.O.S.* 305).

¹ Vide Danvila vol. ii. p. 338, note i.

² *Relacion del Motin*, E. 87.

³ "The governor of the Council thought the 'canalla' had very little to do with the riot." (Ferrer del Río vol. ii. p. 45).

organised; the riot itself was started by a small number of determined men, and the Insurgents were plentifully supplied with money. It seems quite clear that some faction was at the bottom of it. In the absence of definite knowledge, it is at least reasonable to assume that the riot was promoted by those who had something to gain by it—that is the anti-foreign party—who took advantage of the general discontent to stir up a movement which favoured their views.² The people on the other hand, finding no resistance, insisted on redress of their own grievances: it is not necessary to seek much further for the cause of a movement, which certainly stands out among those of its kind. The complicity of the Jesuits, as a body, has not been proved, and is very improbable.

If Grimaldi joined in the conspiracy he must soon have regretted it: the disgrace of the Minister of Finance, in the opinion of the Spaniards, was only the first step towards the total elimination of foreigners: "Down with the foreign ministers," was as general a cry as "Down with Squillaci." His windows had been broken, as well as those of his colleague, and the mob had demanded the dismissal of all foreigners from the Government. Already the probability of his fall was being discussed.³ Single handed he resisted for ten years, owing to the favour of the King and the support of the French; but the fall of Squillaci, whom he had so disliked, left him alone to resist a party which acquired strength as time went on, and brought him into opposition with the most determined and obstinate man of the reign.

² "There is not the least room to doubt but that some of the principal Grandees and the Heads of the Law were at the bottom of all this affair" (Rochford to Conway, 31 March, 1766).

³ Ibid.

The Insurrectionary spirit spread to the Provinces ; there were riots at Saragossa, Cuenca, and other places, but they were easily crushed.¹ It was decided to adopt a policy of energy, and Count d'Aranda was appointed to the Presidency of Castile, with the full powers formerly attached to that office.

Aranda was the right man for the occasion.² He was the most distinguished representative of the enlightened portion of the Spanish nobility—by nature a Spaniard of the old school, by education an energetic reformer. Under his government tranquility was soon restored. Blending firmness and tact, he corrected many abuses, reformed the police of the town, and did more in six months than had been done in five years ; whilst he governed with a firm hand, he yet contrived to make himself popular ; he was always the first at the Council, setting the example of industry. The people were kept amused by masquerades which Aranda considered a sure way of averting insurrections. Carlos, who at one time was seriously thinking of making some other town the capital, was appeased by petitions begging him to pardon his repentant subjects. In view of these, the concessions to the populace were formally revoked, but the royal clemency maintained the pardon granted to the Insurgents.³ The royal honour was thus satisfied, the people were contented, and the Madrid Riot became a matter of history.

¹ Vide *Tumulto de Zaragoza acaecido en April de 1766* (*Acad. de Hist. E.* 87) also Ferrer del Rio vol. ii. ch. ii.

² For an excellent sketch of Aranda see *Morel Fatio, Etudes* vol. ii. Real provision, 23 June, 1766. (*A.H.N.*).

V.

THE ecclesiastical policy of Carlos is fully exposed in what may be termed his "political testament." Therein it is said that the Pope is the head of the Catholic religion, to whom strict obedience in spiritual matters is due, but that inasmuch as it is possible that decrees contrary to the immemorial rights and privileges of the crown may be issued, the greatest vigilance should be exercised, lest the Papacy encroach on the royal power.¹

To limit the power of the Church to the sphere of religion had been the policy of Carlos in Naples. In Spain it was a task of immense difficulty; it was not so much that the royal Confessor exercised too much influence, or that the President of the Council was a bishop; the whole nation was steeped in ecclesiasticism—the priest was the dominant factor in Spanish life; the village "cura" was the master of his parish; the Bishop was the potentate of the diocese. In such a country it seemed almost hopeless to attempt to restrict the clergy, yet Carlos immediately set to work. "The clergy have certainly no weight in what does not relate to ecclesiastical business," wrote Bristol;² but more active measures were taken than merely ceasing to consult the Confessor. Article 8 of the Concordat of 1737, enjoining the contribution of newly acquired ecclesiastical possessions, was ordered to be enforced:³ the Inquisitor, who dared to

¹ Instruccion Reservada que la Junta de Estado, creada formalmente por mi decreto de esta dia, 8 de Julio de 1787, deberá observar en todos los puntos y ramos encargados á su conocimiento y exámen.

² Bristol to Pitt, 6 December, 1760 (*R.O.S.* 292).

³ *Novissima Recopilacion* lib. 1. tit. viii. ley. 15.

publish of his own authority a decree from Rome, was banished from Court, and a law was made ordering that all bulls, briefs, rescripts, or pontifical letters be submitted to the approval of the King and his Council.¹

Sooner or later it was inevitable that the Jesuits should come into conflict with the Crown. This body had obtained in the Catholic world a power which was well earned by the great talent and unflagging energy of its members. "In the Order of Jesus," says Macaulay, "was concentrated the quintessence of the Catholic spirit."² The reason of their success lay not only in their wonderful organisation and spirit of devotion, which sent Jesuits into the remotest regions of the earth to preach, conquer, and suffer martyrdom, but also in their cohesion and authoritative principles. The great idea of the Catholic Church, that its teaching is not open to discussion, but must be implicitly believed, is the main feature that distinguishes it from the various forms of Protestantism, more perhaps than the Mass and Confession. Humanity as a rule is ready to submit to authority, and the great success of the Order of Jesus is largely due to the fact that they took up the cudgels on behalf of the principle of obedience.

Jealousy, of course, followed in the wake of their power. Not only did the Crown begin to perceive that the Jesuits were a greater factor than the King,³ but the other orders and the episcopacy, together with the secular clergy, were alarmed at their widespread influ-

¹ Real Pragmatica, 18 January, 1762. *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles* vol. lix.

² Macaulay's Essay on *Ranke's History of the Popes*.

³ Theiner has well observed that no man in particular can be made responsible for the expulsion: the ground was prepared by exaggerated notions of their power, which was certainly great: as Choiseul put it, "le hasard seul a commencé cette affaire" (*Histoire de Clément XIV.*).

ence. Nothing is more bitter than clerical dissensions, for nothing excites and interests more the mass of the people: thus those who disliked the Company were led by their passions to gross exaggeration, while the champions of the Jesuitical cause supported the Fathers without discrimination. The Jesuits were made responsible for all the ills of mankind; if an attempt was made on the life of a sovereign, it was said that the murderer had been prompted by the Jesuits; if a bishop was refused promotion at Rome, he declared that the Jesuits had influenced the Pope.¹ Thus it was not only among the Encyclopedists that the Company was disliked; its enemies were to be found in all classes of society, among the village priests and the peasants, in the episcopal and royal palaces. A Jesuit, it was thought, would stop at nothing: he acted up to the maxim that the end justifies the means, and that to tell a lie in a good cause is praiseworthy; in short, he was a danger and a criminal.

It is only such an existing state of mind that can explain the expulsion of the Jesuits decreed by Carlos in the year after the Madrid Riot, and in which he was only following the example of the Kings of France and Portugal. It is also only the general dislike of the Jesuits among a great part of the ecclesiastical world that ensured the success of the undertaking. In the memorial presented to the Pope praying for the abolition of the Company it is said that there can be no doubt that the Jesuits are morally corrupt, that they foment sanguinary opinions, persecute the clergy, calumniate and disobey the Pope, excite the people to insurrections, and are generally a scandal to the Church.²

¹ See Appendix B.

² See *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, vol. lix. p. 9.

Aranda was a confirmed enemy of the Jesuits. Tanucci was constantly declaiming against them: "The Jesuits," he wrote, "are always the same, everywhere seditious, enemies of sovereigns and nations, public thieves, full of vices, and generally atheists."¹ This absurd and violent libel is quite sufficient to illustrate the opinions of those men who had the most influence at the Spanish Court, and who led the King into a measure which his naturally temperate character would not have conceived alone.

The prime mover of the expulsion was undoubtedly Aranda. For many months after the Madrid Riot he was busily engaged in inquiring into the origin of the late disturbances: he may have honestly believed that the Jesuits had a share in the movement; but, as not one single proof has been produced of their guilt,² it is more reasonable to assume that he wished for their expulsion because he thought it beneficial to the regeneration of the country. The French were anxious to work the expulsion. Calumnious accusations were made, forged letters were shown to the King, who at last became convinced that the Jesuits had organised the Riot.³ There is no room to doubt the sincerity of Carlos: he was personally no enemy of the Company; but, in the face of the determination of those about him and the so called proofs they produced, it is not astonishing that he believed the fable. There was, besides, much to lend some semblance of truth to the concoctions of Aranda: the Clergy on the whole had not

¹ Tanucci to Azara, 15 August, 1766. (Simancas 5997).

² Vide Sismondi *Histoire des Francais*, vol. v. p. 370. Coxe vol. iv. p. 355.

³ Vide Libros de Gobierno etc., año. 1766.

welcomed the new government or their reforms:¹ some of the rioters had declared that they were fighting for their religion; many Fathers had mixed with the crowd for the purpose of exhorting them to calm. For a long time after the Riot seditious songs and pamphlets were circulated,² and an attempt was made in 1767 to get up another disturbance by spreading the rumour that the Government was going to prohibit the wearing of whiskers, hair knots and pins, and silk coifs. Tanucci expressed in a few words the feeling of Aranda when he wrote that, as the authors of the rebellion had not been discovered, the Jesuits must be responsible, for they only had enough influence to excite such a rebellion.

An Extraordinary Council was appointed, with Aranda as its President, to inquire into the cause of the Riot. All the enemies of the Jesuits, to the number, it was said, of 1500,³ came, not to bear witness to positive facts, but to deliver their opinions; some said that the Company must have fomented the Riot; others that the Jesuits were conspiring to murder Carlos, and all declared that, to their mind, the expulsion of the Company was necessary to the tranquility of the kingdom. The deliberations of the Committee were kept profoundly secret. Their report to the King (29th January, 1767) advised the expulsion of the Company. Another Committee examined the report of the first, and decided in its favour, and on the 27th February the royal decrees were signed by Carlos and despatched to

¹ Theiner, who cannot be accused of partiality, attributes the flood of satirical pamphlets to the Jesuits (*Histoire de Clement XIV.*, vol. i. p. 68).

² Vide Extracto de la causa criminal fulminada a' Don Juan Baranchan y al Dr. Don Benito Navarro (*Acad. de Hist. Papeles Varios* E. 87).

³ Devisme to Shelburne, 5 April, 1767, R.O.S. 310.

the governors of his colonies. In the night of the 31st March—1st April all the Jesuit establishments in Spain were surrounded by soldiery; the Fathers were ordered to assemble in the refectory where the order of expulsion was read; they were allowed to collect a few necessaries, and instantly drove off to the nearest port under escort. In the morning, when they were already a good way off, a decree was published forbidding any communication with them or any comment either in speaking or writing upon the subject.¹ It was intended to send the Jesuits to the Pontifical States; but the Pope, having in the meantime received official notification of the expulsion, refused to allow the disembarkation, and orders were given to resist any attempt to land them by force. After negotiations with Genoa they were taken to Corsica, and soon the Roman Court allowed them to settle at Bologna and Ferrara. The expulsion from the colonies was carried out with perfect ease; it was expected that the Jesuits, especially in the Phillipines, would give some trouble, but they submitted with great humility to the decree.

The Spanish Government did not publish its reasons for expelling the Jesuits. Many stories were circulated by the enemies of the Company, while its friends spread rumours that they would soon return. As time passed the Ministers occasionally made confidential statements to the effect that the Jesuits had fomented the Madrid Riot and were generally disturbers of the peace.²

¹ Real Pragmatica, 2 April, 1767.

² In two very long conferences with the Portuguese Ambassador, Marquis Grimaldi has entered into more details, and in order to give him a mark of his confidence, he communicated several original papers found amongst those of the Jesuits, which prove not only their dangerous principles, but the direct share they had in the troubles of Madrid (Devisme to Shelburne, 25 May, 1767: *R.O.S.* 311).

The example of Spain was followed, as a natural consequence, by Naples¹ and Parma. In Naples the moving spirit was of course Tanucci. Parma was governed by William du Tillot, a Frenchman educated in the philosophical school, and he urgently pressed the ecclesiastical reforms; Torreggiani treated his demands with haughty contempt, and du Tillot constantly appealed to Spain for support.² Early in 1768 (16th January) an edict was published forbidding recourse to foreign tribunals. The Court of Rome thought it was time to strike: a brief was published (el Monitorio de Parma) abolishing the anti-ecclesiastical legislation of du Tillot and excommunicating all those who had a share in it or continued to obey it. The only result of this brief was to excite France, Spain and Naples to hostile measures.³ Benevento was occupied by Neapolitans, while the French seized Avignon; the Jesuits were expelled from Parma, and negotiations were begun between the Bourbon Courts and Portugal to arrange for a collective petition to Rome for the abolition of the Order of Jesus.

It is superfluous to enter into a detailed relation of the abolition of the Company. The seditious pamphlets and the spurious miracles organised by the friends of the Jesuits, only served to confirm the King in his

¹ For the alleged causes see Appendix B.

² See his correspondence with Roda—*Coleccion Montes, Biblioteca Nacional*.

³ "Quand à l'affaire de Rome, je crois que nous n'avons plus rien à dire au St. Père, qui est si spirituellement conseillé qu'il nous a traités comme de vrais polissons: il n'y a plus à reculer sur les reprisailles; nous sommes disposés ici à les faire" (Choiseul to Grimaldi, 3 May, 1768: *A.H.N.* 2880). . . . Grimaldi thought that the French might occupy Avignon and the Neapolitans Benevento (Grimaldi to Choiseul, 16 May, 1768 *ibid.*). The *Judicio Imparcial* should also be read. (*Biblioteca de Autores Españoles* vol. lix.)

determination. Spain, France, Portugal, and Naples presented memorials on the subject early in 1769. The death of Clement XIII. a few days later (2nd February) opened the way for a settlement by the election of an anti-Jesuitical Pope. The Cardinals were about equally divided: the Spanish party proposed that a written guarantee should be demanded from their candidate that he would abolish the Jesuit Order, but this proposition was vehemently opposed by Bernis. After much intrigue, the conclave ended in the election of Ganganelli, a man who had committed himself to no party, but who was known to harbour sentiments of dislike to the Company.¹

The new Pope was cautious and diplomatic: in spite of the renewed solicitations of the Bourbon Ambassadors, he declared he would take time to consider,² and meanwhile, by the bull "*Coelestium munerum thesaurus*," he renewed the missionary privileges of the Jesuits. But Carlos, who had become firmly persuaded that the Jesuits had conspired against him, was not to be shaken in his determination, and the temporisations of the Pope only served to increase his ardour.³ The fate of

¹ Crétineau Joly asserts that Clement XIV., before his election, gave in a limited form a written promise to abolish the Company (*Clement XIV. et les Jésuites* p. 260), and says further "la simonie, la terreur et l'intrigue venaient de créer un Pape" (272); against this Theiner protests as being unsupported by proof and proceeding from the half jocular despatches of Bernis (vol. i. p. 244). The promise is supposed to have been seen by St. Priest. Ferrer del Rio denies that it exists (vol. ii. pp. 292—294).

² Theiner vol. i. p. 253.

³ "Charles porte dans sa conduite l'ardeur d'un Espagnol, le fanatisme d'un moine, le despotisme d'un petit fils de Louis XIV." says Masson (*Le Cardinal Bernis depuis son ministère* p. 84). Carlos himself wrote "je désire ardemment que ce nouveau Pontife se détermine à éteindre l'ordre des Jésuites" (Carlos to Louis XV., June, 1769. *A.H.N.* 2850).

Choiseul had no effect on the conduct of France in the negotiations. Aiguillon, his successor, was a friend of the Jesuits, but the necessity of keeping in with Carlos neutralised his sympathies: Spain continued to press her demands with vigour, d'Aiguillon followed suit, and at last, in 1773 (21st July), the brief "Dominus ac Redemptor Noster" abolished the Company of Jesus.¹

VI.

DURING the ten years that elapse between the Madrid Riot and the fall of Grimaldi from power (1766—1776) our attention is chiefly occupied, in the domestic history of the reign, by the rivalry of Grimaldi and Aranda, at the head respectively of the "Golillas" and "Arragoneses" parties. The President of the Council, through the very circumstances of his appointment, found himself immediately heading an opposition against the Italian Minister. He was, of course, the representative of the Anti-Foreign Party, and both in character and policy he was diametrically opposed to the system of the "Golillas." He was essentially a man of action, of authority; his firmness was blended with a knowledge of his country; he would have shot down the Insurgents of 1766 had he been in power, and conciliated them afterwards with bullfights; but he lacked a few of the essential requisites of success in political life—he was not conciliating and he had no respect for the opinions of others. It probably never occurred to

¹ Crétineau Joly in his *Clement XIV. et les Jésuites* says Florida-blanca persecuted Clement, sneered at him, bullied him. "Ganganelli," he says, "n'est pas mort sous le poison des Jésuites, il a été tué par les violences de Floridablanca" (p. 315).

him that his adversary might be in the right; at the council board he argued, bullied his opponents, and stuck to his views with a tenacity which wearied even his friends. As time went on, he became the most unwelcome of individuals—the man with a grievance, the prophet of evils to come. At last, with his complaints and warnings, he wearied even the King.¹ Perceiving that he had not enough influence to discredit Grimaldi, he solicited employment abroad. With alacrity the Government sent him to the Embassy at Paris, where he satisfied to the full his taste for writing bad French, spent his money freely, and altogether astonished French Society by his quaint manners and conceits.²

The departure of Aranda seemed to remove all obstacles from Grimaldi's way; in reality, however, he was more dangerous in Paris, where he would be in a better position to persuade the French Ministers not to support the "Golillas"; besides, in his absence, the gratitude felt for his great services was not obscured by his peevishness and complaints: he was regretted by all. After the unhappy expedition to Algiers the popular song was:

Si O'Reilli no muere,
Aranda no viene
Y Cevallos no va,
España se perderá.³

The Arragonese party grew in numbers and strength. Muzquiz, Minister of Finance, through the circum-

¹ The anecdote "Aranda, eres más testurado que una mula aragonesa," etc., is too well known to need repeating.

² Morel Fatio in his *Etudes* (vol. ii.) has given us some amusing specimens of Aranda's efforts in French prose. His obstinacy was much noted. "J'ai négocié avec les Turcs, c'est tout dire, mais je n'ai rien vu de pareil à cet ambassadeur," wrote Vergennes to d'Ossun.

³ Morel Fatio vol. ii. p. 155.

stances of his nomination, was an Arragonese: Ricla, the new Minister of War, owed his appointment to Aranda: Roda, Minister of Justice, though a "Golilla" by profession, was an Arragonese by birth: Arriaga was an influential member of the Spanish party: Figueroa, the successor of Aranda to the Presidency of the Council, was a trimmer. Grimaldi stood alone, the only foreigner, with the favour of the King, as sole counterpoise to the unanimous opposition; but, although his situation was precarious, there was wanting a pretext to raise against him the general voice of the nation and compel him to resign. This pretext his own rashness soon supplied.¹

Spain held, under the name of "Presidios," a few towns on the African coast. These had been the object of attacks in the past, and there were many who thought that they were not worth keeping.² Carlos was personally inclined for peace with the Emperor, Sidi Mahomet-ben-Abd-Allah. In 1766 proposals were made, presents were sent, Ambassadors were exchanged,³ and in the following year a treaty was concluded establishing peace

¹ His conduct in the Falkland Isles affair gave grave displeasure (Lafuente III. viii. p. 318). "The Minister here still continues out of temper. He has lost so much credit with every rank of people by the manner in which he has conducted the affair not so much on account of the accommodation, as from the pusillanimity and inconsistency he has manifested both before and since it was brought about, that nothing but the firm hold he has in the King's good opinion, maintains him in his post." (Harris to Rochford, 25 February, 1771, *R.O.S.* 324).

² The first captured was Melilla in 1497: Cardinal Cisneros dreamt of a conquest of North Africa: the "Presidios" were often attacked, e.g. "Centa" in 1698, "el Peñon de los Vélez" in 1701: Oran captured 1707, recaptured 1732: Centa and Melilla besieged in 1728 and 1732. Aranda thought they were not worth keeping. (See his correspondence with Grimaldi, 1775, *A.H.N.* 4351).

³ See "La Embajada de Don Jorge Juan en Marruecos" by the Conde de Casa Valencia (*Revista de España* vol. viii., Madrid, 1869).

and regulating trade relations.¹ The peace was broken in a startling manner by the Emperor in 1774. He declared that he had no desire to make war on Spain, but that his religious feelings could not allow of Christian colonies on his coasts; he made at the same time the original proposal that the war should be confined to the "Presidios."² The Moors began hostilities by besieging Melilla. The defences of the town were in a very bad condition; there were only about twelve guns, most of which burst when they were fired. Reinforcements were, however, sent from Spain, and Don Juan Skarloch, who commanded the garrison, made a good defence. The Moors raised the siege (16th March, 1775), and attacked "El Peñon,"³ where they met with as little success.

Whatever the reasons of the Emperor were for breaking the treaty,⁴ the hostilities had an unfortunate effect upon the Spanish Government. Their military ardour was awakened, they began to form projects of conquest, and to believe that their army had been brought up to a high state of perfection.⁵ Much had certainly been done to improve the army. The officers

¹ Vide Cantillo p. 505.

² "Bien puedes figurarte que el Rey no ha admitido esta extraña distinción y que volvemos al estado de guerra antiguo con los Marroquies" (Grimaldi to Aranda, 24 October, 1774, *A.H.N.* 4351).

³ For the siege of Melilla see Ferrer del Rio vol. iii. pp. 112—115; and the *Supplemento à la Gaceta de Madrid*, 17 January, 1775. Coxe calls it a "petty attack" (vol. v. p. 2), but the Moorish army numbered 15,000 men and a determined assault was made.

⁴ "Muchos creen que esta irregular conducta del Emperador de Marruecos fué sugerida por la corte de Londres," says Fernan Nuñez (vol. i. p. 246).

⁵ "En parte debemos celebrar lo que ha ocurrido, porque nos ha hecho honor en Europe, se han despertado los espíritus militares y nos ha servido de justo pretexto para el armamento marítimo, que podemos conservar para estar à la mira de los Ingleses." (Aranda to Grimaldi, 10 April, 1775, *A.H.N.* 4351).

who had hitherto considered their position as merely an honorary distinction, had been ordered to attend to their duties; attempts were made to keep astride with the times; foreigners came to Spain to teach the Spaniards what they lacked; a military college was established at Avila for the instruction of officers; the Spanish recruiting agents for the foreign regiments became so active in Germany as to be the object of many serious complaints.¹ There was an abundance of fine fighting material: the national regiments still retained some of those qualities which had made them the terror of Europe—sobriety, bravery, endurance. The system of the “Quinta” brought into the ranks honest peasants at a time when the French recruiting agents were reduced to the dregs of the taverns, and the English pressgangs loitered at the gates of the prisons. A recent law had remodelled the Quinta abolishing many grounds of exemption from military service.² It was not the want of men, but of competent officers that made itself felt. There was not a general, or even a colonel, who knew his business; shameful favouritism had disgusted the nobility of service in the army; thus recourse was had to foreigners, who were themselves not the most successful of their kind. Every adventurer, every military quack, came to Spain, where he was often well received, elaborated plans that failed and invented guns that burst.³

At the time we are speaking of, the man of the hour was O'Reilly, an Irish soldier of fortune, who came to Spain in 1760. Owing to the support of d'Ossun, he

¹ See Appendix C.

² Ibid.

³ e.g. The “canons de M. Maritz” (see Morel Fatio vol. ii. pp. 81—83).

mmediately obtained employment. He was named sub-inspector of infantry, commanded an army corps in the campaign of Portugal, and was sent in 1768 to govern Louisiana, where his harsh measures provoked general dissatisfaction. On his return to Spain, honours were showered upon him. He introduced Prussian tactics, held a grand sham fight outside Madrid, and generally astonished Carlos with marches, parades, and reviews. For his services he was created a Lieutenant-General; on the birth of a son to the Prince of Asturias he received the title of count, and finally, in 1773, he became Military Governor of Madrid.

O'Reilly was eager to show what these new clad troops, drilled "à la Prussienne," could do; Grimaldi was anxious to consolidate his position, which was becoming alarmingly insecure. The plan was conceived of a surprise expedition to Algiers, which the Confessor, actuated no doubt by pious motives, represented as an easy undertaking. Carlos was not sorry to deal a blow at the pirates of the Mediterranean. The enterprise, by its appearance of a modern crusade, would be popular in the country; so it was decided to attack Algiers. The command was at first offered to Ceballos, the successful General in the Sacramento affair, but, as he asked for too many men, O'Reilly who offered to see the matter through with 20,000,¹ was appointed. It was fully recognised that only by a sudden attack, a "golpe de mano," could Algiers be taken. Grimaldi, however, imprudently boasted of the great preparations, and declared that an attack would be made on some

¹ "Le Roi lui préféra O'Reilly, qui prit l'affaire au rabais," says Morel Fatio (vol. ii. p. 211), it is not stated how many men Ceballos required: Grantham says 50,000 (Grantham to Rochford 17 July, 1775, R.O.S. 336).

African port,¹ so that by the beginning of June the real destination of the expedition was an open secret.

The convoy sailed from Carthagena on June 23, and Algiers was reached on the 1st of July. To the great astonishment of the Spanish Commanders, the Moors were fully prepared; they were perfectly informed of the strength and objective of the armament. O'Reilly, who intended a surprise, was dismayed to find that the enemy were in force and strongly intrenched.² Lacking the moral courage to go back, he decided to attack all the same; "Ma foi, mon ami, le vin est versé, il faut le boire," he remarked in French to one of his officers, as he viewed the Moorish entrenchments through a telescope.³ For eight days the rough weather would not permit of disembarkation: during that time the enemy strengthened their defences, and O'Reilly made and unmade plans of attack. At last, on the 8th July, a portion of the army was landed some distance below Algiers, with the enemy in front and on both flanks. Without waiting for reinforcements, they advanced into the hilly country against positions of unknown strength, held by greatly superior forces. After considerable losses, for which the guns of their fleet were to some extent responsible,⁴ they retreated in confusion, sweeping along with them the second contingent that had just been landed. Intrenchments were hastily thrown up, and into these the troops crowded, although there was hardly standing room. Fortunately, the

¹ Grantham to Rochford (2 March, 1775, *R.O.S.* 335).

² "O'Reilly contaba sorprender á los Moros, y los Moros sorprendieron á O'Reilly con sus extraordinarias prevenciones" (*Ferrer del Rio* vol. iii. p. 120).

³ Fernan Nuñez vol. i. p. 250.

⁴ *Ibid* p. 254.

Moors refrained from attack:¹ as it was, the Moorish artillery raked the trenches and inflicted considerable losses. O'Reilly held an informal council of war, where he explained that the defeat was due merely to the wrong formation of the troops: the officers, however, unanimously voted for re-embarkation.² Under cover of night the retreat began and by eleven the next morning all were safely on board. There was some discussion as to the advisability of bombarding Algiers, but as provisions were running short, it was decided to abandon all idea of revenge, and the fleet sailed back to Spain.³

By the excitement the bad news awakened, it might have been supposed that the Moors were preparing to march upon Madrid. A perfect fury seized the nation: O'Reilly and Grimaldi were lampooned, insulted, and generally held up to scorn and ridicule;⁴ the very soldiers joined in the outcry. The unlucky General had, unfortunately, in his official account attributed the disaster to the rash ardour of the Spanish troops, who advanced contrary to orders.⁵ This attempt to shift

¹ "Si los Moros hubiesen obrado en esta ocasion con la intrepidez barbara que acostumbran, atacándonos en nuestras trincheras, y no con la prudencia y precaución que lo hicieron, fortificándose para defenderse al día siguiente, hubieran hecho de nosotros una carniceria horrible." (Fernan Nuñez vol. i. p. 257).

² "Relacion puntual de lo acaecido con motivo de la Expedicion dispuesta contra Argel en el ano de 1775" (R.O.S. 336).

³ For the Algiers Expedition see the official account in the *Gaceta de Madrid* of 18 July, 1775. Dalrymple, Swinburne, and Appendix D (besides the historians of the reign).

⁴ e.g. "Descripcion breve de las fiestas que se han celebrado en Irlanda por las azañas de su hijo Dn. Alexandro O'Reilli" "huyó este Irlandés villano," says a satirical poem: see also "Comedia famosa, breve y compendiosa, La Conquista de Argel." (Brit. Mus. Eg. 626 ff. 96, 104 and 110).

⁵ See the *Gaceta de Madrid* of 18 July, 1775.

the blame from his own shoulders so exasperated the officers of the expeditionary corps that they proceeded in a body to his house and remonstrated with him. He had better, they said, have confessed the truth, for they had received written orders to capture the heights, and how could they do so without advancing.¹ In the popular estimation O'Reilly was a traitor; it was rumoured that he had been seen shaking hands with some of the Moorish leaders, a convincing proof that he was in league with the enemy. On the public roads the mob stopped the coaches, to see if O'Reilly was inside; the very children reviled him.² It was deemed prudent to send him out of the country, under pretence of inspecting some islands off the African coast.

The position of Grimaldi was untenable. "From the fallen tree all cut wood," says the Spanish proverb. All those who had hitherto supported him, now hastened to join the ranks of his enemies. An unhappy dispute with Portugal did away with any small chance the Minister might have had of remaining in power. The main features of the relations of Portugal with Spain can be reasonably compared with Scotland and England. In both cases centuries of bitter strife had engendered reciprocal hatred—Bannockburn and Aljubarrota are similar in object and effect. The English Kings learnt

¹ Ferrer del Rio vol. iii. p. 131.

² A singular instance of the national hatred was exhibited a few months ago at Valencia. Some hundred of boys got together and having divided their numbers into an army of Christians and one of Moors, pitched upon the lame deformed son of a French barber to personate O'Reilly, the chief of the Spanish party. The infidels obtained a complete victory, and a court martial was held upon the Christian commander. He was found guilty of cowardice and mismanagement, and condemned to be whipped. The sentence was executed with such vigour that the unhappy actor expired under the lash. (Swinburne vol. i. p. 42).

that Scotland could not be permanently conquered: the Spanish Monarchs were unable to hold Portugal by the sword. Both Scotland and Portugal were the allies of their neighbour's greatest enemies. Scotland, in the 15th and 16th centuries, was practically a dependency of France; Portugal, in the 18th, is an English province in the Peninsula. To detach the neighbouring kingdom, therefore, from the English Alliance was the primary object of the Bourbon Courts, the first move in the campaign against England; but up to the year 1776 all their efforts were unavailing. Under the Ministry of Pombal, and emboldened by the result of the last war, the Portuguese refused all the advances of France and Spain, and assumed an aggressive policy in America. The boundaries of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies had always been a subject of dispute. At the time of the discovery of America the Popes, without regard to geography, had made grants of vast territories to both nations. Under colour of these concessions, each country took what it could from the other. While the Algiers expedition was occupying the attention of the Government, Pombal thought the opportunity had come for another slice of Spanish territory: he sent an expedition to Rio Grande, which defeated a Spanish force from Buenos Ayres and took several forts. Grimaldi retaliated (November, 1776) with an expedition of twelve men of war and 5000 troops under the command of the "Marquès de Casa Tilly," which easily defeated the Portuguese, captured the isle of "Sta. Catalina," and occupied the much disputed colony of Sacramento. This act of vigour had been preceded by a concentration of troops on the Portuguese frontier and an invitation to the King of France to side with Spain: there seems even to have been some idea of ending once for all

the Portuguese question by conquest, Spain annexing Portugal, and France taking Brazil or some other Portuguese territory in America.¹ But the French Government were by no means anxious to engage in hostilities before the revolt of the English colonies had assumed a more definite aspect.

D'Ossun employed his influence to arrange matters: he prevented Grimaldi from writing a sharp note to the Portuguese Ambassador, on the ground that it would spoil the work of the French Ambassador in Lisbon.² Pombal, however, politely declined French intervention as being quite superfluous.³ Negotiations had begun in August, 1775. There seemed little prospect of an agreement, when the death of the King of Portugal (23 February, 1777) altered the whole situation. Pombal had intrigued against the succession of his daughter, and had thereby incurred the enmity of the new Queen and of her mother, sister of Carlos. He was dismissed, and the Portuguese Court evinced a desire to terminate amicably its differences with Spain. By the Treaty of "San Ildefonso" (1st October, 1777), the frontiers of the American colonies were defined, Sacramento was ceded to Spain, and Portugal gave up the futile claim to the Philippine Islands, while Spain restored Sta.

¹ "Pero estas mismas reflexiones han dado pié á otro proyecto. Este seria el de emprender seriamente la España la conquista de Portugal con el auxilio de veinte ú treinta mil Franceses, y que, por resarcimiento de los gastos ó riesgos á que se expondría la Francia, conquistasse ella el Brasil é hiciese en America un establecimiento solido, ventajossimo, y permanente, contribuyendo por su parte la España con una diversion oportuna en Buenos Ayres." (Grimaldi to Aranda, 18 October, 1775. *A.H.N.* 4068).

² Grimaldi to Aranda, 29 November, 1775, *A.H.N.* 2831.

³ "Enfin il a terminé son discours par un compliment, dans lequel il a décliné poliment l'intervention de la France, comme étant inutile, vu l'état actuel des choses, qui vont s'ajuster d'elles mêmes" (Blosset to d'Ossun 17 November, 1775, *A.H.N.* 2831).

Catalina and all their recent conquests.¹ On the conclusion of the treaty, the Queen Mother visited the Spanish Court, remaining there for a year. Under pretence of explaining some obscure points in the last treaty, Floridablanca and Continho concluded the treaty of the "Pardo," (11th March, 1778), by which the two crowns pledged themselves to keep the peace and guaranteed each other's dominions.²

Thus one year of peaceful negotiation had accomplished that which three hundred years of strife had been unable to effect. Portugal had abandoned England, and the Bourbon Courts had scored a point. As long as Portugal was an English province in the Peninsula, Spain was crippled at the outset; but, with Spanish colonies safe from Portuguese attack and the Portuguese frontier secure, the struggle assumed a different aspect, and a war with England was possible.

Grimaldi retired from office a few days before the expedition of Casa Tilly sailed to America. The Portuguese negotiations furnished his enemies with another excuse for attacking him. Aranda, from Paris, added fuel to the fire.³ In Spain the leader of the opposition was Don Pignatelli, brother of the Conde de Fuentes: he was supported by the Prince of Asturias, and expected to succeed Grimaldi in the Ministry, but he was cruelly disappointed. Grimaldi solicited the Embassy at Rome, and recommended as his successor Don José

¹ *A.H.N.* 3373.

² *ibid.*

³ Aranda to the Archbishop of Tebas (royal confessor), 11 October, 1776, " . . . Es possible Illmo Sr que no ha de haver en la Monarquía, entre 20 millones de habitantes, 10 en España y otros tantos en America, algunos pocos que puedan ocupar las sillas que el estrangero llenare (same to same, 11 October, 1776, separate *A.H.N.* 2831).

Moniño, Conde de Floridablanca. The King acceded to his wish and took his advice. Grimaldi was appointed Ambassador at Rome with the title of Duke and the Golden Fleece, while Floridablanca was summoned to Spain to take the place of his successor in the Embassy.

The struggle against the Foreigners was now ended, to the satisfaction of all except Aranda; he had imagined that the fall of Grimaldi would be followed, as a matter of course, by his own elevation to power. For the rest of the reign he does nothing but grumble and criticise, not scrupling to write to the Prince of Asturias long letters full of complaints against the conduct of the Government and of woeful prophecies as to the future of Spain.¹ But his influence was gone: the new Minister was too great a man to succumb as his predecessors had done. It fell to his lot to reap what others had sown, to affix his signature to the most favourable treaty ever obtained by Spain since St. Quentin, and to connect indissolubly his name with all the reforms of the reign.

VII.

It was not many years after the accession of Floridablanca to power before Spain again found herself engaged in war with England, a war which she had impatiently expected and desired. At the Peace of Paris the

¹ See "Copia de los papeles que mediaron del Principe N. Sr. despues Rey Carlos IV. hallandome Embajador en Paris." (*A.H.N.* 4823). . . . he egged the Prince on to attack Moñino "bien veo lo que te pasa con Moñino pero ¿ que se ha de hacer, sino tener paciencia? Yo siempre que pueda, sacaré la cara por ti," (Prince to Aranda, 15 July, 1781). Aranda felt indignant at being left out in the cold, as he himself admits, "despues en 13 de Mayo de 1782 volvé á escribir á S.A. indicandole mi sentimiento de verme olvidado para Gibraltar, prefiriendose á un desconocido como Crillon."

two Bourbon Courts recoiled to make a better spring. They both realised the importance of the question and the necessity of a carefully elaborated plan of action. But while the French were for biding time, the Spanish Government, with the impatience of ignorant confidence, continually urged the expediency of war. It is not astonishing that of the two allies Spain should have been the most restless. She had vast colonies in America, bordering upon English and Portuguese possessions and inadequately provided with means of defence, while England held command of the seas, and was thus mistress of the situation. This was more clearly understood since the colonies had been the object of inspections and plans of reform. Spain desired, besides, now as always, the restitution of Gibraltar. Threatened more directly than France by England's maritime supremacy, and with more to gain by a successful war, than her ally, she was not unnaturally anxious to fight. Pretexts were not wanting. There was still some considerable bickering over the vexatious logwood question, much paper being blackened on both sides to no ostensible result. Again, the Spanish Government categorically refused to pay the Manila ransom. The mutual irritation caused by these trifling disputes increased with time, and a serious incident served to show up the eagerness of Spain and the unwillingness of France to engage in a war.

A small English settlement had been made in the Western Falkland (1766). There is no doubt that, acting upon the advice given many years before by Anson, the English Government intended to secure a base for any future enterprise against the Spanish colonies.¹ The islands lay conveniently near to the Rio

¹ Vide Johnson's Essay on the "Falkland Islands."

de la Plata, and were situated on the direct route to Manila. The Spanish Government with some reason felt alarmed at the establishment of a foreign power in such a threatening position, on territory, too, which, although uninhabited, they claimed as part of the Spanish dominions. They had prevented by their remonstrances the English Government from settling there as early as 1748, and Bougainville, who founded Port Louis in 1764, was obliged by order of his Government to hand it over to Spain, upon the Spanish Government protesting (1767). So, on hearing of the English settlement, the Governor of Puerto Soledad (Bougainville's Port Louis) intimated to the Commander of the British force that he was on Spanish territory, to which the latter retorted that the island belonged by right of occupation to King George. He was again warned to leave, and replied that his orders were to remain. On the matter being referred to Madrid by Bucarelli, Captain-General of Buenos Ayres, orders were immediately given to expel the English by force. Accordingly an expeditionary corps—so superior in numbers to the strength of the English garrison as to render resistance impossible—was equipped, and sailed for Port Egmont. After some parleying, the troops were landed, and the English having fired a few shots to save appearances, the place was surrendered (10th June, 1770).

This act of violence—without even a preliminary warning to Great Britain, or a formal demand of restitution—was bitterly resented in England; at the same time the embargo laid on the importation of muslins into Spain served still further to increase the resentment, while various libellous attacks in English periodicals

upon Carlos and the Royal Family stimulated the hatred and wounded the pride of the Spaniards. Both countries prepared for war. George III. made a patriotic speech to Parliament, while Aranda and O'Reilly in Madrid urged the necessity and expediency of immediate hostilities. A compromise was opposed to the demand of Harris, the British chargé d'affaires, for an unconditional apology and the restoration of Port Egmont, while the military and naval preparations were pushed forward with all the vigour and expedience of which the Spanish administration was capable. The negotiations proving ineffectual, Harris withdrew from Madrid, and the Spanish Court, not receiving any encouragement from Versailles, was obliged to give in. Carlos disavowed the "violent enterprise," and agreed to give back Port Egmont, provided that the restitution was not construed to imply the renunciation of his sovereignty over the islands.¹

This sudden concession to the demands of the English Government was due to the distinct refusal of Louis XV. to engage in war. He had approved of the order sent to Bucarelli,² but since then affairs had

¹ Declaration by Masserano, 22 January, 1771. "Sa Majesté Catholique désavoue la susdite entreprise violente, et en conséquence le Prince de Masseran déclare que Sa Majesté Catholique s'engage à donner des ordres immédiats pour qu'on remette les choses dans la Grande Malouine au port dit Egmont précisément dans l'état où elles étoient avant le 10 Juin, 1770. Le Prince de Masseran déclare en même temps au nom du roy son maitre, que l'engagement de Sa Majesté Catholique de restituer a S.M.Br^e la possession du port et fort dit Egmont ne peut, ni ne doit nullement affecter la question du droit antérieur de souveraineté des Isles Malouines, autrement dites Falkland" (*R.O.S.* 324).

² Carlos to Louis XV. (22 December, 1770, see Appendix E). It seems possible that France at the beginning—when the order to Bucarelli was despatched—agreed to share the consequences. A letter from Consul Banks to Weymouth (31 December, 1770, *R.O.S.* 320) says: "I am secretly informed by a person of distinction that

changed. Choiseul had just been dismissed and the "Parlements" were showing signs of independence: but, apart from questions of internal affairs, the French Court did not consider their preparations complete, nor the general state of Europe favourable to the Bourbon cause. Russia was free to side with England: for the first time in history a Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean; Portugal had not yet been detached from the English Alliance, while the Jesuit question was pending at Rome. With so many difficulties to face a war would have been foolish and the issue doubtful.¹

The decision of the French King was wise, but highly displeasing to Carlos. The dislike of England in Spain was as much the result of sentiment as of political considerations, and was therefore more intense and unreasonable. The tone of superiority adopted by the English Government and the virulent attacks of the English press—which at that period was so generally violent and abusive—were perhaps as much responsible for the state of feeling as the dispute about the ownership of a barren island.² Although baffled, the Spanish

a war with England was agreed on between the courts of France and Spain in the beginning of last year, in consequence of which agreement orders were some time after sent to the Governor of Buenos Ayres to take the Island of Falkland in order to irritate the English to declare war," etc. This may be taken for what it is worth, but the fact that Louis XV. *did* approve of the order to Bucarelli (Appendix E), and the fact that an order was sent (which was not known, although Junius urged that it must have been so) certainly give some credit to Banks' statement.

¹ See the correspondence of Louis and Carlos. Appendix E.

² e.g., great indignation was excited in Spain by a silly article in the *Gazette* of 11th August, 1770 (*R.O.S.* 319), which says: "The King of Sicily's eldest brother, we all know, was put aside from the throne because he was an absolute, irrecoverable idiot. His present Majesty of Sicily is, I conceive, just one remove from

Court did not abandon its task. Great exertions were made to improve the army and increase the navy, and the French Court was repeatedly urged to do the same;¹ the old plan of Alberoni to utilise Sweden for a descent on the British Isles was again discussed;² but at the same time, it was felt in Spain that the Family Compact had proved a failure. Thus, when the time came, Carlos and his Ministry showed no desire to declare war before events had taken a definite course.

It is unnecessary to describe in detail a war which forms part rather of the histories of England and France. Louis XVI. ratified the Family Compact, in spite of the efforts of Lord Mansfield. The fear that the French Queen, and through her the Court of Vienna, would wield too great an influence over her husband was soon dissipated.³ The French King ratified a

his brother. The next crowned head of the Bourbon family—I mean the King of Spain—may be allowed to be one remove and a half from his Sicilian Majesty, if weighed in the scale of intelligent or intellectual beings."

¹ Aranda to Grimaldi, 30 September, 1774. *A.H.N.* 4068.

² Same to same, 23 November, 1773. *Ibid.*

³ "El asunto es de los más graves para nosotros, pues si la Reina llega à tomar parte en todos los negocios, será excesivo y sumamente perjudicial el influjo que el ministerio de Viena tenga en ellos" (Grimaldi to Aranda, 18 June 1774. *A.H.N.* 4068). There was considerable discontent at Madrid with regard to Austria. . . . "y sobre todo hasta ahora no hemos visto que las multiplicadas alianzas hechas entre las familias de Borbon y Austria hayan producido aquella intimidad en aquellos enlaces políticos a que estabamos dispuestos por nuestra parte: pues engolfada la corte de Viena en sus vastos proyectos de conquista y en otras miras de desmesurada ambicion, se ha limitado con la Francia y con nosotros à unos terminos regulares de cordialidad y de buena correspondencia." (Same to same, 7 February, 1774. *Ibid.*). Again Aranda spoke to Vergennes on the matter: "Repliquéle yo pues vea V.E. como la corte de Viena no cuenta con nadie, y va à su negocio, y que papel hace en el dia la poderosa casa de Borbon, sino el de un guarda-espaldas embebecido de hacer un gusto à su principal para que le llene de alagos y cumplidos" (Aranda to Grimaldi, 21 November, 1774. *Ibid.*).

treaty which had for object to put down smuggling in Rousillon¹ and altogether showed a disposition to keep on good terms with Carlos. While France was thus busily effacing the bad impression caused by her conduct in the Falkland affair, the relations of Spain with England did not tend to improve. Affairs being in this state, the revolt of the American colonies broke out, and Aranda in Paris began to discuss the advantages of war, maintaining that England was a country which could observe no treaties, since peace or war depended on ministerial changes, and that to anticipate events, therefore, and seize the present opportunity would be wise and beneficial.²

The French were the first in the field. Vergennes strongly advocated that the rebellion should be prolonged by underhand help, whereas Turgot maintained that the true interest of France was to remain perfectly passive. Shortly afterwards (July, 1776), Silas Dean arrived in Paris as secret Agent from the colonies. He was joined in September by Franklin and Arthur Lee; but before their arrival the French Court had adopted Vergennes' plan and Turgot had been dismissed. Loans were made to the colonies, French officers flocked to the continental army, and every secret assistance was afforded by the Government, while smooth assurances of the desire to keep the peace were made to the British Ambassador. The surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga decided the Court of France to declare openly against England. Early in 1778 (6th February) the French Government recognised the independence of the colonies and concluded treaties of alliance and commerce with the American Com-

¹ *A.H.N.* 3373.

² Aranda to Grimaldi, 30th March, 1775. *A.H.N.* 4068.

missioners. The communication of the commercial treaty to the English Government by the French Ambassador was met by a declaration of war. A short time before the treaties had been made public Lord North practically proposed to concede to the Americans all they were contending for, except independence, but it was now too late, and the terms which would have been accepted with joy at the beginning of the struggle were rendered impossible by the alliance with France.

The Spanish Court, by the Family Compact, should have followed suit. In October, 1776, while the preparations for the expedition against Sta. Catalina were being pushed forward and it seemed possible that England would support Portugal, Grimaldi wrote to Paris urging that, war with England being inevitable sooner or later, it was better to anticipate events; but Vergennes replied that it was wiser to wait and let England exhaust herself in the suppression of the Rebellion, a task which she would certainly not abandon, since fortune favoured her arms.¹ The French Minister spoke wisely. A declaration of war from the Bourbon

¹ "Il est hors de doute que, si par une attaque brusque et imprévue, les deux couronnes surprenoient les Anglois de la même manière que ceux-ci surprirent la France en 1755, le nombre de prises de tout genre qu'elles pourroient faire, porteroit un coup sensible à leur Marine, dont ils auroient bien de la peine à se relever; mais ne s'en suivroit-il qu'une guerre entre les trois puissances? et toutes celles qui jaloussent la grandeur de la Maison de Bourbon voyant l'Angleterre prête à succomber, ne s'empresseroient-elles pas de lui tendre une main secourable? le feu de l'embrasement gagnant le continent, la guerre seroit bientôt générale de toutes les probabilités, la continuation de la guerre paroissant la moins equivoque, il y a peut être bien moins d'inconvénients aujourd'hui pour les deux couronnes, qu'il n'y en avoit il y a quelques mois, à laisser les Anglois s'acharner toujours de plus en plus à la destruction de leurs colonies d'Amérique." (Vergennes to Aranda 5 November, 1776, *A.H.N.* 4168).

Courts might well have effected a reconciliation between the colonies and the mother country. Austria and Russia could not be relied upon; Russia, indeed, had offered troops to quell the American Rebellion, an offer against which the Bourbon Courts immediately protested.¹

The disappointment and resentment in Spain at these repeated refusals of France to fall in with the views of Carlos and his Ministers led to serious estrangement. It was felt that since France refused to place her obligations before her convenience, the Family Compact was inoperative. So when the French Ministry, having concluded an alliance with the American colonies without the consent of Carlos,² called upon Spain to join in the war, the reply was in the negative. Vergennes waxed furious and said to Aranda: "This is the third of Spain's blunders: first of all, you get a thrashing from a few barbarians; then you quarrel with Portugal, and finish by concluding a treaty without our knowledge; and now, with your vacillation and procrastination, you are losing your opportunity." Floridablanca answered that Vergennes had surely not counted right—this must be the fourth blunder of Spain, for the first was the war by which Florida was lost and the waste of time occasioned since by plans and preparations that came to nothing.³ This state of feeling and these mutual recriminations were quite sufficient in themselves to make Carlos hesitate about helping France, and there was another consideration of a higher nature which could be urged in favour of neutrality; the

¹ Aranda to Grimaldi, 11th November, 1775, *A.H.N.* 4068.

² "Sin consentimiento de Vuestra Majestad" (Floridablanca's Memorial Aut: Esp: vol. 59, p. 310).

³ Aut: Esp: vol. 59. Introduction p. xxviii.

creation of a republic on the frontier of the Spanish colonies, and the bad example thus given of the success of rebellion was not likely to encourage loyalty in the largely disaffected Spanish America.¹

During a whole year, therefore, Carlos stood aside, watching the course of events. He probably desired peace; Floridablanca certainly wished to accommodate matters.² Spain offered her mediation to England, asking in return for Gibraltar, but Lord Mansfield declared that the condition was impossible.³ By September (1778), however, the English Cabinet expressed its willingness to accept the mediation of Spain. It had found, to its alarm, that the French navy was really formidable—the battle off Ushant had proved that the French were capable of holding their own at sea, and there seemed no prospect of the situation improving.⁴

¹ Grantham wrote: "I am persuaded that M. de Floridablanca looks upon the independence of America as prejudicial to this country on account of the example and vicinity of a new power upon that continent" (Grantham to Weymouth, 27 May, 1779, *R.O.S.* 348).

² Same to same, January, 1779, *R.O.S.* 347. Floridablanca wrote to the Prince of Asturias: "Crea V.A. que el asunto es mas critico de lo que algunos creen, gritando guerra sin saber que tenemos tantos ó mas motivos para desconfiar de nuestros amigos y aliados que de nuestros enemigos" (13 August, 1778, *A.H.N.* 2453).

³ Escarano to Floridablanca 11 May, 1778, *A.H.N.* 4199.

⁴ "Hemos llegado al punto que desea el rey; esta corte pide la mediacion de S.M. Digo pide, porque aunque esta excluida esta palabra y sustituida la de desea, en sustancia es lo mismo, y solo es cuestion de nombre para salvar el decoro. Sobre ese puede entablarse una buena negociacion; ya esta visto el efecto de la campaña de este año, los sucesos que aun faltan para concluirlos no pueden alterar gravamente el sistema de gabinetes; el tiempo que gana la Inglaterra ya no la sirve de nada; sus esfuerzos para el año proximo no pueden ser muy superiores: es gente y no navios lo que la falta; solamente un entusiasmo general del pueblo pudiera salvarla, pero no hay apariencia que suceda, ni tampoco se hallan

Louis XVI. signified that he was ready to treat of peace on the following terms:— (1) Recognition by England of the independence of the United States; (2) Conquests to be mutually restored; (3) France to be allowed to fortify Dunkirk; (4) French and English to have equal rights in India; (5) Permission to be given to fortify Chandernagor and maintain there a proportionate garrison.¹ George III. declared that as soon as France had withdrawn her support from his rebel colonies, he would be ready to listen to any reasonable proposals.² Herein lay the crucial difficulty: the French Court would not abandon the American colonies, while George III. made such abandonment the preliminary to all negotiation.

It would be tedious and unprofitable to enumerate the subsequent proposals of Spain, which were rejected by the belligerent powers.³ The unwillingness of the English Ministry to discuss terms which they considered humiliating led the Spanish Ambassador in London to believe that they did not desire peace.⁴ The probability of the failure of the negotiations was fully recognised at Madrid, and the Government pushed forward with vigour their armaments.⁵ The military operations in the early part of 1779 proved that France could at least hold her own against England, and it appeared as if the united force of the two Bourbon

con un hombre que pueda hacer mudar de semblante las cosas." (Almodovar to Floridablanca 14th September, 1778, *A.H.N.* 4199).

¹ Declaracion entregada por el Embajador de Francia al Gobierno Español en 12 de Noviembre de 1778, *A.H.N.* 4215.

² Grantham to Floridablanca 14th November, 1778, *A.H.N.* 4199.

³ See the diplomatic correspondence *A.H.N.* 4199 and *R.O.S.* 347.

⁴ Almodovar to Floridablanca, 23 February, 1779, *A.H.N.* 4199.

⁵ Floridablanca to Vergennes, 20 November, 1778 (*ibid.*).

Courts would prove irresistible. Already in January, Vergennes and Floridablanca discussed plans of attack, and by the end of February the Spanish Court had decided to force its proposals on England or declare war. Almodovar accordingly presented an ultimatum to Weymouth, summoning the English Government to accept the terms of peace lately put forward. On receiving an energetic refusal Spain declared war (16th June).¹ A secret treaty of alliance with France (12th April) provided for the conduct of the war and enumerated the objects to be gained. It is a fitting illustration of the relations between the two Bourbon monarchies that the Family Compact should thus have been treated as non-existent. By the new treaty both powers bound themselves not to make peace without mutual consent. The chief desire of Carlos was to regain Gibraltar and Minorca.²

The principal events of the war may be briefly indicated. According to a preconcerted plan, the Spanish and French fleets met at Cape Finisterre, and, amounting to 59 ships of the line with a proportionate number of frigates, entered the English Channel: the English fleet, numbering only 38 ships of the line with some frigates, retired into harbour. The Spanish and

¹ The declaration delivered by Almodovar recites many grievances and insults: (1) There have been repeated invasions of Spanish territory in America: (2) The Indians have been armed and incited to attack the Spaniards: (3) Spanish captives have been forced to serve against the Americans: (4) There have been 86 distinct cases of aggression from 1776 to 1779: e.g. an English officer detached to board a Spanish ship (31 October, 1778) had the Spanish flag lowered and then proceeded to wipe his face on it: (5) The judgments of the Admiralty courts have always been notoriously unjust etc. (*A.H.N.* 4199). Floridablanca in his Memorial says that—during the negotiations—England gave orders to attack the Philippine islands from India (*Aut: Esp: vol. 59. p. 311*).

² *A.H.N.* 3373.

French Courts, however, disagreed as to the next move of the great armament, the former holding that the troops collected at Havre and St. Malo should be landed on the English coast, while the latter thought that the first task of the allied fleets should be to destroy the English fleet or blockade it in its harbours.¹ The natural result of this discord was that nothing was effected. Disease soon thinned the crews, especially of the French ships, and on the approach of the equinoctial gales the allied fleets retired to Brest. The French had lost 12,000 men by disease, and the Spaniards only 3,000, a difference which was probably due to the greater cleanliness of the Spanish ships.²

Gibraltar, the main goal of Spain's efforts, was besieged from the beginning of the war. In 1780 Rodney relieved it, utterly destroying on his way a Spanish squadron of inferior strength; in June, however, a desperate attempt was made to burn the small English squadron anchored in the bay, and, although it was defeated, want of provisions would have compelled the garrison to capitulate, had not the fleet of Admiral Darby again relieved the fortress (April, 1781). Meanwhile, Floridablanca had artfully procured the declaration of the Armed Neutrality by the Empress of Russia and the formation of the Northern League,³ while the irregular conduct of Holland had led England to declare war against her ancient ally. The position of England was now desperate, all Europe being practically leagued against her. In America the Spaniards had concentrated their efforts upon the recovery of Florida and on May 9th Pensacola surrendered to an overwhelming

¹ Floridablanca's Memorial.

² Fernan Nuñez vol. i. p. 331.

³ Floridablanca's Memorial.

force. In the same year a large Spanish force, under the command of the Frenchman Crillon, was landed at Minorca: the English commander, Murray, who had only 3,000 men, shut himself up in the fort of Saint Philip. The French sent help, and after an obstinate defence the fort was surrendered and the island passed once more under Spanish rule (February, 1782). On the conclusion of the affair Crillon was named Commander-in-chief of the army besieging Gibraltar, and 12,000 Frenchmen were sent to reinforce the Spaniards. It was determined to make a great effort, and victory was confidently expected. The Comte d'Artois, the Duke de Bourbon, and many of the most distinguished members of the French and Spanish aristocracies came to witness the triumph of the floating batteries, constructed on the plan of a French engineer. On the 13th of September the great attack was made; forty-seven ships of the line, innumerable frigates and other craft, together with the ten floating batteries, attacked from the sea, while an army of 40,000 men, with 186 guns, co-operated by land. The British garrison made a heroic resistance, and the attack proved a complete failure, the enemy losing 2,000 men and the British only 90. In October the fortress was relieved for the third time by Lord Howe, and all hope of capturing it was extinguished.

The Spanish Ministry had now become heartily tired of the war. As early as 1779 Austria and Russia made an attempt to mediate between the belligerent powers. Floridablanca was discontented with France; the French enthusiasm for America had considerably calmed down. On the other hand, the capitulation of York Town had rendered futile all further attempts to subdue the United States by force. But there was an

even more pressing need for peace through the disturbances in Spanish America. The bad example of successful revolt had already begun to operate in the Spanish colonies. Oppressed and plundered by the official class, they only wanted an opportunity and a leader to rise: both were present in 1781.¹ There had been partial risings in Peru and Mexico and early in the reign the reforming mission of Galvez had excited a considerable disturbance. In the former country a chief was found in the person of Tupac-Amaru, a descendant of the Incas, whom the natives regarded as the representative of their native sovereigns. For some years he had harboured thoughts of rebellion,² and the opportunity of throwing off the mask was provided by an unimportant dispute. The Corregidor of Tinta had made himself odious to the people by his exactions, and had incurred the displeasure of the ecclesiastical authorities. He was waylaid on his way home from a dinner party by Tupac-Amaru, who threw a noose over his head and dragged him off his mule. The murderer then rebelled openly against the Spanish Government, and, having defeated a small body of troops at Sangarara, the rebellion spread until there were nearly 60,000 men under arms. But he was beaten off from Cuzco, and the Spanish forces followed him up. Tupac, his wife, and two sons were captured (6th April, 1781), and after a short trial the rebel leader was barbarously executed at Cuzco.³ His death, did not, however, end the rebellion, which was kept up by his brother, and even threatened to become general throughout Spanish Ame-

¹ See Coxé vol. iv. pp. 331—336.

² See Danvila vol. v. p. 423.

³ Sentencia dictada contra José Gabriel Tupac Amaru (MSS. sobre America vol. viii. *Acad. de Hist.*).

rica. It was not until after the Treaty of Versailles that Carlos was able to stamp out effectually the movement.

The American revolt naturally hastened the desire for peace. Already towards the end of 1779 Florida-blanca had entered into a secret negotiation with England, offering to abandon France in return for Gibraltar; but the English Government refused to make the cession of Gibraltar a preliminary to all discussion, and, in spite of the secret mission of Cumberland, private secretary to Lord George Germaine, the negotiation fell through.¹ The capitulation of York Town had been followed by the resignation of North and the accession of Rockingham and the Whig party to power. Their avowed task was to terminate the war by recognising the Independence of America.² The cause of peace was furthered by the great victory of Rodney over De Grasse, and the consequent failure of the Jamaica expedition, while the impossibility of taking Gibraltar was now fully recognised. Thus peace had become a necessity to each side—to Spain, who was wasting men and money to no result, and was threatened with the loss of her colonies; to France, whose navy was depressed by a great defeat; to England, who was now willing to grant independence to the United States. The terms of peace were settled in the latter part of 1782, and the treaty was signed early in 1783 (20th January).

The net result of the war for Spain was the acquisition of Florida and Minorca.³ It may very well be doubted if these additions to the Spanish Monarchy were worth the enormous efforts and expenditure of the

¹ See Coxe vol. v. pp. 166—186.

² Lecky vol. v. p. 125.

³ *A.H.N.* 3373.

struggle. The Empire of Spain was already larger than she could conveniently manage. Although the peace of Versailles was undoubtedly a great triumph over England, yet the Spanish forces, both naval and military, had not distinguished themselves in the war: except for the easy conquest of West Florida, they were uniformly defeated. Even the great numerical superiority of the Bourbon fleets could not permanently wrest the command of the seas from England: Gibraltar and Jamaica remained British, and the war ended with a brilliant British victory. But still, in all justice to Spain, we may praise her for having been for once on the winning side.

The peace of Versailles is the curtain-drop of the political drama. The centre to which all the political action of the reign gravitates is the struggle against England. As far as Carlos is concerned that struggle is now at an end, although it only received its death blow in the bay of Trafalgar. Peace had been made with the Emperor of Morocco in 1780, with the Turk in 1782, and, as the result of the last, with Tripoli in 1784.¹ Algiers alone proved refractory: Carlos resolved to bombard it into submission and for two successive years (1783—1784) an expedition was sent. It was intended to repeat the bombardment in 1785, and the expedition threatened to become a yearly fixture, when the Regency of Algiers expressed a desire to come to terms, and a treaty of peace was signed in 1786.²

The Portuguese marriages form a fitting epilogue to the political review. The policy of Carlos, from 1776 was, as he himself laid down, to consolidate the alliance and pave the way for a dynastic union of the two

¹ *A.H.N.* 3373.

² *Ibid.*

countries by a solid network of marriages.¹ A double match was arranged: Don Gabriel, third son of Carlos, married the Portuguese Infanta Maria, while the eldest daughter of the Prince of Asturias, the Infanta Carlota Joaquina, was given to Don Juan of Portugal. The way was thus prepared for the union of the two countries, and, had the course of history favoured the plan, Carlos would have been justly considered the wisest and most farseeing of Spanish Kings.

VIII.

It is with a certain feeling of inward satisfaction that we turn from the dreary records of the feeble efforts of Spanish diplomacy to the clear and instructive annals of reform. We cannot bring ourselves to take much interest in a phase of European history which has left no permanent results. The rise of a young and vigorous people is a delightful subject for the historian, but the last convulsive struggle of a politically dying nation is both distasteful and insipid. The year 1783 closes the political history of the reign; not only is there no political activity worthy of notice after that date, but

¹ Instruction reservada. . . . Aut: Esp: vol. 59, pp. 209—270, arto ccclxxviii. says: "Los matrimonios reciprocos que se han hecho ahora entre los Infantes de ambas casas de España y Portugal, se han de repetir todas las veces que se presente ocasion para ello. El rey, mi padre, lo hizo así, yo le he imitado, y deseo que mis sucesores sigan el mismo, ejemplo. De estos matrimonios se seguiran tres grandes utilidades: la primera renovar y estrechar la amistad; la segunda, proporcionar y preparar por los derechos de sucesion la reunion de aquellos dominios; y la tercera, impedir que casando en otra parte los principes Portugueses, se susciten y salgan de sus enlaces nuevos competidores á aquella corona contra España."

it also marks the end of a system which was principally concerned with foreign policy. In a word, we pass from the stormy atmosphere of the swashbuckler O'Reilly and the quarrelsome Aranda—with their plans of war and aggression—to the enlightened and reforming policy of Campomanes and Floridablanca, and the sensation we experience is one of relief, as if we had passed from a storm at sea into a safe port. In reality the new system had already begun to work in 1776, on the elevation of Floridablanca to power.

The two men—Campomanes and Floridablanca—at once fix our attention. Of the two, the former is the greater, although his work was not so apparent to the outside world. Born in 1723, or, according to some authorities, in 1710, he was one of the greatest men of the century and undoubtedly far in advance of his fellow countrymen in intelligence and learning. He quickly rose to the highest posts. His active and comprehensive mind was directed especially to the improvement of trade and manufactures. He protested energetically against the ideas prevalent at the time with regard to commerce and the sources of prosperity. He is, indeed, fit to be compared to Adam Smith, and although not understood by his fellow countrymen, he yet accomplished enough to preserve his name for ever. Of the same stuff, though perhaps of slightly inferior quality, was made Don José Moniño, Conde de Floridablanca. The two were much alike and their public careers had been strangely similar: they had the same ideals and were employed largely on the same work. They were respectively civil and criminal fiscals of the Council at the time of the Madrid Riot: after the unhappy rising Campomanes was appointed to the Board of Inquiry at Madrid, while Moniño was sent to Cuenca to investigate

into the causes of the riot there. Both argued in favour of the right of the Crown to confiscate the goods of the Jesuits and their opinion was adopted. It was Campomanes who wrote the "*Juicio Imparcial*," maintaining the rights of the Duke of Parma against the Roman See, and it was Moniño who, by his firm conduct, obtained the circulation of the work.¹ Both were at one on the question of reform, perceiving the wants of the country, the enormous latent sources of wealth of the Peninsula, and the evils of clerical power.

The reforms were so exhaustive, extending as they did to every detail and every part of the Spanish dominions, from Cadiz to Buenos Ayres, from bull-fights to cabinet councils, that only the principal facts can be grouped together synthetically.

At the accession of Carlos, Spain was an absolute Monarchy in the fullest sense of the term. It was absolute because no check even temporary could in theory be opposed to the Royal will. The old constitutions of the Spanish kingdoms had fallen into abeyance, and the Cortes were but a mockery of the old assemblies, occasionally summoned for mere formal proceedings and to have the honour of kissing the King's hand.² The Spanish nobility had decayed slowly, and were finally crushed as a power by the long war at the beginning of the century and the advent of the House of Bourbon, although they still possessed feudal rights. The new House introduced into Spain that extreme centralisation which Richelieu had begun in France and Louis XIV. had perfected. It was considered that the best system was one which—not allowing for the diversity of customs existing in each province—concentrated all power in

¹ Aut : Esp : vol. lix. Introduction p. 8.

² They were thus summoned three times during the reign.

the hands of the King. But it was impossible for the King to do all by himself, and the importance of the "secretaries" grew with the size of the kingdom and the growth of centralisation. Already in the early kingdoms we find the "King's Secretaries" mentioned as people of standing. Philip II. had several secretaries, forming but one bureau, the "Secretaria del Despacho." Through this bureau all business passed, whether relating to the army, the navy, finances, or foreign policy. As time went on it was found necessary to assign to each secretary a particular branch of business, and in 1717 we find four "Secretarias," namely—to use the proper terms—of State, of War and the Navy, of Justice, of Political Government and Finance.¹ They were not, however, considered fixtures: occasionally another secretaryship would be created, or one already existing would be suppressed. The practice, too, of giving two portfolios to one man was quite common: it was, indeed, a well received theory that War and Finance should if possible run together. But early in the reign of Carlos it became apparent that the Minister could not possibly attend to the business of two separate portfolios, and that he was bound to neglect one or perform his duty badly.² Whenever, therefore, the holder of these double posts retired or died, they were never again

¹ Danvila "El poder civil en España."

² The evil is clearly exposed by Aranda in a letter to the Prince of Asturias: (22 April, 1781. *A.H.N.* 4623): he further says, speaking of the portfolio of the Indies: "En varios tiempos se ha suscitado el que no convenia un solo Ministro de Indias por la razon sobredicha de formar por si solo un imperio: sino que la Secretarias de Despacho de España incorporasen en cada una su ramo respectivo: y á la verdad nada avria mas natural, ni mas ventajoso á aquellos dominios tan distantes, para tratarlos bien como á los Vasallos cercanos." He suggests a cabinet ministry, with a "ministro confidencial," rather like the present German "Reichskanzler."

granted to one man.¹ But further, it was manifest that the number of secretaries was out of proportion to the exigencies of business and that each Minister was too many things at once. The evil was remedied by the creation of new secretaryships, especially in the department of the Indies.²

But the greatest step in the direction of progress was made by the creation of the "Junta de Estado." The necessity for some sort of council between the Secretaries was very pressing. As each Secretary depended only from the King and made his reports direct to him, there was no concerted action. The Secretary for War would obtain the royal consent to some extraordinary item of expenditure without previously ascertaining whether the Treasury could supply the funds; hence inevitable confusion, waste, and bickerings. Those members of the Government who disapproved of a certain measure or policy would attack their colleague who originated it, and we see by the correspondence of the British Ambassadors the anarchy occasioned by this state of affairs, the intrigues of Grimaldi against Squillaci, and the still more serious breach between Grimaldi and Aranda in 1770 over the Falkland affair.³ It may here be noted that, as there was no Cabinet Council, whenever a question of importance had to be decided the King named a commission to report upon it, the members of which

¹ e.g., Squillaci held in 1766 the Secretaryship of Finance and War. On his dismissal the Finances went to Muzquiz and War to Muniain. Arriaga held the Indies and the Navy: on his death in 1775 Galvez got the Indies and Castejon obtained the Navy: etc.

² *Novísima Recopilacion* lib. III. tit. vi. ley 12.

Aranda, who was so hotly in favour of war, attacked Grimaldi most violently: "Monsieur d'Aranda, a warm enterprising man, is of the contrary opinion, and went so far as to call Monsr. Grimaldi, before the king, an indolent lazy minister." (Harris to Weymouth, 18th October, 1770. *R.O.S.* 320).

were not necessarily all Ministers, as, for instance, the "War Committee" of 1770, which included, besides the Ministers, the President of the Council, Aranda, and the two fiscals, Campomanes and Moniño.¹ The result of all these quarrels, committees, and sub-committees was to show up the hopeless confusion resulting from a system which, in the days when the King really governed the country could work well enough, but was absurd at a time when the real government was in the hands of those very Ministers whose chief occupation seemed to be intrigue. At last a quarrel between the Ministers of the Navy and of the Indies suggested to Floridablanca the necessity for concerted action, and he proposed and obtained the creation of a "Junta de Estado."

This was a Cabinet Council of all the Ministers to treat of all affairs which concerned more than one department—according to an elaborate set of instructions drawn up by Floridablanca—to decide all matters of dispute between the Ministers and the superior tribunals, and to discuss the merits and fix upon the choice of candidates to be proposed for nomination to the King. The germ of a "Junta" may be discerned early in the reign, when Grimaldi convoked now and then the Ministers to a private conference; but the meeting had no official existence and its decisions were in no way binding. The "Junta de Estado," therefore, introduced a principle of cohesion and collective responsibility, and rendered possible a strong executive by abolishing the need for committees composed of persons who were not Ministers. Henceforward such persons would probably be called up, if at all, merely to give their professional advice, not to contradict and bully the

¹ Floridablanca's Memorial.

responsible Minister. The collective responsibility of the Ministry must not, of course, be taken in the modern English Parliamentary sense. No principle had been laid down by which the Ministers would be obliged to resign *en bloc*. But they were morally collectively responsible, in that no one of their number could plead ignorance of measures which had been discussed at the Council board, and each would take a share in any such discussion. The "Junta de Estado" may be termed the Father of the Spanish Cabinet Council.¹

But the Junta only came into existence in 1787. The administration of the country was carried on by a number of councils, and it is rather difficult in such a regimen of disorder and change to make out what were the functions of each. The most important was certainly the Council of Castile: originally purely administrative, it had also become judicial, and it was in 1759 both a council—in the proper sense of a body of advisers—an administrative board, and a high court of justice, divided into several committees or "salas." An exact and short definition of its duties is impossible, but, by comparing it to the council of the Tudors, we may form for ourselves a general idea. It issued decrees, examined reports, gave advice, and was generally the medium between the King and his subjects. But the most important side of its powers was the judicial. During the reign of Carlos the Council grew in importance, not so much as the result of direct change as from the importance of its business and the eminence and great authority of the men who directed its deliberations. With Campomanes and Moniño as fiscals and Aranda as president, it took an active part in all affairs, reorganising the government of

¹ It was abolished by Charles IV. in 1792.

Madrid, issuing edicts to restore public order, and generally advising the Crown in matters of reform. Its numbers were increased from 25 to 30, one fiscal was added to the two already existent, and it was definitely separated into six committees or "salas."¹

The "Camara de Castilla" was an offshoot of the Council, consisting of six members, with the President of the Council at its head. Its business was to safeguard the royal church patronage and decide all disputes arising from it, and to propose appointments to the councils and courts of justice. Carlos did much towards blending it with the Council, by abolishing the post of fiscal of the "camara"—his work being done by the civil fiscal of the Council—and by ordering that all petitions addressed to the Camara be communicated to the Council.² The Camara was also to decide all disputes arising about town charters or privileges, and other municipal questions, such as those concerning markets and fairs, were referred to it.³ It thus became a kind of board for the settling of all municipal affairs.

The three other "Consejos" which played a part in the Government are the Supreme Council of War, the Supreme Council of Finance, and the Council of the Indies. Of the first it need only be said that Carlos fixed its composition at twenty members reserving to himself the presidency. Its powers were extended to include all civil and criminal causes which had anything to do with the army. It also absorbed the minor war-office committees, such as the board of cavalry, and the

¹ Two "salas de Gobierno": "la sala de mil y quinientos, la de justicia, la de Provincia y la Real Sala de Alcaldes de casa y corte." For their respective duties see Bourgoing *De l'Espagne Moderne* vol. i. pp. 338. 339.

² *Nov. Rec.* lib. iv. tit. v. ley 12.

³ *Nov. Rec.* lib. iv. tit. iv. ley 7: Real Orden, 20 March, 1765.

committees of "Juez de Presidarios."¹ It was both the committee of defence and the highest military tribunal. The Supreme Council of Finance was divided into three "salas" and one tribunal: (i.) de Gobierno, (ii.) de Millones, (iii.) de Justicia, and (iv.) Tribunal of Accounts. Its duty was, as its name indicates, to administer the complicated system of taxation. It was a cumbrous institution; the "ciudades de voto en cortes" had the right to send deputies to the "sala de Millones," and the right was extended to those of the Principality of Catalonia and the Kingdom of Majorca,² and various branches of taxation which had not belonged to its competence were brought under its rule. When the "unica contribucion" was established the Council of Finance was ordered to administer it, and the suppression of the "Committee of Tobacco" was followed by the transference of its business to the "Sala de Justicia."³

The Council of the Indies was the object of some legislation concerning its composition, but of nothing worthy of note affecting its powers except that in 1773 it was decreed that its decisions were final.⁴

Such was the organisation of the central power, if it may be called organisation. To quote the words of Campomanes: "The government is divided up among a number of Councils, Juntas, and Tribunals, each of them working away without paying any attention to the others: thus what one orders, another countermands, and all in the King's name. The Monarchy is like an old house, patched up with many repairs; as fast as

¹ Real Cedula, 4 November, 1773.

² *Nov. Rec.* lib. III. tit. viii. ley 14.

³ Real Decreto, 17 September, 1788.

⁴ Real Decreto, 29 July, 1773.

one side is mended, another falls to the ground, and the only radical remedy—to pull the edifice down and make a new building—is impossible in our country where, as my friend Floridablanca was saying, to do one good thing it is necessary to undo four hundred bad.”¹ Bearing this in mind and remembering the difficulties which stood in the way of reform in Spain, where it is one thing to command and another to be obeyed, we must allow that the reforms, although not radical, were yet very praiseworthy. We easily discern in them that horror of disorder which characterised Carlos and an earnest desire to reduce to their simplest expression the innumerable committees which administered and quarrelled over the administration of the kingdom. The important fact is the gradual growth in power of the Ministers, and the great step in the right direction made by the creation of the Junta de Estado, which in the end would certainly have assumed the duties of a strong executive.

The representative of the royal power in the provinces was that terrible person in Spanish life, the Corregidor. He had been in early history the royal instrument for crushing all local liberties, such as the election of mayors and judges, and the Cortes had continually, though in vain, petitioned for his abolition. In 1749 his functions were largely added to; Ferdinand VI. established Intendancies in every province and united this post with that of Corregidor.² The new Corregidor-Intendente was an absurdity: he was everything at once, judge, collector of taxes, inspector of woods and forests, chief of the police; officially he was

¹ Rodriguez Villa—*Cartas político-económicas del Conde de Campomanes al Conde de Lerena*.

² *Nov. Rec. lib. vii., tit. xi. ley 24.*

III

supposed to do the following:—(1) As Intendant: organise the repartition of taxes, hear Revenue cases, enforce the levy of the "Tercios," see to the conduct of the Revenue officers, stewards, auditors, treasurers and tax collectors, write reports on the general financial condition of the province, provide barracks and see to the pay, arms and clothing of the troops. (2) As Corregidor he was (a) The Judge of the capital—the appeal from his sentences going to the royal provincial court of appeal or "Audiencia." (b) The chief of the police: as such his duties were to repress vagrancy, discourage idleness, visit from time to time the towns, distribute municipal posts, and observe carefully and write reports upon the state of agriculture, cattle breeding, population, industry, water supply, soil and roads of his province.¹

This superhuman task was of course neglected: the Corregidor-Intendente confined his efforts to the vigorous exaction of the taxes, and the rest was left severely alone. Carlos separated the "Intendencia" from the "Corregimiento," thus leaving no excuse for the neglect of duty. Far more important, however, was the reintroduction of the elective principle in local government. The nomination to all municipal offices had fallen into the hands of the King, thus crushing all provincial life and activity. The office of Mayor was sought only as a means to curry favour with the Corregidor and to rise to higher posts. After the Madrid Riot the abolition of the Committee of Supplies served as a pretext for the decree enjoining each township to elect five men, one syndic and four deputies, to organise

¹ This enumeration of the duties of the Corregidor-Intendente is taken from the "Real Cedula" of 13 November, 1766, separating the "Intendencia" from the "Corregimiento."

its supplies,¹ and the decree establishing a government for the Sierra Morena declared that "its municipal offices are to be elective, so that the new towns avoid all the evils attendant on the old".² Thus Carlos and his Ministry had clearly seen that the provinces wanted more local life, and that, to infuse that life, it was necessary to restore to the people some part of their local government. Complete independence in local affairs would have been highly beneficial in Spain. In speaking of the Spanish nation we ought never to forget that we are grouping together many peoples of different habits, customs, and temperament; there is perhaps as much difference between a Catalonian and an Andalusian as between an Englishman and a Frenchman. To impose from Madrid the same rules on all was to crush all initiative and ruin all prosperity; for what was food for one province was poison for another. The creation of a strong executive and the desire to restore local life seem to be the chief aims of these reforms in provincial government, and we can unhesitatingly declare that they were sound.

In the domain of Jurisprudence and the administration of justice very little was really done. The law courts were so confused and their attributions so uncertain that no attempt can be made to even enumerate them.³ Legal problems acquired more importance when Floridablanca and Campomanes rose to power. The tendency was to create "Audiencias" in the provinces where none existed and generally to define the conflicting powers of the tribunals. The great error in a

¹ Auto del Consejo, 5 May, 1766.

² Real Pragmatica, 2 April, 1767.

³ The "Calendario manual y guia de forasteros en Madrid" published in 1788, gives a list of the law courts.

system which was wholly wrong, was the blending and consequent confusion of Judicial and Executive, such as we have already seen in the Council of Castile and the Corregidor. Justice was administered, not according to the strict letter of the law, but upon maxims of government, the "reason of state" and other considerations with which students of the Stuart epoch are familiar.

Much was done during the reign to bring about that separation which we in England have come to look upon as one of the fundamental principles of a good government. The tribunals were ordered not to delay justice¹ and the salaries of the judges were increased, thus rendering bribery less tempting.² But it was not sufficient to reform the mechanism of justice, when a new code was badly wanted and the study of Spanish Jurisprudence required to be enforced. The confusing and contradictory nature of the Spanish laws had led to a complete neglect of their study in the Universities, to the benefit of Roman and canon law. The lawyers themselves knew hardly anything of Spanish Jurisprudence: "our constitution," wrote Campomanes, "is very rotten; the tribunals do not accomplish the object for which they were created; laws are piled up, but they are not observed; the Council is constantly treating us to the comedy of the *ridiculus mus*".³

A Junta was formed in 1782 to compile a code, but unfortunately it discussed and did nothing. Six academies of jurisprudence were, however, established in Madrid, while the encouragement given to the study

¹ Nov : Rec : lib. iv. tit. ii. ley v.

² *ibid* ley xv.

³ Villa—*Cartas politico-económicas*.

of Spanish law led to a great revival of interest in that direction.¹

The humanitarian feelings of Carlos and his Ministers inspired them with a desire to reform the penal code.² A commission was appointed to study the question, but as usual it wasted its time and was still discussing when the King died. But in many respects the harshness of the penal code was toned down; wholesale hanging, such as existed at the time in England, was not practised, and torture—although legal in cases of high treason, parricide and assault—was not inflicted after 1775.³

In the domain of economics the progress made was truly remarkable. If we seek for a comprehensive formula to express the change, we can say, with Colmeiro,⁴ that "the principle of authority gives way to

¹ The six academies were (1) de Santa Barbara, (2) Teorico-práctica, (3) de Nuestra Señora del Carmen, (4) de Derecho civil y canónico de la Purísima Concepción, (5) de Práctica de la Purísima Concepción, (6) de Carlos Tercero. The preference given to Roman and Canon law was a subject of complaint in the 17th century: the council in 1713 issued an edict declaring that the habit of judging according to them, instead of following the laws of the kingdom, was most pernicious, and in 1741 orders were issued to the Universities, enjoining the study of the latter (Nov: Rec: lib iii. tit ii. notes 2 and 3). The revival of interest in the study of law is seen by the quantity of law-books written during the reign: *e.g.* Castro, "Discursos criticos sobre las leyes y sus intérpretes," advocating the compilation of a new code (1765); Olmeda, "Elementos de Derecho público de la paz y de la guerra" and Manuel, "Historia de la legislación civil de España" (1771) Guardiola, "El Corregidor perfecto y juez dotado de las cualidades necesarias para el buen gobierno de los pueblos (1878).

² The opinion of Campomanes is consigned in a few words. "Nuestro Código criminal, tal vez es el menos defectuoso de los antiguos de la Europa, pero no deja de resentirse por todas partes del espíritu de despotismo y tiranía de los siglos barbaros" (Villa Cartas político económicas, etc).

³ Torture was abolished by the Cortes of Cadiz in 1812.

⁴ Colmeiro—*Historia de la Economía Política en España* vol. ii. p. 221.

that of liberty expounded by Adam Smith." It was Campomanes who led the movement in Spain, and who, by his writings, threw a lurid light on all the mistakes of the Spanish system. He pointed out that the decay of industry was to be attributed, not to the constitutional laziness of the Spaniards, but to the want of any encouragement.¹ Without studied improvement the industry of a nation will never prosper.² But in Spain industry had always been looked upon as something degrading, and the laws of the kingdom had embodied this principle. Thus, to efface from the statute book these ridiculous preventions was the first necessary step,³ and the second was to found industrial schools and get the clergy and the upper classes to use their influence in favour of work.⁴

¹ Campomanes—Discurso sobre el Fomento de la Industria Popular p. 46.

² *ibid* p. 114.

³ *ibid* p. 119: "es tambien necesario borrar de los oficios todo deshonor, y habilitar á los que los exercen para los empleos municipales de la República."

⁴ Industry had declined so far, that even the commonest articles of clothing came from abroad (*Industria Popular*, p. 10). The making of stockings and all wollen garments would have occupied the woman and children: as it was, they were idle. All the burden fell upon the Father of the family, who at the most gained 4 to 4½ reals a day: as there were 93 holidays in the year, no wonder that the poorer classes were miserable (p. 11 and note 2). Some remedies are proposed: (1) No import duty on hemp and flax. (2) All rude materials should be allowed to enter free so as to encourage manufacturers (p. 20). The proper way to set about fomenting industry would be (i.) the village priests to exort their parishioners to work. (ii.) Proprietors encourage their tenants. (iii.) Industrial and agricultural schools. (iv.) The funds of the "Cofradías" might be more usefully employed in defraying the expenses of these schools and founding prizes. (v.) The funds of the Bishoprics (*espolios y vacantes*) might be diverted to the same use, also any surplus of the revenue. (vi.) In each provincial capital there should be a drawing school, a skilled maker of looms, a turner and a machinist, also a teacher of mathematics, paid by the state to instruct all those who wish to learn. (pp. 32-39).

No knight (*caballero*) could exercise the trade of a tailor, skinner, carpenter, stone-cutter, smith, shearer, barber, or any other "base and vile" trade, without losing caste. In 1783 this disability was entirely removed and all trades were declared to be "honest and honourable." At the same time much was done to encourage industrial enterprise. Manufacturers, who had hitherto been restricted in every way, were allowed to work as many looms and produce as much as they pleased, and wollen and linen goods were freed from all internal duties. In addition, the duties were taken off foreign flax and hemp as well as off all machinery for Spanish factories, and native flax and hemp were exempted from the "*alcabala*" and "*cientos*."

While the trammels of industry were thus partially removed, markets were provided for Spanish goods by the abolition of most of the absurd regulations concerning commerce. The trade of Spain with its colonies was hampered and crushed by the system of the "*flotas*." It was an absurdity, since the need of it in time of peace was gone, and in time of war the fleet would fall an easy prey to the enemy. Furthermore, the fleets did not sail frequently enough¹ and the goods they carried were not sufficient to meet the demand for them; thus the colonies, unable to rely upon the Peninsula, resorted to home made goods and carried on a huge contraband trade with foreign nations. As the fleets were bound to dispose of their cargoes and sail back within a stated time, the colonists held out to the last minute and bought at their own price. These and other considerations were

¹ They were supposed to sail every two years, but this was never carried out and on one occasion (1725—1729) four years elapsed between two fleets.

fully exposed during the reign of Carlos.¹ It began to be realised—especially owing to Campomanes—that freedom was the only remedy; in 1778, therefore, the “flotas” were abolished and absolute freedom of trade was established between Spain and her colonies. The result of this stupendous change was to open up to the whole Peninsula markets, which had hitherto been the monopoly of Cadiz, and to treble the revenue of the customs. To stimulate trade with the Philippine islands, the Philippines Company, which had existed in a limited form ever since 1733, was given a monopoly for 25 years, and the recently founded Bank contributed 21,000,000 reals to its capital of 8,000,000 dollars. The creation of the “Bank of San Carlos” is perhaps the most important fact of all. The great expenses of the Government could not possibly be met by the yearly revenue, and when in 1779 the war with England increased the expenditure, it was found necessary to negotiate loans. The only body available for such a purpose was the company of the “Cinco Gremios Mayores”; but after a time they refused to make any more advances, and recourse was had to foreign houses;—ten million dollars were raised at an interest of four per cent., and paper money was issued.² The inevitable result followed: the paper money was discredited and bankruptcy threatened the nation. In

¹ See—*Informe y reflexiones del Visitador General de Nueva España para que se determine el sistema de Gobierno que conviene establecer en el mismo Reyno y los demas Dominios de la America Española* (A.H.N. 2872). This Visitador General, who denounced the absurdity of the flotas was Don José de Gálvez, who, as Minister of the Indies in 1778, proposed the degree of the 12 October, establishing freedom of trade. This decree of course did not abolish the import and export duties.

² 9,900,000 dollars in 1780. 5,300,100 dollars in 1781. 14,793,600 dollars in 1782.

these conditions Floridablanca proposed to the King the creation of a national bank.¹ A Frenchman, Cabarrus, drew up a plan which was approved and the bank came into existence in 1782.² Its nominal capital was three hundred million reals, but in reality it only reached two hundred and forty millions, the public contributing fourteen millions and a half. The importance of this change cannot be overrated. The bank guaranteed the paper money, being obliged to redeem it in specie, and thus restored public credit. It encouraged industry, by providing an outlet for capital. It relieved the Government from penury, and supplied funds for the new bridges, roads, canals, and other improvements which otherwise could only have been carried out, if at all, by an increase in taxation or a forced paper currency. It marked, in a word, the change from the old hand-to-mouth policy to the modern system of finance based upon credit, and generally furthered industry by promoting the capacity of the Government to borrow and the readiness of the public to lend.³

The interior trade of the Peninsula was also relieved of the absurd and vexatious regulations which prevented the free transport and sale of corn, and fixed arbitrary prices for various articles without regard to the principle of demand and supply. In 1765 the restrictions on the corn trade were removed,⁴ and two years later all interior trade was freed from any regulations.⁵ These measures destroyed the guilds.⁶ The notable reductions

¹ Floridablanca's Memorial.

² Nov: Rec: lib. ix. tit. iii. ley. vi.

³ It was of course violently attacked. It is rather astonishing to find Mirabeau in the ranks of its enemies.

⁴ Nov: Rec: lib. vii. tit. xix. ley. xi.

⁵ Real Cedula, 16 June, 1767.

⁶ The opinion of Campomanes on the guilds is worth quoting:

in taxation were also responsible for the general improvement in the material prosperity of the nation. The taxes were of three kinds (1) General Rents, consisting of the customs, the tax on the American trade and various monopolies; (2) Provincial Rents, being the Alcabala and Cientos, Milliones, Tercios, etc.; (3) Territorial Revenues, comprising the tax on mines, rights of chancery, fines, imposts on the clergy and others. The Alcabala is perhaps the best known: it owes much of its celebrity in England to Adam Smith,¹ and was certainly a most vexatious tax, being an impost of ten per cent. upon every sale of any moveables or immoveables; to this was added the Cientos, a tax of four per cent., making fourteen per cent. in all, and it was imposed each time an article changed hands. The Milliones were an excise levied on various articles such as wine, oil, vinegar, and soap. The Tercios were nominally three-ninths, in reality two-ninths, of the ecclesiastical tithes, which went to the crown.² The Provincial Rents were raised only in Castile and Leon: In Catalonia they were replaced by the "Cadaastro" a tax of ten per cent. on all incomes, and the bolla, a tax of fifteen per cent., similar in nature to the Alcabala,³ in Aragon by the "Equivalente" and in Majorca by the "Talla." The clergy contributed to the royal exchequer in addition to the "tercios reales," the "media annata," or half a year's income, on appointment to office, and in some cases the "mesada," or income of one month.

he says "Nada es mas contrario à la industria popular que la ereccion de gremios y fueros privilegiados." (*Industria Popular*, p. 109).

¹ Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, vol. ii. p. 498.

² *Instruccion Reservada* par: ccxliv.

³ *Floridablanca's Memorial*.

The profits of the Bill of Crusade had also been vested in the Crown by the Concordat of 1752.

These were the principal sources of income of the Monarchy. To the Spanish peasant, who earned at the most four and a half reals a day, and who could with difficulty support his family, the burden was crushing. To do away, therefore, with the "Rentas Provinciales" had been the aim of Carlos' predecessors, and Ferdinand VI. in 1749, had decreed the levy of the "Unica Contribucion" in lieu of all other form of taxation; but the old system went on. Carlos in 1770 again decreed it, with as little effect; the only result of this purely theoretical reform was to supply economists with a subject of discussion.¹ But if the Unica Contribucion was a chimera, important reductions were made in all the taxes on the first necessities of life. The alcabala and cientos on meat, oil, wine, and vinegar were reduced to five per cent. in Castile and eight per cent. in Andalusia,² while the duty on fish, vegetables, and other articles generally consumed by the poor was fixed at two per cent., and hens, eggs, pigeons, etc. were free from all duty. Cattle dealers and farmers were allowed to sell their produce at four per cent.; manufacturers paid nothing, and their goods in retail were taxed at two per cent.³ Finally the Catalanian bolla was abolished.⁴

Far more striking than the facts themselves is the principle contained in these measures. They were intended, as Carlos himself declared, to alleviate the burden which weighed upon the working classes. "As

¹ Morel Fatio. Etudes vol. ii. p: 67.

² Instruccion Reservada. par: ccl.

³ Ibid. par: ccliii.

⁴ Floridablanca's Memorial.

regards the tax of five per cent. on property, which is called a new impost, the reason for imposing it was the just and equitable one of relieving the poor consumers, labourers, farmers, artificers, and mechanics, on whom fell nearly all the burden of the taxes which I have reduced. It was an insufferable and crying injustice that the most powerful persons in the kingdom, living in luxury and abundance, should not pay taxes in proportion to their wealth."¹ This is, indeed, strange and welcome language in the mouth of an eighteenth century Bourbon King, and for this alone, if for no other reason, Carlos deserves the eternal gratitude of the Spanish people.

The agriculture of the country and the agricultural classes were in a very low state of decay and misery, and not the least cause of this was the sparseness of the population. According to the census of 1768 Spain contained 9,159,992² inhabitants, a very small population for what had once been the greatest power in the world. Early in the reign a German settled in Spain, by name Thurriegel, proposed to the Government to import German colonists. Campomanes commended the plan, and Thurriegel was commissioned to negotiate the affair. It was decided to settle the newcomers in the Sierra Morena, a range of mountains on the boundary line of the Mancha and Andalusia, completely desert except for

¹ Instruccion Reservada par: cclxi.

² The census of 1768 was carried out by the clergy. In 1787 another census was taken by the Intendants giving a total of 10,268,150, or a supposed increase of 1,108,258. In spite of Floridablanca, who says "ha tenido Vuestra Majestad el consuelo de ver *aumentado* en su tiempo el número de sus súbditos en los dominios de Europa, en cerca de millon y medio," we may say with Bourgoing (vol. 1. p. 286) that this great difference is due rather to the inaccuracy of the first census, although undoubtedly the population did largely increase.

four inns, which served at once for the accommodation of travellers to Cadiz and a refuge of the thieves who lurked about to rob them.¹ The government of the new settlements was entrusted to Don Pablo Olavide, a remarkable man in more ways than one, but who is principally known in other countries as one of the last victims of the Inquisition. The settlements did not prosper at the beginning, whatever the official reports affirmed. Fernan Nuñez, who probably knew as much about it as anybody else, says that most of the first batch of settlers were French loafers and convicts, who did nothing but drink, and died off like flies.² Those who came afterwards were of a better stock, and the Sierra Morena began to show signs of prosperity;³ but the settlement was an eyesore to the Spanish peasants who lost no opportunity of playing tricks on the newcomers, burning down their houses and driving off their cattle.⁴ The rowdy element in the colony itself was not entirely

¹ "Divide la Andalucía de la Mancha una cordillera de montes, conocidos antiguamente con el nombre de Marianos, y hoy con el de "Sierra Morena" cuya anchura por el camino Real del Puerto del Rey, es de doce leguas. Esta dilatada distancia tiene á su extremo de Castilla el lugar del Viso, y al opuesto el de Bailen, sin que hubiera en su intermedio mas pueblo que cuatro ventas, igual alvengue del Passagero que del Ladron; pues espiaba este desde ellas, con seguridad, el asalto que podia conseguir en el desierto, y al favor de los bosques." (Carta que escribió en las Nuevas Poblaciones de Sierra Morena un amigo á otro de Sevilla dandole noticias de su estado y progresos, 1 July, 1768, *A.H.N.* 2872).

² Vol i. pp. 223-224. See also Swinburne, p. 310.

³ See the account of the Sierra Morena in Dalrymple, who visited it in 1775. Although the settlement was supposed to consist solely of foreigners, yet in 1791 we find 957 Spanish to 565 foreign families (note 6 to Fernan Nuñez, vol. ii. pp. 68-69).

⁴ These outrages grew so frequent that Olavide was obliged to ask for two companies of infantry from Seville to preserve order, and severe penalties were decreed for the above mentioned offences (Real Cedula, 17 October, 1769).

absent, and at the end of the reign it still gave some trouble.¹

The colonisation of the Sierra Morena has to our mind been given a place in the histories of the reign out of all proportion to its significance, while its real importance has been overlooked. The importation of a few thousands of foreigners is not in itself a matter of praise, and in this particular case it may be doubted whether the great trouble and expenditure were worth the result. Its real interest lies in the fact that it was the preparatory school of reform, the "corpus vile" on which experiments were made before the remedy was generally applied. Thus the freedom of election to municipal offices, the right of enclosure and educational reforms, were first given a trial in the Sierra Morena before being extended to the whole nation. But that the agriculture of the country was improved by a colony of foreign vagabonds cannot be maintained with any truth, and the reason for the undoubted progress made in the science of agriculture and in the condition of the agricultural classes must be sought in measures of a more sensible nature.

¹ La novedad de dominio origina continuas disputas sobre pago de diezmos y otros puntos de consideracion. Trastornado el metodo y subordinacion, no es facil contener los insultos de los vecindarios confinantes, personas transeuntes, malhechores y contrabandistas que frecuentan aquel paso, pueblo, y su termino, sin auxilio. Me veo fatigado: no se me facilita ni un piquete aunque le pido, quando en ningun paraje del Rey no es mas necessario. (Rafael Gonzalez, fundador de la Villa del Carmen to Floridablanca, 2 June, 1787, A.H.N. 4826). In a letter of the same date to Campomanes he says: "Mis justicias no se ven obedecidas como antes. . . . Como en la Villa del Carmen no ai tropa ni hé podido conseguirla á pesar de recursos, oficios ni ruegos, es imposible contener los estragos é insultos que en la jurisdiccion termino, pastos y frutos se estan infringiendo diariamente, llegando á tanto extremo que se hace resistencia con armas al Alcalde y Ministros quando á consecuencia de denuncias pasan a cumplir sus deberes."

Of the many absurd regulations, none was perhaps so mischievous as the privilege of the "Mesta." This was an obligation on cultivators to let cattle feed on their land, and by it they were forbidden to make inclosures. It is needless to enlarge upon the absurdity of such a rule, which ruined agriculture simply to favour the "Mesta," as if, as a Spanish historian remarks,¹ man were made for cattle, not cattle for man. Campomanes was a hot opponent of the privilege and gradually it was abolished, the right of inclosure being granted at first to the Sierra Morena and finally extended to the whole Kingdom in 1788.² But the Mesta was not alone responsible for the wretched state of agriculture. The greed of the landlords, who fixed rents out of all proportion to the profits of the tenant reduced the farmer to a state of misery bordering on starvation.³ Through various causes only a third part of the arable land in Andalusia was cultivated, and that third very indifferently. Olavide suggested some remedies, amongst others that the landlord should not be able to evict at pleasure.⁴ It was difficult to interfere with the

¹ Danvila vol. vi. p. 227. On the Mesta see "Bourgoing, Tableau de l'Espagne Moderne" vol i. pp. 92—97. He says very justly: "C'est une société de grands propriétaires de troupeaux composée de riches monastères, de grands d'Espagne, d'opulents particuliers, qui trouvent leur avantage à faire nourrir leurs moutons aux dépens du public dans toutes les saisons de l'année, et qui ont fait sanctionner par des ordonnances peu réfléchies un usage introduit d'abord par la nécessité." (p. 92).

² Nov: Rec: lib. vii. tit. xxiv. ley. xix.

³ "Hombres los mas infelices que yo cognosco en Europa," says Olavide (Report of Olavide to the Council of Castile upon the state of agriculture 20 March, 1768: Acad: Hist: Papeles Varios-Economia Politica—tomo vii.).

⁴ See *ibid.* He proposes (1) Rents be paid in kind by a certain proportionate part of the year's produce; thus the landlord will share the good or bad luck of his tenant. (2) Landlord shall not evict a tenant unless (i) he wants to cultivate the land himself: he

freedom of contract and absolutely contrary to the principles professed by Floridablanca and Campomanes; but landlords were forbidden to evict their tenants on pretence of cultivating the land themselves, unless they had sufficient labourers for the task.¹ But furthermore the sale of agricultural produce and the cultivation of the crops were seriously hampered by the difficulties of communication and the want of a system of irrigation. A network of canals, some of old date, was accordingly planned to serve this double purpose. The canals of Aragon,² of Tauste and of Tortosa opened up the navigation and fertilised the valley of the Ebro, while the Canal of Castile watered the arid plains of those parts. Other canals were begun or planned, such as those of Manzanares and Guadarrama, of Urgel, Albolete and Ugijar, while two huge reservoirs were built in Murcia.³ It is hardly necessary to point out that the free trade of corn and other measures which have already been mentioned, did much to rehabilitate agriculture.

No sketch of the reign would be complete without some mention of the Inquisition. To trace the attitude

must prove that this is no pretext, (ii) the tenant fails to pay him rent two years running, (iii) the tenant neglects to cultivate the land, (iv) for ii to be valid, the landlord must have sued him in court both years. (3) The landlord shall compensate the tenant for all improvements. (4) No subletting shall be allowed.

¹ Real Cedula 6 December, 1785.

² "It is a work not unworthy of the Romans," says Coxe (vol. v. p. 198). From the facility of irrigation more than 100,000 acres were brought into cultivation, and the value of land rose from £1 10s. to £50 the acre (ibid p. 199).

³ Floridablanca's Memorial. The Canal of Guadarrama, starting from the range of mountains of that name, would have joined the Tagus, the Guadiana and stopped below Andujar on the Guadalquivir, thus connecting the south with the centre and making it possible to go by water from Seville to Toledo. Unfortunately the canal was not finished. (vide Bourgoing vol. 332—333).

of the Government towards the clergy would be to write the ecclesiastical history of the reign, a task beyond the scope of an essay. We have seen enough in treating of the expulsion of the Jesuits to form an accurate conception of what was the aim steadily pursued. In Spain as in Naples the clergy must be restricted to their spiritual duties; there must be no priestly interference in the machinery of government. This was the general tenour of the plan; and so it was that no bishop was entrusted with an office of state, and all ecclesiastical censure on governmental acts was severely punished. But this was not enough: the power of the clergy resided greatly in their enormous wealth. To check therefore the growth of mortmain was necessary both on secularising and economic principles. Partial checks were cautiously administered; the final task Carlos left to his successor.¹

The inquisition had received a blow early on in the reign when the Inquisitor General was peremptorily banished from Court for having done what he conceived to be his duty. It was indeed but the ghost of its former self. Occasionally, to prove that it was not a mere antique curiosity, it woke up from its state of lethargy and burnt one or two people;² but as a living institution its significance was gone, and the fright it inspired was due rather to the memories it awakened

¹ Instruccion Reservada par. xiii. and xiv. Charles IV. in 1798 ordered all mortmain to be sold, the proceeds going to the "Royal Coffer of Mortmain" and three per cent. interest being paid (Nov. Rec. lib. i. tit. v. ley. xxii.).

² In 1714 some monks were condemned to death and executed for disorderly practices. In 1725 the Inquisition discovered a family of Moors at Granada and burnt them at the stake. In 1756 some people were condemned for slight offences, and in 1763 a few "heretics" were burnt at a small "auto-da-fé" at Lerena (vide Bourgoing pp. 372-373).

than to its actual power. After the expulsion of the Jesuits, the Inquisition made a feeble attempt to indict Aranda, Campomanes, Floridablanca, and the bishops who sat on the committee as enemies of the Church ; but it was easily silenced by a royal order to stop the proceedings. In 1770 its jurisdiction was limited to cases of heresy and apostasy,¹ and it seemed to have been definitely silenced, when it suddenly astonished the nation by arresting Olavide.² This act had been in the air for some time : Olavide was not without enemies ; the successful man is never without them, and it seems clear from all evidence that dark hints had been thrown out against him as early as 1766 : from that year down to his arrest in 1776, anonymous letters were sent in abundance to the Minister of State and the Inquisitorial Board, accusing him of many crimes, such as having indecent pictures in his house, putting on a supercilious air in church and keeping up a correspondence with Voltaire. The finishing touch to the picture of his villanies was given by Father Romualdo, German vicar of La Carolina (the capital of the Sierra Morena settlement), who wrote a long tissue of absurdities to the authorities, repeating it from time to time, no doubt upon the principle that perseverance insures success.³ In the end his efforts secured the arrest of his enemy.

¹ Nov. Rec. lib. ii. tit. vii. note 13.

² Swinburne says : " Freedom of speech on religious matters had risen to such an height in the coffee-houses of Madrid, that at last it reached the ears of the King, who sent for the Inquisitor-general, whom he reproached with his supineness in a concern of so important a nature. The bishop answered that he looked upon his office as next to a sinecure ; not having any expectation of support from the Government, should he attempt to exert his authority." The King, Swinburne goes on to say, promised his support. (note 36, pp. 379-380).

³ For the accusations against Olavide see Danvila, *El Poder Civil en España*, documento 1365.

For two years Olavide was left to speculate in prison upon the dangers of ambition, while the case against him was strengthened by the testimonies of all those who bore him a grudge or desired to see their name printed in the Gazette. At last in 1778 the judicial farce was enacted, with all the pomp usual on such occasions. Olavide was pronounced to be a "heretic in form" and received sentence of eight years' seclusion in a monastery, where he was also to read pious works all day.¹ A rumour went about to the effect that it was only the personal intervention of Carlos that prevented a death sentence. But this sudden persecution of Olavide was due merely to a passing reaction, and except for the burning of a reputed witch at Seville in 1780,² the Inquisition maintained during the reign an eloquent and beneficial silence.

We must pass rapidly over the rest. In every branch of national life improvements were effected. Something was done to improve communication; roads were begun all over the kingdom and a regular postal service was established. Education was encouraged by every possible means: the library of the Jesuits at Madrid was turned into a public one on their expulsion, while the royal library was augmented and received by right one copy of every book that was printed.³ The expulsion of the Jesuits banished from the kingdom the great teaching body, and it was necessary to replace them by some secular institution. The "Reales estudios de san Isidro" were established in what had

¹ See the account of his "autillo" in Bourgoing vol. i. pp. 381-383. Olavide was soon allowed to escape to France; Charles IV. permitted him to return to Spain in 1798.

² Bourgoing vol. i. p. 388.

³ Nov. Rec. lib. viii. tit. xix. ley. ii. approving of the new rules of the library, which contained a clause to that effect.

been the Imperial College of the Jesuits,¹ while the Universities were improved by the reform of the "Colegios," especially the six "Colegios mayores."² Primary instruction was made obligatory in the new settlement of the Sierra Morena, schools for girls were founded in Madrid,³ and everything was done to encourage the education of the lower classes. The pioneer in the movement was Campomanes, and it was largely owing to him that the "Economic Societies" came into existence. The first was founded in Biscay; other provinces soon followed suit, and by the end of the reign there were forty-four in existence. The economic societies went largely on the lines drawn up by Campomanes in his "Industria Popular." They encouraged industry, proposed the reforms in taxation, commerce, agriculture, and looked after the poor; they offered prizes for the best essays on given subjects, founded free schools and organised committees for the purpose of providing poor women with work. In a word they looked after the interests of the nation and stimulated progress. Thus was the plan of Campomanes carried out, even to the contribution of the "espolios y vacantes" to the funds of these societies.⁴ At the same time the Government established a system of outdoor relief in Madrid, administered by the committees of the 64 wards into which the capital was divided, thus checking the

¹ Nov. Rec. lib. viii. tit. ii. ley. iii.

² Nov. Rec. lib. viii. tit. iii. leyes vi. and vii. The Colegios were on somewhat similar lines to the colleges of Oxford or Cambridge. They had been founded at different times to provide a place of study for students desirous to work. There was no real difference except that of the name between the Colegios "mayores" and "menores." The six "Colegios mayores" were at Salamanca, Cuenca, Oviedo, Santiago, Valladolid and Alcalá.

³ Nov. Rec. lib. viii. tit. i. ley. x.

⁴ See Bourgoing, pp. 333—336.

reckless almsgiving which always accompanied the King on his shooting parties, and making an attempt to distinguish the real poor from the professional beggars, who were and are still such a great feature of Spanish life.¹

We must now close the story of the reign, and, when we have finished, a certain sense of the hopelessness of the task and the bitter irony of the whole thing comes to mar our satisfaction. None of those permanent results with which we expect to frame the picture have remained, and we may well ask ourselves what was the good of all this striving, if the subsequent course of Spanish history was to be one rapid slide down the slippery path of decay. Yet it is unfair to deduce from this that Carlos is entitled to no lasting fame, for the moral of it is that he came too late. He came, when the cumulative force of generations was there to resist him, and he attempted the impossible, to destroy in the space of nineteen years the work of three centuries. He himself and those about him recognised that he could but begin a new epoch and that the continuance of the task depended upon his successors. In that long "exposé" of his work and plans of which mention has so frequently been made, he lays down what he should like to see done, and always the same note recurs, "I have not had time to do this, but it should be done." He left to his successors the carrying out of a vast scheme, of which the union of Spain and Portugal, better government of the colonies, development of trade, establishment of a graduated income tax in lieu of all other form of taxation are but a few features. He attempted, not to

¹ Floridablanca's Memorial. It was at first intended to rely on private charity, but this proving insufficient, Carlos contributed a yearly sum of 30,000 ducats.

force, but to lead the Spanish nation into the ways of modern times, and in this he fully succeeded.¹ To the traveller in Spain everything modern bears the stamp of Charles the Third: wherever he goes some traces of Carlos' work are to be seen. But the significance of the good King to the Spanish people resides not alone in what we consider to be his chief merit. He represents to their eyes a happy time when Spain was still in the front rank of nations, when her alliance was sought and her enmity dreaded; and this last flash of light in Spanish history, before the final plunge into darkness, has given a brilliancy to his reign which makes men sigh for "los tiempos gloriosos de Carlos III."

IX.

It is a difficult task to give a true sketch of the personality of Charles the Third. On the one hand we must avoid the error common to biographers—who become too engrossed with their subject to be impartial—of giving way to the easy method of praise, where none is due. On the other hand we must beware of too much moderation, which would probably result in an incomplete and inaccurate estimate of our hero.

Carlos was not one of those complex characters which puzzle the psychologist. There is a certain disproportion between the place he occupies in History and his personality. His portraits make him a plain man—a

¹ Danvila says with great truth "sin peligrosas convulsiones, pero modificando profundamente la organizacion del pais y preparandole para las imperiosas exigencias de la edad moderna (vol. vi. p. 4).

regular Bourbon of the later degenerate type, the receding forehead, the large nose—no “godlike physiognomy,” as we perceive, yet with a certain stamp of firmness, the legacy of his mother. He appears to have had a charm of manner and a winning smile which lit up his countenance and drew to him the sympathy of all those who came into contact with him.¹ He does not seem to have been talented in the slightest degree. His correspondence betrays no trace of culture or knowledge of the world: it merely reflects a kind nature, overflowing with sympathy and affection for his family and his friends. There is no record of his ever reading a book, and he is known to have hated music² and the theatre. He encouraged art and education; but he seems to have done so rather from a natural inclination to do good than from any just appreciation of the beauties of the one or the advantages of the other. It is he himself who has given us the best description of his qualities. “Primero Carlos que Rey” was his favourite motto; with this we fully agree. He was indeed rather Carlos than king, more fitted for the duties of a good father than for those of a throne. It is amazing to read

¹ He is in his person tall, round shouldered, big boned, of a dark brown complexion, small eyed, and has a very large prominent nose. From this it is easily seen that he is very plain (Clarke, *Letters concerning the Spanish Nation* p. 323). But Carlos was not tall; Fernan Nuñez says: “Era el rey Carlos de una estatura de cinco pies y dos pulgadas, poco mas.” Here there is evidently some mistake, for this would make out Carlos to have been only 4ft. 9in. (taking the Castile foot as eleven inches). “La magnitud de su nariz ofrecía á la primera vista un rostro muy feo; pero pasada esta impresion, sucedía á la primera sorpresa otra aun mayor, que era la de hallar en el mismo semblante que quizá espantarnos una bondad, un atractivo y una gracia que inspiraba amor y confianza (vol. ii. p. 40).

² Fernan Nuñez says “cosa que aborreció el Rey Carlos, porque, quando chico, le hacia ir por fuerza á la ópera su ayo, el Conde de Santisteban (vol. i. p. 104).

of the dull and insipid life he led, a life which no man of genius or great mental activity would have tolerated for a week. From the first year of his reign down to the closing of the scene he rose and went to bed at the same hour, ate the same food and performed the same task at the same time.¹ Never once was he known to vary his habits, to eat beef at night instead of veal, to take three cups of chocolate in the morning instead of two; and this regularity was so ingrained in his constitution that it systematised even the smallest details of his actions.² His

¹ For his daily routine see Fernan Nuñez (vol. ii., pp. 53—58). "S.M. se levanta todos los días á las cinco de la mañana por lo regular. Trabaja en su gabinete hasta las siete. A esta hora se va á oír misa. . . . luego del Oratorio á los cuartos del Príncipe, Infantes, y Infantas, sus hijos; é se vuelve á su gabinete, en donde está lo restante de la mañana; unas veces solo, y otras con sus Ministros. Al mediodía comen SS. MM. en publico é a este tiempo les hacen la corte los Ministros extranjeros, é los grandes. Mientras dura la conversacion como una hora, el Rey, é Reyna hablan ja á unos, ja á otros é siempre con la misma afabilidad. Acabado este tiempo, se va el Rey á caza; é al volver á Palacio entra por lo regular en el cuarto de la Reyna Madre en donde se halla hasta que la hora del Despacho, que el Rey tiene con uno de los Secretarios de Estado. Cada Departamento tiene sus días señalados para el Despacho, que dura hasta las nueve de la noche en que el Rey cena. A las diez ya todo el Palacio esta en silencio, aun la camara de S.M." (Metodo de Vida del Señor Carlos Tercero, Rey de Españas, sacado del Mercurio de 1760. *Brit. Mus. MSS.* 21444, f. 485). The above account, of course, only holds good for the beginning of the reign. He regularly changed his residence, remaining (1) in Aranjuez from Easter to the end of June; (2) in Madrid to the 17th or 18th of July; (3) in La Granja, with one day at the Escorial on his way, to the 7th of October; (4) at the Escorial till December; and (5) in Madrid till Easter. (Lafuente III. viii. p. 136).

² "Cenaba siempre la misma cosa: su sopa; un pedazo de asado que regularmente era de ternera; un buevo fresco; ensalada con agua, azucar y vinagre, y una copa de vino de Canarias dulce, en que mojaba dos pedazos de miga de pan tostado y bebía el resto. . . Bebía dos vasos de agua templada, mezclada con vino de Borgoña, á cada comida, y su costumbre era tal en todo, que observé mil veces que bebía el vaso (que era grande) en dos veces, y la una llegaba siempre al fin de las armas que habia grabadas en el." (Fernan Nuñez vol. ii. pp. 56 and 49).

only diversion seems to have been to shoot all game that came within reach of his gun. Every day, whatever the weather, there was a royal shooting party. We may in part believe his statement that it was necessary to ward off the constitutional melancholy of his house: "if only people knew how little I sometimes enjoy it," he would say to those around him.¹ But that he really enjoyed it there can be no doubt, and nothing pleased him more than to show his trophies to those he particularly wished to distinguish.²

We have already said that he was no soldier, and it is certain that he was no diplomat—yet this man did more to regenerate Spain than any of his predecessors, and it would be a mistake to suppose that he was a mere figurehead of government. The reign is primarily one of ministers, and we could without difficulty separate it into different periods coinciding with the rise to power of the many distinguished men who, for a wonder, occupy the stage. Yet this would not preclude any interest in the King, who will always play his part in an absolute monarchy, however insignificant he may be; and insignificant Carlos was certainly not. The student of Richelieu could not understand his career without some knowledge of Louis XIII. But Carlos was not a "roi fainéant" and his ministers did not play the part of mayors of the palace. The reign is in reality all of one piece, and throughout it we discern a sameness of purpose which can only be

¹ Ibid pp. 52. 53.

² "I was as usual at Court. The King had killed a buck, the weight of which was 275 lbs. or about twenty stone. The horns were on his table and weighed about fifteen pounds. This led to his showing me his collection of horns, which is a favour he confers on every new Ambassador (*Journal and Correspondence of Lord Auckland* vol. ii. p. 79).

accounted for by the personal influence of the Monarch. There is a conscientious desire to improve and a fixity of resolution in all undertakings which tally well with the character of Carlos. He possessed to an eminent degree that quality which in success is called firmness of purpose and in failure is dubbed obstinancy. He was slow to make up his mind, but when once he had decided upon a course of action, nothing would deter him from his purpose. Thus, although his ministers exercised a great influence, they could only persuade, never lead. "You do not know what a master I have to deal with. When he has taken a resolution, there is nothing can make him alter," said Grimaldi to Rochford:¹ and the minister spoke the truth.² We perceive at once the effect of this characteristic of Carlos upon the political action of the age. It explains his tortuous policy towards the English nation which was remarkable in a man of his probity and honour. At the beginning of the reign he became firmly persuaded that England was his natural enemy and that her defeat was absolutely necessary to the furtherance of his plans and, with a firmness of purpose which we may well admire, he stuck grimly to his view. It seems probable that Floridablanca was adverse to making war on England; but the war was waged, and the struggle only ceased in 1783, because the question had been settled. He was convinced that

¹ Rochford to Halifax, 17 December, 1764, *R.O.S.* 300.

² "It has been imagined that he is a very weak prince and of little or no understanding. It is a great mistake. He has some parts, but is mulish and obstinate to the last degree. . . . He can neither be led nor driven; all must come from himself." (Clarke. *Letters concerning the Spanish Nation* p. 324) Swinburne says "Being naturally of an even phlegmatic temper, the King is sure to see events on their favourable side only; and whenever he has determined in his own mind that a measure is proper to be pursued, he is an utter enemy to alteration" (p. 336).

the Jesuits had conspired against him and, not content with banishing them from the kingdom, he never rested until he had secured their abolition as a body. But furthermore this trait in Carlos' character explains the seeming inconsistency between the power of the ministers and the authority of the king. It allowed those around him, in whom by nature he placed an entire confidence, to influence him far more strongly than would have been the case had he been weak and inconsistent: it enabled Squillaci, Grimaldi and others to wield much more power than would have been possible under a versatile prince, for Carlos was as obstinate in his friendships as in his opinions.

The great secret of his success lies in the very fact that he was a man of moderate abilities and good intentions. Had he been a clever man, impatient of obstacles and sweeping in his views, he would probably have brought ruin on himself and his reforms. As it was, he proceeded with caution, attempting no sudden or violent change, slowly, sluggishly working his way, building ships, making roads and bridges, undermining ignorant bigotry, relying all the while on advice which he knew to be better than his own views. He strove hard all his life, not to gain any reward, but to do what he conceived to be his duty towards his people. It is this goodness of heart which strikes us most in Carlos. He was devoted to his wife, to his children, to his friends, to his people. There was nothing on which he prided himself more than on being a kind and affection-father. It is sad to have to confess that his love was badly repaid by his two eldest sons, and that the undutiful conduct of the Prince of Asturias—who was soon himself to experience the ingratitude of his son and heir—embittered the last moments of Carlos' life. The

end was fast drawing near. In 1787 Aranda returned to Madrid, and the presence of this peevish and discontented man, who stirred up discord wherever he went, was the signal for violent attacks on Florida-blanca. The Prince of Asturias took an active part in these cabals against his father's trusted friend and minister, and Carlos, whose hopes for the future were based upon the worthiness of his son to continue his task, was deeply affected by the evident ruin of his plans. The death of his favourite son Gabriel (October, 1788), gave the last stroke to his failing health. "Gabriel is dead, I shall soon follow him," was his mournful prophecy. On the 14th December the end came, and the good old King was no more.

It does not seem that Carlos was ever popular during his lifetime. He had none of those dazzling qualities which strike the imagination of the populace. His simplicity of attire and dislike of show and high-sounding language were out of place in Spain, where men delight in outward display, and are led captive by the magic of fine words.¹ But, soon after his body had been consigned to the gloomy sepulchre of the Escorial, his absence was felt, and the Spanish people, in their subsequent troubles, have given to his memory that praise and admiration which his contemporaries did not bestow.

And we, after all criticism, come back to the popular verdict. For he was a man who strove earnestly and

¹ "His dress is as plain as possible, too homely for a prince; he commonly wears a plain cloth frock, a leather waistcoat, leather breeches, boots (always made in London), a large pair of tanned gloves, and usually carries a gun upon his shoulder." (Clarke, p. 323). See also Fernan Nuñez: the King hated wearing gala clothes; as soon as he could get away, he went to his room and took them off with a 'gracias á Dios.'" (Vol. ii. p. 44).

toiled hard for better things, whose reign was one constant endeavour to lead his people in the right way towards a higher standard in social conditions, and a higher place in the council of nations, and who through a long life in a difficult position deservedly earned for himself the title of "the Good King."

Had there been more of his kind, the course of Spanish History might have been very different.

APPENDICES.

A.—THE FAMILY COMPACT.

THE older historians have unanimously considered that the Family Compact was due mainly to the efforts of Choiseul and that Carlos was, so to speak, drawn into it: (vide Becattini, Coxe, Fernan Nuñez, Ferrer del Rio) but the last work on the reign minimises the influence of French intrigues and ascribes the Compact and the Convention to the desire for re-establishing the maritime balance (Danvila vol. pp. 166-167): there is truth in both assertions. Carlos came to the throne desirous of peace: "sabes mi sistema, que es ser amigo de todos y hacerme respetar de ellos" he wrote to Tanucci (5 February, 1760, Simancas 6042); but there is no doubt that he was inclined to France personally, and that there was general alarm at the sudden disturbance of the maritime balance: early in December, 1759, he said to d'Ossun: "il faudra bien qu'ils fassent la paix, sinon ils me contraindront, quoique contre mon envie, a faire la guerre; mais, de façon ou d'autre, je ne souffrirai pas qu'ils restent les maitres en Europe et en Amerique." (*Instructions aux Ambassadeurs de France—Espagne*—tome iii. p. 338). In the middle of 1760, he adopts a tone of despair, as it became evident that England would not be so easily intimidated: "Dios sabe que no he deseado ni deseo nada de nadie, pero que quiero guardar lo que por su infinita bondad me ha dado, y que nadie me lo inquiete ni me lo quite," he wrote to Tanucci (26 August, 1760, Simancas 6043). By the end of 1760 it was quite decided to ally in some shape with France.

The French actively courted Carlos: Choiseul sought to bring off an interview between the Spanish King and Louis

XV : Carlos says of this " Tout cela est venu d'un discours innocent que ma femme eut un jour avec cet Ambassadeur de France, quand on crut qu'il (i.e. Ferdinand VI.) n'avoit que peu d'heures de vie, luy disent en ma présence que si ce cas là arrivoit, et que nous dussions passer par la France, elle esperoit que le roy ne luy nieroit pas la consolation de voire sa soeur, ce que l'Ambassadeur escrivi et comme elle est grosse, le roy fit tenir une consultation de médecins dans lequel ils jugèrent qu'il auroit été dangereux de l'exposer à un tel voyage, mes que le roy et le dauphin auroint souhaité me voire ou a Lion ou dans quelque autre lieu que je eusse voulu (Carlos to his Mother 1 May, 1759, *A.H.N.* 2777). D'Ossun actively pressed the view which Choiseul had ordered him to present, namely that England would fall upon Spain, after crushing France : he had so many private conferences with the King, that even the optimistic Bristol thought fit to mention them. (Bristol to Pitt, 1 December, 1760, *R.O.S.* 292).

Grimaldi, it appears, had instructions to be cautious; he tried to bluff, adopting in Paris the same language he had held about his departure at the Hague : " Venido aqui, he seguido y aun sigo el mismo lenguaje, pues para nuestro fin importa igualmente que lo crean estas gentes, como los estraños " . . . and, commenting on a letter of Choiseul, " y las palabras que V.S. observara en el papel, ' de concourir au succès des affaires dont Elle sera chargée,' me hizo temer que por el Marquès de Ossun tubiese este Ministro Francès algun antecedente de que tenia yo encargos á mas de los regulares y ordinarios." Of his conference with Choiseul he says " continuó con lo mismo que V.S. me refiere en su venerada carta principal de 14 de Enero, citando la ultima oferta hecha por el christianissimo al Rey neustro Sor. de suspender sus medidas para procurar la paz, si S.M. se determinaba (por su proprio interes, y para no dejar tan potentes en America los Ingleses) a unirse con la Francia ò desde luego ò dentro de un señalado termino; y concluyó diciendome que no habiendo recibido respuesta favorable havian empezado aqui à trabajar para lograr de qualquier modo la paz como lo havian

declarado al Rey: lo mismo que V.S. me dice; pero añadió el Duque, por consecuencia, que no nos podíamos pues quejar." (Grimaldi to Wall, 14 February, 1761, *A.H.N.* 4176).

This language and the overtures of peace made at the same time, had the desired effect. By April the form of the treaty was being discussed. Grimaldi was afraid that the French might conclude peace, but Choiseul reassured him: "dijé al Ministro Francès, que me parecia debía considerarse nuestra union bajo de dos miras, y puntos: uno venidero; y el otro presente. Que para el primero, y raciocinando segun la disposicion que manifestaba à los puntos de convenccion que le habia propuesto, me parecia que iríamos con felicidad, acuerdo, y bien al fin.

"Que para el presente era preciso explicarnos mejor, y ver bien qual fuesse el animo de su Corte, su disposicion y sus medidas. Que como se podía temer que nuestra union despertasse queja ó recelo en los Ingleses, que de ellas se viesse obligado el Rey á la guerra, era preciso se examinasse si su Corte estaba en animo y disposicion de continuarla.

"A este me replicó, y es bien cierto en vista de los antecedentes que nos constan, y de su conducta aqui que hé averiguado, que por su Consejo no tan solamente no haria la paz con la Inglaterra, teniendo el considerable apoyo y union de la España, pero que hubiera continuado solo la guerra aun otra campaña como lo compraba la oferta que nos hizo antes de empezar á negociar con sus aliados. Pero exclamó: soy Vasallo dependiente y no amo; y *añadió con visible sentimiento y no afectado que eran tales los gritos de todos los lados del Rey, y familia Real, que no se atrevia á esperar de poderlos vencer . . .* convendría, dijo, á la Francia facilitar para el tratado, pues siempre nos procuraria mejores condiciones para la paz; pero yo no pasaré adelante sin exponer la verdad, y sin tener palabra precisa y clara del Rey y del Delfin, con los quales sera entonces de mi cuenta obligar á los demas á callar." (Grimaldi to Wall, 14 April, 1761, *A.H.N.* 4176).

Grimaldi was to some extent reassured, but grew alarmed when he heard that the project of alliance had been com-

municated to the Council and had encountered considerable opposition. . . . “La razon por la qual ha resuelto de participar la negociacion al Consejo, no obstante su primera disposicion contraria, dice que ha provenido de dos motivos, el *uno* de no cargarse solo del odio y de las reconvenções que el Christianissimo y todos los demas le harian, si en vista de nuestro tratado ó por el motivo de mas diferencias con la Inglaterra, resultasse el deber continuar la guerra, ó dejar de seguir la negociacion de la paz mediante los principios ya adoptados.

“El *otro* que, como no depende solo de la ejecucion de lo que se conviniese, creia que los demas Ministros, y en particular el de la Marina, comprehendiessem bien las obligaciones en que se constituia cado uno y se hiciessen cargo de ellas para cumplirlas. . . . Me ha coutado que fueron unanimes las opiniones para el deseo, la utilidad, y aun la necesidad de una alianza con la España para los tiempos venideros, *pero que el Maréchal d'Estrées, el Marquès de Puysieulx, y Mr. Berryer Ministro de la Marina, representaron la necesidad que la Francia tenia de la paz, los passos ya adelantados para ella, y la impossibilidad ó á lo menos la suma dificultad de armar Navios y establecer la Marina en lo pronto y durante la guerra.*

“Propusieron estos tres Ministros de concebir el tratado, de modo que no obligasse para el momento presente ni la una ni la otra parte, y de dirigirle solo para después de hecha la paz. Añadio el Mariscal d'Estrées que se podia retardar hasta ver si las replicas de la Inglaterra á la ultima Memoria eran concluyentes: que en caso que de ellas se infriese una proxima disposicion sincera de los Ingleses á la paz, convendria limitar la alianza con la España hasta despues de la paz.” (Grimaldi to Wall, 28 April, 1761, *A.H.N.* 4176).

These were words of wisdom; but Choiseul stuck to his guns. He proposed the Secret Convention and presented it as if it were a sacrifice on the part of France: “notara V.S. que voluntariamente ofrecen ellos de unir su acomodo con los Ingleses al nuestro, sugetando el uno al otro, y dan como causa de esta sugecion que se impone desde luego una devida

reciprocidad en recompensa de la obligacion que assume el Rey de declarar la Guerra á los Ingleses el primero de Mayo del año que viene, si no se logra en este intermedio un ajuste razonable por las dos potencias. . . . me replicó el Duque de Choiseul que estaba muy bien, que lo referiria assi, que ya lo tenia dicho y que lo havia tambien escrito al Marquès de Ossun. *Pero que igualmente se picaron ellos de equidad y que no era justo, ni del interés de la Francia, que devia mirar tambien como propios los negocios y ventajas de la España, el dejar en esta ocasion pendientes sus disputos con la Inglaterra, y que esto era una debida reciprocidad que correspondia á la obligacion que assumiese la España.*" (Grimaldi to Wall, 2 June, 1761, A.H.N. 4176).

But at the same time, Choiseul was holding conferences with Stanley, the English envoy. (Grimaldi to Wall, 27 June) When the Spanish Ambassador expressed his willingness to sign both the Family Compact and the Secret Convention, Choiseul objected, saying that he might be obliged to make peace, so as to be able to crush the "Parlement." At the same time he suggested the cession of Louisiana to England. (Grimaldi to Wall, 14 July). This again alarmed Grimaldi, who thought that the Compact and Convention were slipping from him. (Grimaldi to Wall, 15 July). Pitt's reply to Bussy's memorial, which convinced Choiseul that England would not grant him peace on his own terms, decided the signature of both treaties: even the "peace party" of Puisieulx declared for war (Grimaldi to Wall, 1 August, 1761).

Thus had Choiseul worked the Alliance, and well might he say "*depuis que je suis en place, je vous jure que je n'ay rien signé qui me fasse autant de plaisir.*" (Choiseul to Grimaldi, 13 August, 1781. A.H.N. 4176).

B.—THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS.

MUCH has been said on both sides about the Jesuits. The violent opinion of Tanucci is repeated throughout his

correspondence. There were many who thought the same. The reaction against them was the inevitable result of their immense power. In Portugal the conspiracy against the King's life was attributed to them (see Sismondi vol. xxxix. pp. 221—225 and Cretineau Joly pp. 185—190). They were accused of having armed Damiens (Sismondi vol. xxix. p. 226). Voltaire is perhaps to a certain extent echoing the popular voice when he makes a priest say "Je me veux point me charger de l'âme d'un Jésuite, cela est trop scabreux," or when the Jesuit says "nous voulons dominer partout, je le confesse" (*Relation de la maladie, etc. . . . du Jésuite Bertier*).

The Jesuits were perhaps to a certain extent responsible for the seditious pamphlets which circulated in immense quantities: how far they were guilty we cannot say, nor what was shown to the King. (Theiner *Pont de Clement XIV.* p. 69). Coxe speaks of a forged letter from the General at Rome to the Provincial General in Spain. (Coxe vol. iv. p. 355). Amongst those who voted for the expulsion were several ecclesiastics. Carlos seems to have been satisfied that the Jesuites had conspired against him "bien sabemos que son capaces de todo, y nadie lo sabe major que yo que lo he experimentado; y sobre quanto me dices acerca de esto, me remito á lo que te tengo escrito y solo te diré, que cada día estoy más contento y satisfecho de lo hecho, pues siempre más veo la indispensable necesidad que habia de hacerlo," Carlos to Tanucci (16 June, 1767, Simancas 6057). The reasons were not published, but a letter of Roda to Tanucci (23 June, 1767) says "de todo resultó que los Jesuitas eran el principal ó unico fomento que atizaba el fuego por todas partes, indisponia los animos de toda clase de gentes, los separaba del amor y subordinacion al gobierno, imprimian y esparcian papeles y escritos sediciosos y contrarios á la autoridad real y a la Soberanía y sus legítimos derechos, predicaban contra Portugal y Francia en sus sermones al publico. . . . amenazaban desgracias y tragedias en tono de profecias antes, y despues, del tumulto. . . . murmaraban de todas las providencias del Gobierno, porque no tenian parte en ellas, y por ser contrarias á sus ideas y ventajas. Su mala

moral práctica en España é Indias, la relaxacion de sus costumbres, su sordido comercio, sus intrigas, sus manejos, y por fin todo quanto se ha escrito y publicado por los que la Compania supone emulos, y enemigos suios, se ha verificado y convencido con hechos y casos particulares modernos é innegables, sin necesidad de acudir á los muchos y enormes excesos de los tiempos pasados, ni de los Payses extranjeros." The letter further says that the Jesuits hate the House of Bourbon and are enemies of the Family Compact.

This is a declaration that Voltaire could have applauded. It relegates to the background the question of their complicity in the Madrid Riot which is at least not proved. It was felt that they *must* have fomented the Riot, *because* of their power and dislike of the Government: but the case against them was not strong enough: the Archives certainly contain no real proof of their guilt; only occasionally some vague accusation. (e.g. the case of Navarro). It is plain that the real reason for their expulsion is contained in the vague indications of Roda who resumes the opinion of many of the most distinguished men of the time: perhaps too Aranda thought their money would come in useful. The riches of the Jesuits were probably both a reason for the hatred they incurred and a cause of their expulsion. "It happened too that all the religious orders very cordially hate each other, and the Jesuits as the most rich and powerful are the most universally detested. . . . The calculations made here of the riches of the Society are too much hazarded to trouble Your Excellency with at present, however, it is certain that the royal Treasury will be much benefited by this expulsion, at a time that it stood in need of some extraordinary assistance." (*Devisme to Shelburne*, 13 April, 1767, *R.O.S.* 310).

In Naples much the same proceedings were gone through. The report of the Neapolitan Committee (with Tanucci as its moving spirit) to the young King is a corollary to the Spanish report, and serves still further to illustrate the question: "the Jesuites are thieves, they corrupt the young, hold pernicious views, (e.g. dicha corporacion. . . ha dicho que los Gentiles y los mahometanos podrian salvarse profesando de buena fe

sus doctrinas) have often murdered or tried to murder Kings," and finally the climax is reached in article 8. "Habiendo sido expulsados de sus estados por vuestro augusto padre y temiendo que V.M. va á quitarles el honor, no cabe duda de que llegada la ocasion intentarán algo contra la vida de V.M." (Simancas 6003). Mention should be made of the affair of the Bishop of Cuenca : it illustrates the feeling of dissatisfaction so prevalent at the time, and probably had some effect on the vital question of the following year. The Bishop of Cuenca wrote shortly after the Madrid Riot (15 April, 1766) to the royal confessor, Joachim Eleto, declaring that Spain was rushing to its ruin (que España corría á su ruina) nay, that it was already ruined (que ya estaba perdido el reino sin remedio humano) by the persecution of the church ; for her possessions were plundered, her ministers outraged and her immunities trampled under foot (saqueada en sus bienes, ultrajada en sus ministros, y atropellada en su inmunidad). The Confessor promptly communicated this intemperate missive to the King who ordered the Bishop to furnish explanations ; this he did in a letter to the King, founding his complaints upon various alleged excesses in connection with the contributions of the clergy and tithes (excusado y noiales), the concordat of 1737, the law of mortmain, the commandeering of horses for the conveying of corn, the right of asylum and other minor points.

The government took energetic measures against the refractory prelate : after the vigorous Requisitories of the two "fiscals" (civil and criminal) Campomanes and Moniño, the Council admonished the Bishop, who promised to behave better in future : (see "Expediente del Obispo de Cuenca" in vol. lix. of the *Autores Españoles*.) This affair may well have activated the Government against ecclesiastical discontent.

C.—THE ARMY.

THE military reforms of the reign somehow always seem amateur efforts. At the very beginning activity was displayed.

"All the officers belonging to the Land as well as the Marine, are directed to repair within two months to their destinations; indeed this order was necessary, for as there was but little discipline of any kind observed in the late reign, several of the military gentlemen had been absent from their corps for seven or eight years" (Bristol to Pitt, 25 February, 1760. *R.O.S.* 291). After the unhappy war with Portugal, all sorts of plans were set on foot. The difficulty was to find recruits both for the national and foreign regiments. As regards the first, the system of the *Quinta* should have filled the ranks, but the following were exempted: "the familiars and Ministers of the Inquisition, the Ministers of the Crusade Office, (*Cruzada*) those engaged in the tobacco trade, weavers of velvet, linen, canvas, hempen cloth, (*cañamo*) brothers and syndics of religious communities, the officers of the revenue and their acolytes, the Commissaries of the Brotherhoods, (*Santas Hermandades*) shepherds, the employés of the royal transport service, silk and wool manufacturers, mill hands, those who construct dikes and floor-timbers (*presas y perchas*) shearers and carders, employés of the '*gabelle*,' (*salinas*) saltpetre and gunpowder manufacturies: the owners of stud farms and their servants." These exemptions, together with many frauds and the practice of getting a doctor to give a certificate of ill-health, practically threw all the burden of military service on the peasant. A royal decree of the 9th of June, 1762, (*A.H.N.*) orders that all unmarried men of the classes enumerated above be comprehended in the "*Quinta*," including those who take the habit within the month immediately preceding it. Only the following are exempted, (1) the Bachelors of the Universities of Salamanca, Valladolid, Alcalá, Huesca, Cervera, Saragossa, Valencia, Santiago, Seville and Granada; (2) orphans of father and mother who support one or more unmarried sisters; (3) the only son of a poor father over 70 years of age; (4) unmarried men who cultivate their own land and are unable to leave it; (5) those who have already a brother in the army: they are however to be liable to replace him if he deserts; (6) Of two or more brothers living in the same province, the one living

nearest to his parents; (7) an unmarried man, who issues banns of marriage 15 days before the Quinta.

For the foreign regiments it was difficult to obtain men. The Walloons were mostly Frenchmen, deserters from the French army (see Morel Fatio's excellent sketch of the Spanish army in his *Etudes*, vol. ii.). Recruiting in Germany was becoming daily more difficult (Squillaci to Mahoni, 9 July, 1764, *A.H.N.* 2872). However, various schemes were proposed, e.g., a corps of 300 Hungarians (*A.H.N.* 2872), or again, the Prince of Hohenlohe and Wadenburg Schissimpfirt expressed his willingness to sell some of his subjects (*ibid*). The Imperial Envoy Plenipotentiary at the Ulm Congress made a formal complaint of the emigration of Germans, especially to Spain (speaking in particular of the colonisation of the Sierra Morena, *A.H.N.* 3731). The Imperial agents stopped recruits for the Spanish army, and in 1774 a whole detachment for the Walloon Guards was detained at Liège. (Grimaldi to Aranda, 26 May, 1774, *A.H.N.* 4068).

All these military reforms looked well on paper; in reality the do as you please system prevailed. Fernan Nuñez, writing in 1766 says, "A muchos oigo que el ejercito está perdido porque se han ido los quintos, y falta toda esa gente; pero si la que queda fuera como ellos, no havia que llorar, pues bastante gente tienen los regimientos en el día para tiempo de paz, en que por razon de economia puede llevarse esta falta, si huviera un methodo establecido para reemplazarla siempre que se quisiera; pero no creo verlo en mis días, porque otros que lo esperan, mucho tiempo hace, se han ido de este mundo con la expectativa solo." (Morel Fatio, vol. ii. p. 224).

Every English traveller of the time praises the Spanish soldier as a man, but criticises the discipline. "Their soldiers," says Swinburne, writing in 1775, "are brave, and patient of hardships; wherever their officers lead them they will follow without flinching, though it be up to the mouth of a battery of cannon; but unless the example be given them by their commander, not a step will they advance." (*Travels through Spain*, ed. 1779, p. 371). ". . . their uniforms are

ugly and ill made; the soldiers abominably nasty in their cloaths, and their black greasy hair seldom drest. Till very lately, they were commonly in rags, and often mounted guard with half a coat, and almost bare breeched; but now they are rather better clad, and kept in a somewhat more decent trim" (*Ibid.* pp. 25 26).

D.—THE ALGIERS EXPEDITION.

THE best account of the Algiers expedition is the *Diario de la expedicion contra Argel* of Fernan Nuñez, who took part in the enterprise (published in vol. ii. of the *Compendio Historico*, pp. 119—220). His criticisms are just. On the 25th of May all the convoy, with the troops on board, was assembled at Carthagena; they could not sail till the 23rd June; meanwhile the soldiers suffered from sea-sickness and ate up their provisions. Only 120 ships got out to sea on the 23rd, and reached the Bay of Algiers on the 30th June. The second part arrived on the 1st of July; they all anchored where they could, with the result that all was confusion when the troops were landed. From the 1st to the 8th of July there were orders and counter-orders, as follows. (1) Order of the 2nd July: the troops to land on the beach between the river Jarach and the town; the execution of this order deferred on the following day to the 4th. (2) Order of the 4th July, very confused, but probably meaning that the troops were to land in the bay of the "Mala Muger," better in some ways than the original plan. (3) Order of the 5th July: repeating No. 1, intended landing on the 7th. (4) The landing was not effected on the 7th, because (*a*) the foreign ship masters would not expose their boats to the Moorish artillery, alleging that their contract did not bind them to the risk; (*b*) the military commanders squabbled with the naval officers as to how the boats were to be distributed; (*c*) the boats were seized by those nearest to them, thus occasioning confusion. Meanwhile daylight came on and the enterprise was again deferred till the next day.

On the 8th the first division, numbering 8,000 men, was landed in the utmost confusion, the reserves, who were to have come on afterwards, getting mixed up with the main body. O'Reilly and all the generals accompanied this first division: owing to the general confusion the troops extended instead of forming up into columns, as was ordered. O'Reilly did nothing to correct this mistake. The division marched on against an invisible enemy, who inflicted great losses. Meanwhile the Moorish cavalry tried to outflank the Spanish troops, but was driven back by the guns of the fleet, etc. The losses were under 3000 men, but thirteen guns, two howitzers, and nearly all the baggage were left behind.

The Moors had early intimation of the Spanish armaments, and had been busy making guns under the direction of a Mr. Dupont. Two ships were sent to spy on the Spanish coasts; they brought back accurate information. ("Relacion de las cosas mas notables que con motivo de la guerra acaecieron en Argel desde principios de Marzo de 1775 hasta principios del presente de 76." *Acad. Hist. E.* 140).

They were thus fully prepared. Against an alert enemy of superior strength (probably about 30,000, although estimates of their forces rose as high as 200,000), and intrenched in a country peculiarly adapted to their mode of warfare, O'Reilly neglects the most obvious dictates of prudence; he himself tries to throw the responsibility of the disaster on the soldiers, who advanced without orders (*Gaceta de Madrid*, 18 July, 1775), but, although he landed with them, he did nothing to stop them (*Diario of Fernan Nuñez*). Besides the want of foresight exhibited in the initial preparations, the insufficient provisions—which were actually landed with the attacking force and had to be left behind, which fact above all made it imperative to return to Spain—and the ignorance of the most elementary rules of war which characterised the advance, are sufficient, without going further, to warrant us in pronouncing the whole affair a well deserved failure. There was besides nothing to justify an attack on such an extensive scale; writing long before the expedition sailed, Grantham says: ". . . everybody agrees that however de-

sirable such an object may be for Spain, it will be obtained at an exorbitant rate—that the orders given on this occasion are too extensive, and that the greatest mismanagement possible attends the execution of them. This, and the bad state of Naval Reports from Ferrol, and confirmed, as I am well informed, from the Southern parts of this kingdom, make this African war (end as it will) a very heavy burthen on the country, and the preparations already made have exhausted the treasuries of the several provinces where they are making, to the detriment even of the troops in them, whose pay is become due for a long time, above three months more than usual” (Grantham to Rochford, 16 March, 1775, *R.O.S.* 335).

E.—THE INEFFICACY OF THE FAMILY COMPACT.

THE correspondence of the period explains the whole question and needs no commentary. Carlos continually complains of England and urges the necessity of preparation: “Les Anglais d'autre côté nous inquietent toujours; leur ambition n'est pas satisfaite, si ils ne nous dépouillent entièrement du commerce, et des richesses des Indes; notre union intime et nos plus grands efforts dans l'augmentation de notre marine, peut seule mettre une barrière á leurs projets; il est constant que du sort de la première guerre qu'ils nous forceront de faire, dépendra la consistance et la considération de nos monarchies: persuadé de cette vérité je mets tous mes soins à l'augmentation de la Marine, et je suis toujours fâché du temps qu'exige cette opération: qu'il me soit permis de rappeler à V.M. cette nécessité d'une nombreuse marine dans le système présent d'Europe (Carlos to Louis XV. 2 March, 1768, *A.H.N.* 2850). At the same time the Spanish Ministers busily elaborated plans of war, which prove conclusively their incompetence as strategists: e.g. Grimaldi formed the following plan:—

In 1768, France and Spain will have	116 ships,	70 frigates.
„ „ England	„ „ 120	„ 80 „

The plan of war will be as follows:—

- Spain* (1) At Ferrol, 34 ships and 12 frigates.
 (2) In Galicia, 20,000 men ready to embark.
 (3) At Cadiz, 14 ships and 8 frigates with 8,000 troops.
 (4) At Carthagena, 7 ships with troops in proportion.
 (5) A squadron of 4 ships in American waters.
- France* (1) At Brest, 40 ships, 20 frigates, 40,000 men.
 (2) At Toulon, 12 ships, 10 frigates, 10,000 men.
 (3) 16 ships and 10 frigates in American waters.

England will require 80 ships for home defence and at least 20 will be needed to keep the peace in the Mediterranean. Thus 20 only will be available for America. *These 20 would not dare to attack the French fleet of 16 ships, for if they were beaten, America would be at the mercy of the French.* Later on 20 French ships from Brest will sail to America with troops, eluding the English by threatening to land in Ireland. They will join the 16 already out and the whole fleet will make an attack on Jamaica. If the English send reinforcements to America, they will expose their coasts and we can invade England. If they do not send reinforcements, Jamaica will be captured and the expedition can then sail to and conquer Florida (Dictamen del Marquès de Grimaldi en 1766, sobre guerra con los Ingleses, *A.H.N.* 2858). Most of the other "dictámenes" are just as childish.

Although war was desired, yet from the beginning the Spanish Court felt that they had gone too far, as Versailles showed no desire to help Spain. Bucarelli was ordered to keep silent, and the Spanish Ambassador in London said "he had good reason to believe H.C.M.'s Governor of Buenos Ayres had taken upon him to make use of force" (Weymouth to Harris, 12 September, 1770, *R.O.S.* 320). Grimaldi protested, that he had no desire to make war, "we have so little to get and so much to lose by a war, that nothing but the last necessity could reduce us to so violent a measure" (Harris to Weymouth, 28 September, 1770, *R.O.S.* 320). At the same time he insinuated that France would back Spain up (Same to same, 11 October).

At last Carlos wrote himself to Louis (22 December, 1770, A.H.N. 2850). . . . “ Au sujet de la guerre dont les Anglois nous menacent, je suis bien plus flatté de reconnaître que les dispositions de V.M. partent de l'amitié et du coeur, que des obligations des traités et de la propre convenance, quelque clair et evidente que les uns et l'autre puissent être ; mais que V.M. me permette d'entrer un peu en matière sur l'affaire présente pour lui faire le retour sincère de mes sentiments pour sa Personne, et la justification de ma conduite depuis la dernière paix ; connoissant combien V.M. désiroit la conservation de la paix, et sentant l'avantage qu'elle procuroit à nos royaumes, j'ay non seulement dissimulé une infinité d'événements injustes et contraires aux traités et aux droits des gens de la part des Anglois, mais j'ay eu le plus grand soin d'éloigner tout prétexte à cette nation de nous chercher querelle, ne prenant même aucune résolution qui pût induire de loin un pretexte aux Anglois de nous faire la guerre sans la consulter auparavant avec V.M. et en avoir son aprobation ; tel a été l'ordre que je donnois en 1768, à l'égard des établissemens que les Anglois cherchoient à faire dans l'Amérique Méridionale : *il fut trouvé convenable et nécessaire par V.M. et par son Ministère* et sur le consentement que j'en reçus il fut expédié ; c'est pourtant cet ordre même qui cause la querelle présente ou qui sert de prétexte : informé, comme j'étois, que V.M. et ses Ministres craignoient de commencer une guerre, il n'y a eu d'expédient que je n'aye adopté pour satisfaire l'orgueil Anglois, jusqu'à aller même au delà de ce que l'honneur et la dignité d'une couronne auroit du permettre. Je pense même que cette foiblesse qu'on marquoit a contribué peut être à rendre le Ministère Anglois plus difficile. Rien n'a suffi, comme V.M. a esté informée. On veut en Angleterre une bassesse qui nous déshonore, qui décrédite nos puissances dans le monde, et, ce qui est très apparent, *tirer cet avantage dans le moment pour en faire son profit d'ici à peu de tems pour des querelles qui seront plus directes de V.M. et de ses sujets relativement aux affaires du Levant* : si ce n'étoit pas pour un projet pareil, comment le Roy d'Angleterre se seroit-il engagé dans sa harangue à continuer les frais immenses de ses

armements, quand même l'affaire des Malouines seroit accomodée? *Mais puisque malgré cela les Ministres de V.M. croient, suivant ce qu'ils ont fait connoître à mon Ambassadeur, qu'il faut passer par dessus ces considérations, ne s'arrêtant qu'au moment, sans songer à un avenir prochain, je suis toujours exposé à tel expédient d'accomodement qui ne blessera pas directement l'honneur et la dignité. . . .*"

Louis wrote on the 21st December, 1770: ". . . Votre Majesté n'ignore pas combien l'esprit d'indépendance et de fanatisme s'est répandu dans mon royaume. La douceur et la patience m'ont conduit jusqu'à présent: mais poussé à bout et mes Parlements s'oublant jusqu'à oser me disputer l'autorité souveraine que nous ne tenons que de Dieu, je suis résolu de me faire obéir par toutes les voies possibles. Dans cette situation la guerre seroit un mal affreux pour moy, et pour mes peuples, mais ma tendresse extrême pour V.M. l'union intime et parfaite qui régne entre nous, cimentée par notre pacte de famille, me fera toujours tout oublier quand il s'agira de ses interests. Mes ministres ne sont que mes organes, ainsy quand je me croy obligé d'en changer, il n'est pas à craindre que cet événement puisse déranger en rien nos affaires, et tant que j'existeray, V.M. peut compter sur moy comme je compte sur elle. *Avec cela si V.M. peut faire quelque sacrifice pour conserver la paix, sans blesser son honneur, ella rendra un grand service au genre humain et à moy en particulier en ce momen*i cy (A.H.N. 2850).

This was refusing to help Spain. Carlos had to give in, but he criticised Louis' conduct. ". . . Par le même principe, je fairay surement tout ce qui sera possible pour éviter la guerre: mon Ambassadeur informera V.M. des ordres nouveaux que j'envois, afin qu'on tache d'acomoder l'affaire actuelle avec l'Angleterre si il est possible; mais je crains que ces mêmes circonstances de la France qui nous determinent à beaucoup de sacrifices et que l'Angleterre n'ignore pas, ne la porte à vouloir absolument la guerre; *c'est pourquoi il eût été heureux de pouvoir diférer la juste résolution de V.M. vis à vis des Parlements jusques à passer ce moment si critique;* et je suis bien fâché aussi, par la même raison,

que le Duc de Choiseul ait déplu à V.M. dans ce moment cy, puisque nos ennemis jugeront, quoique sans fondement, que comme il a été l'instrument du Pacte de Famille, son éloignement du Ministère puisse amener du refroidissement entre les deux couronnes, que c'est à quoi ils aspirent depuis longtemps: j'expose à V.M. ce que je pense avec sincérité." (Carlos to Louis, 2 January, 1771, *A.H.N.* 2850).

Louis wrote explaining: "Le Marquis d'Ossun doit avoir déjà mis sous les yeux de V.M. l'état actuel de ma Marine, et celui des mesures que je prends pour en augmenter la force et l'activité; nous n'avons besoin que de gagner du temps pour assurer nos succès. Je suis frappé de la vraisemblance des vues que V.M. suppose à l'Angleterre pour se combiner avec la Russie; ce sera toujours avoir dérangé leur projet que de leur ôter le prétexte qu'ils cherchent pour commencer la guerre. Les deux premières escadres Russes doivent être en bien mauvais état, et la troisième attend à Mahon la belle saison. A l'égard de celle que le Ministre de V.M. à Petersbourg mande qu'on prépare, il n'est pas possible qu'elle puisse entrer dans la Méditerranée de tout le courant de cette année: ainsi leur jonction avec les Anglais ne doit pas nous faire rien craindre, surtout quand nos forces maritimes seront en bon état, comme elles le seront sûrement dès que nous en aurons besoin par les ordres que nous avons donnés et que nous continuerons de donner" (24 January, 1771, *A.H.N.* 2850). He promised to prepare vigorously for the next war: "La conciliation de l'affaire des isles Malouines me cause la plus grande satisfaction. V.M. scait dans quelle vue je désirois le succès de cette négociation. Le Pce. de Masseran s'y est conduit de façon à mériter l'approbation de Votre Mté. L'accomodement qu'il a signé nous assure la continuation de la paix, au moins pour quelque temps: c'est nous donner les moyens de soutenir la guerre avec avantage si les circonstances la déterminoient. Ce calme ne doit rien diminuer de notre attention sur les combinaisons de l'Angleterre avec la Russie, et c'est contre les suites de ce concert que doivent se tourner tous nos efforts: je vay redoubler ceux que j'ay déjà faits pour me mettre de plus en plus en état

d'agir efficacement dans l'occasion ; ce sera le fruit de la déférence que V.M. a eue pour mes sentiments " (27 January, 1771, *A.H.N.* 2850).

Carlos was not quite satisfied : he repeated his opinion on the necessity of increasing the navy (Carlos to Louis XV., 10 March, 1771), and gave so much unsolicited advice that Louis asked him in polite terms to mind his own business. (Louis to Carlos, 18 October, 1771). Carlos apologised : " Je n'ay jamais pensé ni pu penser à prendre la moindre part ni à m'ingérer d'aucune façon sur ce que V.M. juge convenable de régler par rapport à l'administration intérieure de sa cour ou de son royaume : je la prie bien d'en être convaincue car je connois plainement la délicatesse de cet article, et je suis bien fâché qu'on aye voulu donner une interprétation de cette nature à une recommandation très circonspecte que j'osois faire à V.M. en faveur du Duc de Choiseul, et qui n'avoit jamais porté que sur l'indulgence de V.M." (Carlos to Louis, 28 October, 1771, *A.H.N.* 2850).

The indignation in Spain against France was very great. " The little share the Court of France takes in the present dispute, and the imperious manner in which it has treated this nation, has rendered its alliance more odious than ever to the Spaniards. They use no bounds in decrying the French and friendship of the French." (Harris to Weymouth, 26 November, 1770, *R.O.S.* 320).

